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ABSTRACT
REGULATING CAPITALISM: THE TAYLOR SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
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This dissertation studies the emergence of a Keynesian
political-economic strategy in America during the interwar
period. It is concerned primarily with one crucial aspect of
this process: the ideological role played by key political,
economic, and managerial elites in the emergence of such
strategy. It thus traces the political discourse articulated
by the Taylor Society, the institutional home of scientific
management, from its inception as an industrial research
organization to its development as an important policy-making
network during the New Deal. It focuses on key figures in
the Taylor Society including Morris L. Cooke, Harlow S.
Person, Henry Dennison, and Mary Van Kleeck, as well as those
who were closely associated with the society, such as Rexford
G. Tugwell, Louis D. Brandies, George Soule, Frances Perkins,
and Sidney Hillman.
The historical narrative shows how during the 1930s the
Taylor Society became an important component of the political
and economic network that put forward a Keynesian strategy
based on the expansion of mass consumption (and thus social
purchasing power) via the intervention of the state . This
network was critical of the corporatist program, embodied in
the National Recovery Administration, in which that state
would sanction cartel-like arrangements among capitalists to
reduce destructive competition, restrict production, and fix
prices. This system of industrial self-regulation entailed
minimal state intervention and a reduced role for the unions
vi
and the collective bargaining. The Keynesian strategy
advanced by the Taylor Society and its allies, on the other
hand, advocated an expanded and strong role for the state and
unions in the political economy, along with macroeconomic
policies that promoted social purchasing power and expanded
mass consumption.
During the "Second New Deal" the Keynesian elite entered
the corridors of power and many of its members took key
administrative positions in the welfare state. From these
positions they attempted to shape the American political
economy
.
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CHAPTER I
THE TAYLOR SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Introduction
"We are all post-Keynesians now, " states Albert
Hirschman, paraphrasing and updating a famous
pronouncement. 1 In doing so, Hirschman calls our attention
to one of the most profoundly important developments in the
history of twentieth-century U.S. capitalism: the rise and
decline of the political-economic configuration called
Keynesianism. Strictly speaking, the concept of
Keynesianism refers to the economic theory of demand
management developed by English economist John Maynard
Keynes. According to Peter A. Hall, this economic theory,
as expressed in Keynes' The General Theory of Employment.
Interest and Money published in 1936, "suggested that
government could influence overall levels of growth and
employment in the economy by means of a strategy based on
aggregate demand." As such, it provided an alternative to
the existing approaches of laissez-faire or direct state
control of the economy that policy makers faced during the
interwar period.
2
However, during the postwar period, as Keynes' ideas
became closely associated with the transformation of the
1
state, Keynesianism acquired a broader connotation. As
Hall puts it:
Like the concepts of Karl Marx... the ideas of John
Maynard Keynes seem quintessential to a historical
period. They are closely associated with a major
transformation in the economic role of the state
that is one of the hallmarks of this century.
Although Keynes was by no means responsible for the
expansion of the welfare state that is sometimes
linked to his name, his theories placed increasing
responsibility for economic performance on the
government's shoulders, and his attacks on the
priority which classical economics attached to a
balance budget helped to loosen a fiscal constraint
that stood in the way of more generous social
programs. In these respects, to study the emerging
influence of Keynesian ideas is to consider many of
the factors behind the development of the state
since the 1920s. 3
Thus, the notion of a "Keynesian state" or of a "Keynesian
era" refers more generally to the social and economic
practices associated with the management of a capitalist
economy in the postwar period. 4
It is in this broader and more general way that I will
use "Keynesianism" here to refer not to a formal
theoretical system, but to denote a political-economic
perspective concerned above all with expanding mass
consumption via the intervention of the state. In
particular, I will apply the concept of "Keynesian" in this
broad sense to those interwar ideas or policies that
despite having been developed parallel to, or separate from
Keynes' writings, expressed basically the same political-
2
economic perspective as the one developed by Keynes. In
addition, I will use "proto-Keynesian" to describe the
strategies that anticipated parts of the Keynesian
perspective and, especially, many of its relevant policy
implications. My concern, then, is not with the
development of a specific economic doctrine, but rather
with the understanding of a political-economic strategy
that came to be known retrospectively as Keynesianism
.
5
Finally, it should be noted that throughout this work
I will draw upon the theoretical framework developed by
Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer and other
French political economist s--called the "regulation
school. "6 As Bob Jessop points out, this theoretical
framework is particularly concerned with the changing forms
and mechanisms— institutions, networks, procedures and
norms--in which and through which the social reproduction
of capitalism is secured, albeit in a temporary and partial
way. 7 Specifically, I will make use (either explicitly or
implicitly) of the two key concepts developed by this
theoretical school: "regime of accumulation" and "mode of
regulation." The first refers to a particular
configuration of production and consumption:
...which can be reproduced over time despites its
conflictual tendencies/" whereas the second
designates a set of historically determined
institutional forms "which can secure capitalist
3
reproduction [for a given period] despite the
conflictual and antagonistic character of capitalist
social relations. 8
As stated above, this study is concerned primarily
with the emergence of a Keynesian political-economic
strategy. It contends that this strategy emerged in the
interwar period as a response to the crisis of the Great
Depression. This crisis came about because the prevailing
mode of regulation, a fundamentally competitive and
laissez-faire form, had become antiquated and was harmful
to the emergent regime of intensive accumulation, which,
following Gramsci, has been called Fordism. 9 It seems
clear, in retrospect, that the way out of the crisis was to
devise a new mode of regulation (i.e. a new set of
political, institutional, and social arrangements such as
the capital-labor accord, the social wage and others) , that
would support the expansion of Fordism and hence the
articulation between mass production and mass consumption.
The new mode of regulation devised was a Keynesian mode of
regulat ion--based on the increased economic power of the
state, collective bargaining and rising consumption .norms
.
*
Central to this new mode of regulation was the
transformation of the role of the state, that is, the use
of the state to stimulate mass consumption and economic
growth through fiscal and monetary policy. 10
4
The rise of the Keynesian mode of regulation, however,
was not a preordained development in the political economy
of twentieth-century U.S. capitalism. Nor was it the
product of some capitalist "conspiracy" to "co-opt"
workers. It was, rather, the outcome of almost two decades
(1933-1950) of monumental economic, political, and
ideological struggles involving conflicts not just between
workers and capitalists, but also between different groups
of economic elites and between contending networks of
policymakers. 11 The rise of the Keynesian mode of
regulation then was the outcome of the projects and
struggles of real people trying to cope with changing
historical circumstances. As such, it was the product of a
host of profound conflicts, which were resolved in a way
that produced wide disparities between intentions and
consequences. As Jessop indicates, modes of regulation
(and regimes of accumulation) are "discovered" rather than
planned; they emerge in a contingent, non-intentional
manner
There is no global subject to plan accumulation
strategies, regulatory mechanisms, or hegemonic
projects and to guarantee their successful
implementation. Instead we find only different
subjects whose activities are more or less co-
ordinated, whose activities meet more or less
resistance from other forces, and whose strategies
are pursued within a structural context which is
• •19both constraining and facilitating. 1 ^
5
It took a major capitalist crisis (the Great
Depression of the 1930s) and the subsequent wartime
mobilization effort to force the creation of this new mode
of regulation. Once in place, however, Keynesianism
promptly contributed to the stability of U.S. capitalism by
creating the macro-economic conditions which enabled
Fordism to become a fully-fledged regime of accumulation.
This process led to the long postwar boom of consumer
capitalism, which lasted until 1973. During that period,
U.S. capitalism experienced unprecedented growth and
prosperity, rising living standards, and relative
stability. 13 A key indicator of the phenomenal growth and
prosperity of the postwar period was the expansion of mass
consumption norms to broader and broader sections of the
working class. Underlying this expansion of mass
consumption was the deployment of Keynesian policies, which
linked wages to productivity through a capital-labor
accord, promoted the growth of the social wage, and
expanded the facilities of consumer credit. 14
The consolidation of the postwar Fordist-Keynesian
mode of development thus led to a profound transformation
of the conditions of life for a large section of the U.S.
working class. First, it entailed the development of a
mode of consumption characterized by the individual
consumption of commodities provided by mass production
6
(i.e. by mass consumption of standardized commodities).
According to Michel Aglietta:
...this involved a reversal both of traditional ways
of life and of the initial experience of the working
class in an epoch of extreme poverty and total
insecurity, which provided no basis for any
stabilization of consumption habits." 15
The development of this mode of consumption, moreover,
enabled growing sectors of the working class to purchase
cars, housing, and consumer durables (televisions, washing
machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, stereos,
toasters, etc.). This process, as Mike Davis points out,
raised perhaps a quarter of the American population--
especially white-ethnic semi-skilled workers and their
families--to consumption standards previously enjoyed by
middle-class or skilled workers, standards marked by home
ownership and credit purchasing. And in doing so, "it
allowed the U.S. working class increasingly to reproduce
itself as a collectivity of privatized consumers ." 1 ^
Second, it also entailed a vast spatial
transformation, which is best exemplified by the rapid
growth of suburbanization, the diffusion of an extensive
network of highways, and the emergence of fast-food
restaurants and shopping malls as the central features of
the so-called "American way of life." Indicative of this
7
transformation is the fact that between 1950 and 1960,
suburbs grew forty times faster than central city areas,
while automobile registration increased by 22 million. 17
Suburbanization involved the breakup of traditional
solidarities, neighborhood communities, and extended kin
networks; and it ensured that the nuclear family would
become the social institution most congruent with the dual
process of commodizat ion and privatization of
consumption
.
1 &
This transformation, however, did not take place
exclusively through the private market. It was made
possible, rather, by the federal government's post-World
War II urban (or better yet suburban) policy, which
included highway building under the Federal Interstate and
National Defense Act of 1956 and home ownership (federal
home loans, and tax relief for mortgages) under FHA, VA,
FNMA, HLBB, and other agencies. !9 Thus, by providing
supportive conditions for higher levels of private mass
consumption, the Keynesian state played a key role in the
development of the "auto-house-electrical-appliance
complex" as the mainspring of economic growth during the
postwar period. 20
The "success" of postwar capitalism led some to
believe that the "consumer society" had definitely resolved
8
the social and economic contradictions of capitalism.
However, those who emphasized the "success" of postwar
capitalism completely ignored the existence of the social
sectors who were excluded (minorities, women and the
underprivileged) from the benefits of Fordism.
Furthermore, they also overlooked abundant signs of
discontent with Fordism even at its peak. As David Harvey
points out, Fordism's inequalities produced serious social
tensions and important social movements on the part of
those excluded from its benefits: "Denied access to
privileged work in mass production, large segments of the
work-force were equally denied access to the much-touted
joys of mass consumption. This was a sure formula for
discontent. The civil rights movement in the United States
spilled over into revolutionary rage that shook the inner
cities. The surge of women into low-paying jobs was
accompanied by an equally vigorous feminist movement. And
the shock of discovery of awesome poverty in the midst of
growing affluence (as exposed by Michael Harrington's The
Other America ) spawned strong countermovements of
discontent with the supposed benefits of Fordism." 21
Toward the midl970s, the Fordist-Keynesian mode of
development plunged into crisis, and with this crisis the
long postwar boom came to an end. 22 The crisis of this
political-economic configuration opened a period of
transition characterized by radical changes in the labor
process, in consumer habits, in the geographical mobility
of capital, in the form and content of state intervention,
and in cultural-ideological trends. But as David Harvey
argues, "whether or not the new systems of production and
marketing, characterized by more flexible labor processes
and markets, of geographical mobility and rapid shifts in
consumption practices, warrant the title of a new regime of
accumulation, and whether the revival of entrepreneurialism
and of neo-conservatism, coupled with the cultural turn to
postmodernism, warrant the title of a new mode of
regulation, is by no means clear. "23 what does seem clear
is that since 1973 the political economy has been in major
transformation. And in the process, we are witnessing the
unraveling of the Keynesian political-economic order that
emerged in the 1930s and was consolidated in the post-World
War II period. We are witnessing the end of an era.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of
economic policy. To paraphrase Robert Boyer, if the
principal debate in the 1970s was between Keynesianism and
monetarism, in the 1980s neo-liberalism reigned supreme.
At present, the debate seems to be reduced to which of the
variants of neo-liberalism (conservative, centrist, or
10
social democratic) will prevail. In practice, neo-
liberalism has involved the deployment of a program
characterized by emphasis on deregulation^ and disengagement
of the state from economic activity (including the
dismantling of state-sponsored social programs and the
privatization of the public sector)
. As such it has become
much more than a mere ideology that exalts the virtue of
the market economy. it has become the spearhead of a
political strategy aimed at displacing "welfare-state
liberalism" with a laissez-faire, free-market economic
model. Gone are the days when even conservative
governments were willing to increase public spending and
social insurance coverage, when even Richard Nixon boldly
proclaimed, "We are all Keynesians now." Today, state
intervention is denounced everywhere as an intolerable
obstruction to "the freedom of the market," to "growth" and
"prosperity." 24 As Hirschman suggests, we have come full
circle: "We are all post-Keynesians now."
The Taylor Society and Interwar Political Economy
If the Keynesian order is dead, perhaps it is
pertinent to retrace its beginnings to shed light on the
birth of the "new order." My purpose here is not to write
a history of the past in terms of the present, but rather
11
to use the past to further our understanding of the
present. I hope to contribute to this understanding by
examining the ideological role played by key political,
technocratic, and managerial elites in the emergence of the
Keynesian mode of regulation. In particular, I will focus
on the political discourse articulated by the Taylor
Society, an industrial research organization and policy-
discussion network, which sought during the interwar period
to chart the future of the American political economy.
Born in 1911 and composed primarily by management-
engineers and businessmen, the Taylor Society was the
institutional home of the scientific management movement
founded by Frederick W. Taylor. Before World War I, the
Taylor Society was concerned exclusively with the technical
problems of factory production and the reorganization of
the labor process. After the War, however, the Taylor
Society would address the problem of industrial relations
by advocating a conception of industrial democracy based on
"workers' consent" and "union-management cooperation"
schemes. This shift in policy led to a rapprochement with
the American Federation of Labor during the 1920s. In the
interwar period, moreover, the Taylor Society would develop
into an important policy-making network concerned with the
problems of the macroeconomy and the state. ^5
12
This dissertation traces the relationship between the
Taylor Society and American political economy. it attempts
to show how during the interwar period the Taylor Society
became a key forum in which an important group of mass
consumption-oriented businessmen, engineers, and social
scientists, sought to sketch the outlines of a
fundamentally "Keynesian" mode of regulation. My
contention is that the Taylorites were part of a
"professional-managerial" elite, who by the early 1930s
came to espouse a "Keynesian" strategy focused on expanding
mass consumption (and thus social purchasing power) via the
intervention of the state. Such a political-economic
strategy, according to its proponents, would lead to full
employment, economic growth, and prosperity. 26 Formed in
the 1920s, this professional-managerial elite came to the
corridors of power during the Second New Deal, when many of
its members became key administrators of the "welfare
state . "
Underlying my contention is the understanding that
although Keynes' ideas had no direct influence on policy in
the United States until perhaps 1938 or 1939, "Keynesian"
ideas were much part of public discourse before the mid-
19303. Consequently, we ought to take this neglected
historical development more seriously than has been the
13
case so far. 27 This study thus acknowledges the importance
of ideas in political economy. However, it also recognizes
that simply stating that ideas are important is not enough.
What matters is to be able to explain why one set of ideas
has more force than another in a given historical moment.
And in order to accomplish this we need to examine not only
the ideas themselves, but also the social political, and
economic conditions that lend force to one set of ideas
over another in a particular historical context. 28 This
dissertation attempts to address such questions.
To summarize, this dissertation uses the Taylor
Society as a vehicle to study the emergence of a
"Keynesian" strategy during the interwar period. As such,
it focus on key figures in the Taylor Society including
Morris Cooke, Harlow S. Person, Henry Dennison, and Mary
van Kleeck, as well as those who were closely associated
with the Society, such as Felix Frankfurter, Sidney
Hillman, Rexford G. Tugwell, Frances Perkins, and George
Soule.29 i trace the Society and its members into the
1930s, moreover, to understand their relationship to the
New Deal itself. Finally, I explore the role played by the
Society and its members in the emergence of the post-World
War II Keynesian order.
14
Contending Political-Economic Strategies
This study attempts to shed light not only on the
beginnings of the post-war Keynesian order, but perhaps
more important on the transition to a post-Keynesian era.
My analysis is based on a non-teleological conception of
capitalist development in which human agency plays a
central role and in which history is understood as an open-
ended process. This conception rejects the "conspiracy"
model of history in which all historical outcomes
consciously serve the interests of the capitalist class.
My point of departure is the recognition that the
history of capitalism is the product of economic,
political , and ideological struggles
,
involving conflicts
not just between workers and capitalists, but also between
different fractions of capital . Underlying my analysis is
the understanding that the New Deal was not the creation of
a class -conscious monolithic capitalist class, that sought
to deliberately "incorporate" the working class into its
"design" for a new industrial state, to save American
capitalism. Instead, I will argue that the emergence of
the New Deal should be understood as the result of the
conjunction of working class struggles "from below" and
"reforms from above." The fact that in the long-run the
New Deal reforms did indeed contribute to the stability and
expansion of capitalism was not pre-determined by some
"deep logic .of capitalist accumulation/" it was determined
15
rather by the resolution of specific political struggles
between contending social forces in a given historical
conjuncture
.
Another key assumption that informs this study is the
recognition that there were contending political-economic
strategies within the capitalist class. In particular, I
will focus on the differences between the corporatist and
the "Keynesian" strategies. As Steve Fraser points out,
the corporatist strategy was promoted by a more traditional
group of capitalists concentrated in railroads, public
utilities, primary commodities, and raw materials. This
sector was linked to older investment banking houses which
emerged after the Civil War and had long dominated the
Republican Party. It was a business elite plagued by over-
production, older technologies, foreign competition, and
great debt. The corporatist strategy endorsed by this
sector envisioned deploying the state to sanction a system
of industrial self-regulation, which would create cartel-
like arrangements to stabilize production, fix prices, and
divide the market. Its basic thrust was best exemplified
by the NRA. Yet, the NRA represented a compromise between
those who were still committed to non-interventionist
alternatives and those who favored some form of state
intervention
.
30
The "Keynesian" strategy, on the other hand, was
advanced by a network of manufacturing, retailing, and
16
financial interests more directly linked to mass
consumption than those who were most closely associated
with corporatism. According to Fraser, this network of
newer, mass consumption-oriented industries included urban
mass retailers like Filene's and Macy's; real estate
developers; investment banks like Lehman Brothers and
Goldman, Sachs; mass consumption-oriented banks such as
Bank of America and the Bowery Savings Bank; and industries
like clothing, housing construction and supplies,
appliances, and office goods. 31 This capitalist sector-
together with other technocratic, managerial, and political
elites--was concerned above all with expanding mass
consumption via the intervention of the state. Their
strategy thus envisioned a more autonomous and active role
for the state (and the unions) in regulating and
stimulating the growth of the economy. During the interwar
period the Taylor Society--in alliance with other
institutional networks such as the Russell Sage Foundation,
the Twentieth Century Fund and the Pollack Foundation for
Economic Research, which was associated with
underconsumpt ionist economists Wadill Catchings and William
T. Foster—provided a forum for the development of this
"Keynesian strategy. 32
17
Interwar Political Economy: An Overview
Given the centrality of the interwar period to the
unfolding of this study, it is helpful to provide at least
a brief overview of the political economy of the period so
as to place the development of the Taylor Society in a
specific historical context. During the 1920s the American
economy experienced an unprecedented growth in
productivity. Such growth resulted in an almost 50 per
cent increase in industrial production between 1918 and
1928, while the workforce actually declined by 6 per cent. 33
The nature and extent of this advance was such that some
scholars considered it nothing less than a "second
industrial revolution." According to Ewan Clague in 1926:
There is taking place in the United States today a
new industrial revolution which may far exceed in
economic importance that older industrial revolution
ushered in by the series of mechanical inventions
which occurred in England in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, and which eventually transformed
English industrial, political and social life. Many
people today are aware that great improvements in
machinery, processes, management, and output are
taking place; but except for a few magazine articles
from time to time, very little has been done to
express this advance in productive efficiency in
comprehensive terms. Some people have hesitated to
accept as typical of industrial production as a
whole the surprising figures of improved output in
particular plants or establishments. And yet, even
when we deal in mass figures, the facts stand out
clearly and unmistakably. We are at the present
time experiencing what is perhaps the most
remarkable advance in productive efficiency in the
history of the modern industrial system.... 34
However, this revolutionary transformation of
production was not accompanied by a concomitant expansion
18
of social purchasing power. Mary Van Kleeck, the Director
of the Department of Industrial Studies of the Russell Sage
Foundation, acknowledged this problem as early as 1926:
Mass production seems to be a very stable thing, andyet with all its economic ramifications it is an
extremely sensitive machine. The gap is wide
between the production of goods and the purchase of
them, and in that gap is the whole process of
distribution of income. In the delicate financial
process of distributing income the same economic
system which is producing such masses of goods fails
somehow to get enough income into the hands of the
people for whom those goods are produced .... No
longer is the danger so serious that it will not be
possible to produce enough to feed and clothe
people, but we are not yet distributing what we
produce so as to feed and clothe and house everybody
adequately
.
35
As a result of this situation, Van Kleeck concluded, "the
customers who are to buy the goods have not enough money in
their pockets to purchase the quantity produced." This, in
turn, was a major cause of "the slumps in the business
cycle" and the concomitant rise in unemployment. 36
During this period the purchasing power of the working
class failed to increase significantly. As Mike Davis puts
it, "during the first great consumer-durable boom of the
1920s, the majority of the semi-skilled industrial working
class remained trapped in poverty-level incomes, unable to
participate in the hoopla of car and house buying." 37 Who
benefited, then, from "the prosperity" of the twenties?
Charles Holt's research revels "the prosperity of the
twenties was a prosperity of the few but not of the many."
As such, these results are consistent with Irving
19
Bernstein's contention: "The twenties were, indeed golden,
but only for a privileged segment of the American
population This was a society in imbalance and workers
enjoyed few of its benefits. "38 This imbalance--the
imbalance between workers' capacity to produce and their
capacity to consume--eventually led to the crisis of
underconsumption of the thirties. 39
The rise of Taylorism and Fordism contributed to the
outbreak of the interwar economic crisis in the United
States. 40 For while the Taylorist and Fordist revolutions
were a contributing factor to an unprecedented rise in
productivity, and to a spectacular increase in the rate of
profit, they could not resolve the problem of coordinating
effective demand to rising productivity. 41 They couldn't
resolve this problem, among other reasons, because
Taylorism and Fordism were a "micro" approach to a "macro"
problem: the regulation of the wage relation. 42 That is to
say, they sought to stabilize the capital-labor relation at
the level of the firm, without the intervention of the
state. In any case this was a problem that took almost two
decades and a monumental conflict to solve. Moreover, as
David Montgomery and others have demonstrated, Taylorism
and Fordism provoked workers' resistance and struggles-
such as sabotage, strikes, and trade union struggles--
everywhere they were implemented. Despite these struggles,
by the mid 1920s American employers had largely defeated
20
workers' opposition to the reorganization of production via
the stop watch and the assembly line. 43
Ironically, it was the very success of the employers'
"American Plan" and its strategy of stifling trade unions
and blocking wage increases, that led in part to the
collapse of the incipient Fordist regime of mass production
and mass consumption. Most employers were either unaware
of or unwilling to question the long-term consequences of
their actions, driven as they were by preference for short-
term gains in productivity and profits. There was,
however, a small group of employers who along with some
industrial engineers and social scientists had a different
perspective. This economic and social elite understood the
danger of relying exclusively on coercion to intensify the
work process, and believed that poverty-level wages of the
semi-skilled workers threatened the consumer-durable
"boom". They also became aware of the contradiction of
trying to organize a mass production/mass consumption
economy within a fundamentally laissez-faire state. In
response to the Great Depression, this elite became deeply
involved in the efforts to map a new political economy, a
political economy based on the expansion of mass
consumption via the intervention of the state. At the
forefront of this effort were the members of the Taylor
Society
.
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CHAPTER II
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
In this chapter I focus on conceptual and
methodological questions. In particular, I will addresses
some key problems concerning the relationship between
political economy and history. This discussion has two
targets. The first is to critique the dominant approach to
modern U.S. political economy: the corporate liberalism
school. The second is to present an alternative approach
to that subject: the regulation approach.
Underlying my discussion is the understanding that
conceptual frameworks provide an entry point into the
analysis of real historical diversity and specificity. As
Doreen Massey states, the purpose of a conceptual framework
is not to provide an abstract and pre-given taxonomy that
will render the "real" world understandable, nor to
superimpose a formal model on "reality" and expect it to
conform. The point of the framework is to provide an
approach to the analysis of the real world, not a
substitute for it. 1
A theoretical framework, thus, cannot in itself (nor
is it its purpose to) answer questions about what is
happening at any particular time or in any particular
place. It can, however, provide an approach that will
28
enable us to reformulate the questions being asked and the
problems being studied, in the hope that this will
contribute to an alternative understanding of the real
world. Frameworks matter. And because they do, one should
not remain neutral before different conceptions put forth
by contending theories. Accordingly, in this chapter I
will take position on two contending approaches to modern
U.S. political economy
.
Critique of Corporate Liberalism
During the last several decades there has been a
growing body of literature concerned with the study of
twentieth-century American political economy. The purpose
of much of this literature was to reassess the so-called
"progressive" or "liberal " school of interpretation, which
was characterized by its emphasis on the conflict between
"business and government " . This revisionist process led to
the emergence of a new conceptual framework which proposed
the notion of "corporatism" or "corporate liberalism" as
the organizing principle of research concerning the
political economy of twentieth-century America. 2
Although there are semantic differences among those
who use the terms corporatism and corporate liberalism,
most historians of the "corporate liberalism school" use
these concepts to describe both a political-economic system
29
and a certain ideological perspective. According to Ellis
Hawley
:
A corporate system is one whose basic units
consist of officially recognized, non-
competitive, role-ordered occupational or
functional groupings. It is also one with a
coordinating machinery designed to integrate
these units into an interdependent whole and
one where the state properly functions as
coordinator, assistant, and midwife rather
than director or regulator. In such a system
there are deep interpenetrat ions between
state and society, and enjoying a special
status is an enlightened social elite,
capable of perceiving social needs and
imperatives and assisting social groups to
meet them through enlightened concert of
interests
.
3
This definition, as Michael Hogan points out, draws
upon Philippe Schmitter's notion of an "ideal-type"
corporatism; and it calls our attention "to the emergence
of an administrative state with limited but important
responsibilities, the concurrent appearance of organized
units of private economic power, the collaborative systems
that fused these units into concerts of group action and
self-government, and the administrative networks that link
private governments and public authorities." 4
In the case of the United States, corporate liberalism
historians use the term "associat ionalism" to refer to the
specific variant of corporatism that has developed in this
country. 5 The inference to be made by the use of this
concept is that in the United States political and economic
initiative comes more often from the private sector than
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the public sector; that the patterns of interpenetrat ion
and power-sharing between these two sectors are more
informal and less institutionalized than in Europe and
Latin America; that the role and power of the labor
movement is less developed than its European counterpart;
and that pluralist ideology and practices remain more
important than in other corporatist societies. 6
As an ideology, corporate liberalism denotes a set of
liberal ideas that envisioned a "middle way" between
laissez-faire and "welfare stat ism. 11 Michael Hogan
summarizes this ideological perspective in the following
way
:
the spokesmen of corporate liberalism favored
positive programs, including those
administered by government, to tame the
business cycle, nurture growth, and protect
elements of the population that did not yet
share in the material benefits of modern
capitalism. But they also sought to contain
the state by entrusting much of the
responsibility for public policy to
semiautonomous agencies of economic
coordination and control , to supposedly
nonpartisan experts from the private sector,
and to corporative systems of economic
planning, voluntary regulation, and social
welfare
.
7
According to this analysis, the corporate liberal
tendency of the interwar years is best exemplified by men
such as Owen D. Young, chairman of the board of the General
Electric Company, Henry S. Dennison, a Massachusetts paper
products manufacturer, Edward A. Filene of the Filene
department stores, and others like them who participated in
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the Commerce Department's Business Advisory and Planning
Council and the Committee for Economic Development. Also
considered corporatist, are the types of reforms these
corporate leaders promoted, as for example, the
establishment in the 1930s of the National Recovery Act, or
the development in the 1940s of a counter-cyclical fiscal
policy
.
8
Although the corporate liberalism school is quite
diverse and not easy to categorize in simple terms, we can
recognize two distinct wings within this school of
historiography: a "new left" wing and a "techno-
corporatist" wing. The new left wing emerged in the 1960s
with the research and writings of "neo-Marxist " scholars
like William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, James
Weinstein, and Ronald Radosh. 9 According to Thomas
McCormick, these new left historians amended and extended
early organizational theory into a more fully-developed and
explicit system of corporatism. They did so in two ways.
First, they went beyond business corporations (the focus of
organizational theory) , and included labor in their
analysis. In particular, they described attempts "to
substitute class collaboration for class conflict via a
corporatist ideology that stressed the community of
interests, aims, and ideals between capital and labor."
Second, they stressed an increasingly important role for
the state: "to arbitrate differences and coordinate the
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interests of capital and labor;" to establish institutions
that would "sanction self-regulation and planning by the
private sector;" and to legitimate the process of economic
concentration and rationalization. 10
The new left wing, moreover, articulated the first
radical critique of the limits of the New Deal. This
critique was aimed at the interpretation of the liberal
scholars of the 1950s and 1 960s--Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., Frank Freidel, William Leuchtenburg, and James M.
Burns--who wrote from a "liberal democratic consensus"
viewpoint favorable to the New Deal:
Enamored of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
recalling the bitter opposition to welfare
measures and restraints upon business, many
liberal historians have emphasized the New
Deal's discontinuity with the immediate past.
For them there was a 1 Roosevelt Revolution '
,
or at the best least a dramatic achievement
of a beneficent liberalism which had
developed in fits and spurts during the
preceding decades.... For most liberal
historians the New Deal meant the
replenishment of democracy, the rescuing of
the federal government from the clutches of
big business , the signi ficant redistribution
of political power. Breaking with laissez-
faire, the new administration, according to
these interpretations, marked the end of the
passive or impartial state and the beginning
of positive government, of the
interventionist state acting to offset
concentrations of private power, and
affirming the rights and responding to the
needs of the underprivileged
.
11
The new left view, on the other hand, argued that the
New Deal was essentially conservative and continuous with
the previous decade; and that it failed to institute the
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measures necessary to have made America
democratic and egalitarian:
The liberal reforms of the New Deal did not
transform America; they conserved and
protected American corporate capitalism,
occasionally by absorbing parts of
threatening programs. There was no
significant redistribution of power in
American society, only limited recognition of
other organized groups, seldom of unorganized
people. Neither the bolder programs advanced
by New Dealers nor the final legislation
greatly extended the beneficence of
government beyond the middle classes or drew
upon the wealth of the few for the needs of
the many. Designed to maintain the American
system, liberal activity was directed toward
essentially conservative goals.
Experimentalism was most frequently limited
to means; seldom to ends. Never questioning
private enterprise, it operated within safe
channels, far short of Marxism or even native
American radicalisms that offered structural
critiques and structural solutions. 12
A key problem with the new left perspective, however,
is its "instrumentalist" conception of the state. That is,
it views the state as a simple tool or instrument of the
ruling-class. 13 Accordingly, this analysis of how and why
the "American corporate state" developed during the
twentieth-century posits that: "a sophisticated group of
large corporate reformers managed to replace a freely
competitive economy and make a new governing class, through
the use of reform mechanisms to mold the government into a
mighty instrument of monopolization and cartelization .
"
14
More specifically, the new left instrumentalist
conceptualization of the state is also clearly evidenced in
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their understanding of the New Deal as a class-conscious
strategy designed to save U.S. corporate capitalism.^
As Fred Block points out, the basic premise of the new
left analysis is that the extension of state power during
the twentieth-century was the product of the deliberate
actions of class-conscious capitalists. As such, this
analysis involved a reinterpretat ion of the traditional
understanding of American liberalism. The traditional view
argued that liberalism was the movement of other sections
of society to restrict the power of big business.
According to this perspective, the expansion of the role of
the state during the twentieth-century was an outcome of
popular struggles that succeeded in making capitalism a
system more responsive to all citizens. The new left
interpretation reversed the traditional view, arguing that
liberalism was the movement of enlightened capitalists to
save corporate capitalism. In this view, the expansion of
the state's role was designed by corporate capitalists and
their allies to rationalize the economy and society, that
is, to stabilize and revitalize American capitalism. 16
According to this perspective, the New Deal reforms
and programs were intended to deliberately "incorporate"
the American working class into corporate capitalism:
In reality, the role played by the Wagner Act
was the same as that of the NRA and the other
conservative New Deal programs. It was the
Wagner Act that allowed the Administration to
obtain the final integration of organized
35
labor into the existing political economy of
corporate capitalism. 17
The role of labor leaders and unions is analyzed in much
the same way
:
As the union movement grew, its leaders
accepted the existing corporate political
economy, in return for a minor share in the
decision-making process and increasing
economic rewards for union members. Its
leaders developed organized labor into an
institution that functioned to integrate
workers into the existing political economy,
rather than as a lever for change.... To
keep [a highly bureaucratic and statist
corporate capitalist machinery] functioning
smoothly, the corporate national class
required the aid of a state-regulated and
approved movement. Such a brand of unionism
would help the corporations maintain their
hegemonic control over American society. 18
This, explains Ronald Radosh, is why Franklin D.
Roosevelt's administration aided in the development of the
CIO, which is conceived by the new left wing as "a
government-created instrument" that enabled enlightened
corporate capitalists to overcome the resistance to change
of both laissez-faire capitalists and craft unions that
refused to accept the new corporate liberal state. 19
In synthesis, the new left's analysis is based on a
"conspiracy" model of history in which all historical
outcomes consciously serve the interest of the dominant
(i.e., capitalist) class. Specifically, it sees the New
Deal as a case where a self-conscious capitalist class was
able to manipulate the state to further their own interest
Such a conception, however, downplays or simply disregards
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(1) the relative autonomy of the state from the capitalist
class, (2) the role of workers' struggles in pushing
forward the major reforms and programs of the New Deal, and
(3) the opposition of the majority of capitalists
(including corporate capitalists) to the most important New
Deal reforms (including the Wagner Act)
.
20
The techno-corporatist wing emerged in the 1970s and
is best exemplified by the works of scholars like Ellis W.
Hawley, Robert D. Cuff, Kim McQuaid, Guy Alchon, and Robert
M. Collins. 21 According to Louis Galambos, the works of
these authors are a key component of the "organizational
synthesis," a broader interpretat ional framework which
posits large-scale organizations as the centerpiece of
modern U.S. history. As such, this approach stresses not
the political struggles between liberal and conservative
forces, but the creation of new and elaborate forms of
bureaucratic organizations that became hegemonic in
American society. 22 For this perspective, as Alan Brinkley
points out, the central forces shaping modern America
society have been: (1) the decline of informal, personal
authority and local autonomy, (2) the rise of large-scale,
national bureaucratic organizations, and (3) the
redefinition of roles and specialization of tasks that
modern organizations demand. 23
Drawing upon the organizational approach the techno-
corporatist historians have attempted to trace what Robert
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Wiebe called "the search for order," and in the process,
they have reconceptualized the relationship between capital
and the state in the twentieth-century America. 24 in
particular, they have challenged the progressive/ liberal
contention that "business and government" have been in
constant conflict and have shown, instead, how the "private
sector" and the "public sector" formed patterns of
association and accommodation beneficial to both. The
central contribution of this research, according to its own
practitioners, was the "discovery of a corporate
liberalism". As Ellis Hawley puts it:
American liberalism has indeed had its
market-oriented and statist varieties, and
these have been mixed in numerous and varied
ways. But developing alongside these,
competing with them and entering into many of
the mixtures, has been a 'corporate
liberalism' seeking answers in new private
orders and disciplines and claiming that it
could provide a liberal but non-statist
alternative to laissez-faire prescriptions. 25
Moreover, the techno-corporat ist wing has also
questioned the notion that corporate capitalists have been
able to unilaterally dominate and control the state for
their own purposes. Instead, they view the state as a
subject (a self-conscious actor) that functions as a
neutral arbitrator which mediates between capital, labor,
and other organized interests. In this view, the state
acts as a "coordinating machinery" designed to integrate
these sectors into an interdependent whole and to promote
38
the general welfare by creating a "true concert or harmony
of interests. "26 Accordingly, where other historians see
conflict or simply an instrument of class domination,
techno-corporatist historians see a partnership between
capital and the state in the form of an "associative state"
characterized by "functional representation, concerts of
interest, public-private continuums, and elitist
engineering of harmonious abundance." 27
There are several important and closely interrelated
problems with the techno-corporatist view of the state.
The first is that such a conception of the state—with its
underlying emphasis on social harmony, cooperation, and
functional interdependence— tends to ignore not just class
and social conflict in general, but more specifically, the
effects of these conflicts on the formulation of state
policies. Consequently, state policies appear as the
outcome of "enlightened elites" acting in name of some
unproblemat ic "common good." Furthermore, by placing the
actions of the state outside the field of social and class
struggle, this view fails to grasp the contradictory nature
of social change in modern America.
Second, the notion of a "neutral" state mediating
between different "organized interests" assumes an
equivalence of power and influence between capital and
labor. Such an assumption, as Leo Panitch points out, is
one that derives from traditional liberal theory: "It is
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based on the view that if producers' organizations
voluntarily enter into a * social contract', they must do so
on the basis of equality, just as liberal economic theory
assumes with regard to individuals in the market. "28 m the
"real" world, however, there is a vast inequality in power
between capital and labor. Thus, the assumption of power
equivalence within the techno-corporat ist view of the state
obscures the problem of unequal power relations between
capital and labor. In this sense, corporatism is no
different than pluralist theory--they both obscure the
problem of power relations.
Finally, the techno-corporat ist view is particularly
weak when it comes to explaining the increased role and the
changing functions of the state during the twentieth-
century. If, as the techno-corporatist historians contend,
the transformations in the role of the state are not a
product of the changing needs of the capitalist class in
maintaining its political and economic dominance, how does
one account for what Panitch calls "the systematic bias
toward capitalist class domination" by the state? 29 On the
other hand, if one disregards (as the techno-corporatist
does) the effects of class and social struggle on the
formulation of state policies, how does one explain those
policies and reforms (such as the Wagner Act) that were
forced upon the capitalist class? How does one account for
those occasions when the state will intervene against the
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particular interests of capitalists in order to protect the
general interest of capital? These are key problems the
techno-corporatist view fails to address. As a consequence
it does not provide an adequate account of the
transformations of the role of the state during the
twentieth-century
.
The techno-corporatist wing is also relies heavily on
modernization theory. This is most evident in the way it
describes America's so-called "organizational revolution"
as some inexorable process moving through history. As Alan
Brinkley points out, such a description of modern America
participates of "an unmistakable aura of inevitability, a
sense that in its broad outlines, at least, what has
happened is what has had to happen." Consequently, it
adopts a winner's vision of history, in which those who
have opposed the centralizing tendencies of modern society
(i.e., the process of "modernization") are viewed as
essentially irrelevant social forces holding on to an
archaic vision of society, and are consequently consigned
to the margins of historical analysis. In doing so, it
gives us a lopsided version of twentieth-century U.S.
political economy, which leaves out of its field of study
the voices of protest and dissent, and the visions of an
alternative society. 30
Despite their differences, both wings of the
corporatist school share several important conceptual and
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methodological limitations. First, both of these
perspectives place excessive emphasis on "consensus,"
emphasis that has made some scholars wonder if the
corporatist synthesis is not a return to consensus
historiography "by the back door."3i a consequence of this
undue reliance on consensus is that the corporatist school
downplays or simply ignores conflict. Ellis Hawley--who is
himself a leading corporatist historian--has suggested that
the most significant contribution made by the corporate
liberalism school, is precisely, that it offers further
evidence that:
the core of modern American history may
consist not of class struggles, business-
government conflict, and market versus
statist prescriptions; that it may consist
instead of an organizational pluralism in
which state agencies collaborated with and
became attached to private orders, of
recurring crises brought on by failures of
coordination and resistance to organizational
values, and of persisting commitments to
liberal values and the possibility of
realizing them through corporative structures
employing private enlighteners and
disciplines
.
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For the corporate liberalism view, thus , the
development of modern U.S. political economy was neither
the product of class struggles, nor the result of any other
form of social conflict. It was rather, the outcome of the
actions of identifiable enlightened elites. Accordingly
for the corporatist approach, what happened in the 1930s--
including the New Deal--"seems best conceptualized not as
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the workings of a class struggle or as the coming of 'big
government but as the efforts of a pluralistic social order
with liberal commitments to find private structures and
elites capable of correcting perceived ills and
malfunctions
.
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Moreover, this interpretation disregards the key role
of working class struggles in pushing forward the major
reforms of the New Deal. In particular, it ignores that it
took the decade-long struggle of the new industrial unions
of the CIO to force upon the capitalist class union
recognition and collective bargaining. The history of
these reforms shows that the majority of capitalists were
unwilling to grant such concessions to the working class.
These capitalists were too short-sighted initially to
accept, let alone to promote, major reforms such as the
Wagner Act and the Social Security Act. The fact of the
matter is that they opposed and resisted such changes. The
major reforms of the New Deal were passed and implemented
over the opposition of the majority of the capitalists. 34
They were won through working class struggles "from below."
These struggles, as Fred Block suggests, pressured state
managers to institute economic and social reforms that
simultaneously provided benefits to many workers,
strengthened the state in relation to the working class,
and increased the state's capacity to intervene in the
capitalist economy. 35
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Secondly, they both also place undue emphasis on
"continuity," and consequently tend to disregard "change."
Corporatist historians view the history of twentieth-
century U.S. political economy as a single process, as an
"evolving" corporate liberalism. According to this
perspective, the rise of corporate capitalism at the turn
of the century marked a new stage in the history of
American capitalism. This stage presumably has not ended.
The New Deal, in this view, is seen not as an important
moment of historical change, but as "part of a continuing
pattern," which began at least during the 1920s. This
concern with continuity has led corporatist historians to
stress, for example, how Hoover's concept of
"countercyclical stabilization" gave way to Keynesian
strategies of "demand management," and how welfare
capitalism and company unionism led to the welfare state,
and the Wagner Act. 35
Furthermore, the attempt to apply the corporatist
paradigm to the New Deal as a whole (and thus to both the
First and Second New Deal) leads to a perspective that
downplays the significance of the radical break in policy
that occurred between 1935 and 1938 during the Second New
Deal. And when this dramatic shift is recognized at all,
as Peter Friedlander points out, it is "as a brief and
inexplicable intrusion by a band of 'statist planners,
anti-trust decentralizers , laborite activists, and anti-
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business Keynesians 1
.
» 37 According to this view, thus, the
Keynesian policies deployed during the Second New Deal
amount to nothing more than an interruption in the patterns
of continuity that characterize U.S. political economy
since at least the 1920s.
Third, the interpretation put forth by both of these
perspectives has resulted in the obscuring of strategic
ideological and political differences within the capitalist
class. By arguing either that corporate liberalism was the
ideology of "big business" or that the New Deal was a
deliberate class-conscious attempt to maintain corporate
capitalism, the corporatist school fails to acknowledge
that corporate liberals were not a cohesive group with a
consistent strategy of reform, and that even among long-
standing business elites there was never an enduring
consensus on the organizational and political implications
of corporatism. 38 Moreover, this view also fails to
acknowledge the existence of other strategies of reform--
such as the "proto-Keynesian" strategy of the Taylor
Society--within the capitalist class. And when it does
recognize these strategies it encompasses them within the
ideology and program of corporate liberalism. 39
Fourth, in discussing the New Deal both wings of the
corporatist school assume a dichotomy between "the economic
sphere" and "the political sphere" of society. An
important consequence which follows from this assumption is
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that the corporatist school tends to ignore the
relationship between the process of capitalist accumulation
(regime of accumulation) and the institutional forms which
affect that process (mode of regulation)
. in this respect,
its analysis of New Deal policies is no different from that
of most New Deal historians. As Rhonda Levine points out,
the corporatist school discusses New Deal policies from the
perspective of the stated intentions of the policymakers
themselves, thereby ignoring the structural context within
which decision making took place. In doing so, they take
for granted the boundaries of state intervention and ignore
the limits that economic processes might place on
policymaking
.
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Conversely, this separation reduces capitalist
"business" activity simply to "economic activity"
abstracted from its sociopolitical context. According to
Martin Sklar, this tendency--the tendency to reduce
"business" to "economics" or to "economic history " --has
obstructed the study of capitalists as a social class
involved in social movements, and has largely confined the
study of social history to noncapitalist classes and
groups. In doing so, it has narrowed the framework of
research respecting capitalists to studies of interest-
group activity, business history, or the "business mind." 41
As the dominant approach to twentieth-century
political economy the corporate liberalism school has made
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important contributions to our understanding of
contemporary American history. Nonetheless, as the
discussion above has shown, the corporatist approach
contains significant conceptual and methodological
limitations. In particular, the corporate liberalism
school—whether in its new left or techno-corporat ist
version--has oversimplified the relationship between labor,
capital and the state. And consequently, it has obscured
the complexities of and suppressed the contradictions
inherent to the process of development of U.S. political
economy in the interwar period. Thus, to go beyond our
present understanding of modern American political economy-
-we need to go beyond corporate liberalism.
A Regulation Approach
An alternative approach to the history of twentieth-
century U.S. political economy is presented by the French
regulation school. The regulation approach is associated
with the work of a group of French political economists
including Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer, and
others who have developed the concepts of "regime of
accumulation" and "mode of regulation." 42
The purpose of this conceptualization is to provide a
historically specific theory of capitalist development, a
theory, that is, which goes beyond the abstract concept of
"capitalist mode of production" and takes the historical
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character of capitalism seriously. Its underlying
assumption is that since the basic features of capitalism-
-commodity production and the wage relat ion--take different
forms over time, it becomes necessary to examine the
historical forms these basic categories of the capitalist
system have taken. 4 3 In order to accomplish this, however,
it is necessary to offer an intermediate level of analysis,
more general and abstract than a detailed history of
capitalism, but more specific and concrete than the
abstract theory of capitalism-in-general presented by
traditional Marxism. 44
Regulation theory is characterized by a non-
teleological conception of capitalist development. It
rejects conceptions which view the history of capitalism as
if it were inexorably determined by some abstract "logic of
capitalist accumulation" or as the expression of "the
general laws of capitalism." Instead, it attempts to
provide a conception in which both social agency and
contingency play a significant role. As such, it focuses
on class relations, technological change, and political
struggles, as the concrete and contingent determinants of
history. 45 For regulation theory thus the development of
capitalism is not preordained. Rather, it is always
mediated through historically contingent institutional
forms, regulatory networks, and norms of conduct (such as
the wage relation, the state, and forms of competition)
,
48
which are themselves always the product of past and present
struggles
.
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The regulation school developed in the 1970s, when the
economic crisis forced many radical intellectuals to
reassess their assumptions and understandings of how
capitalism works. It emerged in part out of the demise of
Althusserian structuralism. 47 Regulation theorists argued
that Althusserianism placed undue emphasis on reproduction
and correspondingly disregarded contradiction. In their
view, Althusser's reproduction paradigm (which was based on
his rather static reading of Marx) was inadequate to
conceptualize the model of capitalist reproduction
prevalent in advanced capitalist societies--a model
characterized by the combined dynamic transformation of
production and consumption. Moreover, the Althusserian
view of reproduction, in which social-economic reproduction
appeared to succeed in a near spontaneous manner, did not
provide a sound basis for explaining the capitalist crisis
of the 1970s. 48
In short, as Bob Jessop states, regulation theorists
rejected the Althusserian conceptualization of
"reproduction, " which assumes that structures somehow
maintain themselves quasi-automat ically , independent of
effective social agency, and without significant
transformations. In its place, they developed an
alternative conceptualization based on the concept of
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regulation. 4 9 Michel Aglietta defines this concept in the
following way:
One should try to avoid using the term
•reproduction' either in the sense of a self-
perpetuating invariant or as an outcome of
social contradictions which are a priori
predictable. All that is reproduced is the
problem of socialization: how can social
cohesion exist, despite the discord of social
conflict. This is the problem which the
concept of regulation attempts to confront.
Contrary to the currently fashionable
interpretation of Marxism, it does so without
resorting to any teleological hypotheses.
The theory of capitalist regulation is that
of the genesis, development, and
disappearance of social forms, in short, of
the transformations which the separations
constituting capitalism undergo. 50
In other words, without assuming that reproduction
must occur, the regulation approach asks how capitalism is
reproduced given the conflictual and contradictory
character of capitalist social relations. As Jessop points
out, in explaining how regulation occurs (i.e., how social
relations take on stabilized forms even though these
relations are contradictory)
,
regulat ionists looked at
specific institutional forms, social norms, and patterns of
strategic conduct which expressed and stabilized conflicts
over a certain period of time. However, given the inherent
contradictions and antagonisms of capitalism, regulation is
always conceived as partial, temporary, and unstable. 51
The two key concepts developed by the regulation
school are regime of accumulation and mode of regulation.
According to Alain Lipietz, "a regime of accumulation
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describes the fairly long-term stabilization of the
allocation of social production between consumption and
accumulation." in other words, a regime of accumulation is
essentially a reproduction scheme--it comprises a pattern
of production and consumption which can be reproduced over
time despite its conflictual tendencies. 52 Several regimes
of accumulation are possible. For example, a regime of
accumulation can be either extensive (i.e., accumulation
occurs without any major transformations in the labor
process), or intensive (i.e., the labor process is
radically transformed and labor productivity can
continually rise)
.
Further, intensive accumulation can
occur without mass consumption, or with growing mass
consumption
.
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As David Kotz indicates, these regimes of accumulation
are seen as successive stages of capitalist development:
with an extensive regime of accumulation characterizing
19th century capitalism, an intensive regime without mass
consumption predominant in the early 20th century, and an
intensive regime with growing mass consumption developing
during the post-World War period. Each regime of
accumulation, moreover, is associated with a particular
mode of regulation. 54 However, as we have already noted,
regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are not
inscribed in the fate of capitalism. Rather, they are the
improbable outcome ("chance discoveries") of social and
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political struggles; that is, they emerge in a contingent
non-intentional manner. 55
A mode of regulation refers to an ensemble of
institutional forms, norms and social practices, which can
secure capitalist reproduction (for a certain period)
despite the conflictual and contradictory character of
capitalist social relations. These institutional forms and
social practices contain and limit the basic conflicts of
capitalism and thereby contribute to regulate the process
of accumulation. 56 As Alain Lipietz puts it:
A
|
regime of accumulation does not float,
disembodied, in the ethereal world of schemas
of reproduction. For one or another such
schema to be realized and reproduced over a
prolonged period, it is necessary for
institutional forms, procedures , and habits
to act as coercive or inciting forces
,
leading private agents to conform to the
schema. This set of forms is called a 'mode
of regulation 1
. As we shall see, a regime of
regulation cannot correspond to just any mode
of regulation
. Economic crises, which appear
to be a general, manifest mismatch between
supply and demand, may in reality reflect a
variety of underlying relationships
.
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However, as Lipietz warns , we should not assume that
the "function" of a mode of regulation is to make a regime
of accumulation work, or that the Welfare State was
invented "in order to make mass production go on smoothly,"
and so on. Rather, regimes of accumulation and modes of
regulation get stabilized together because they are able to
ensure the crisis-free reproduction of social relations for
a certain period of time. Furthermore, it should be noted
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that not every mode of regulation can regulate every regime
of accumulation and that a specific mode can present itself
as different combinations of partial forms of regulation.
For example, the social wage does not have the same
importance in the U.S. that it has in Sweden. 5 8
The regulation school sees the history of capitalism
as a succession of regimes of accumulation and modes of
regulation. It emphasizes, moreover, how the
contradictions of capitalism take different forms depending
on the prevailing regime of accumulation and mode of
regulation. According to this approach, the interwar
period was characterized by an intensive regime without
mass consumption and a competitive mode of regulation. 59
This mode of regulation, as Kotz states, "enforced a
competitive form of wage determination that made wages
sensitive to the size of the reserve army and precluded any
significant rise in real wages over time, thus preventing
mass consumption." 60
Competitive regulation was relatively adequate for
extensive accumulation—characterized by minor changes in
norms of production and consumption. But it was not
adequate for intensive accumulation which provoked
unprecedented productivity gains during the 1920s. By
preventing mass consumption "competitive regulation failed
to induce a growth of final demand compatible with these
productivity gains." This situation eventually led to the
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crisis of underconsumption of the 1930s. In short, this
crisis is seen by the regulation school as one in which the
emergence of a new regime of accumulation (an intensive
regime with mass consumption) was being held back by
outdated forms of regulation (competitive regulation)
. it
is also analyzed as the first crisis of intensive
accumulation or the last crisis of competitive regulation. 61
The post-World War II period was characterized by the
development of an intensive regime of accumulation based on
mass consumption. Following Gramsci, the regulation school
called this regime of accumulation "Fordism. 1,62 According
to Robert Boyer:
Under this regime the development of the
means of production sector of the economy
went together with the modernization of the
consumer goods sector, whose expansion was
stimulated by an apparently unprecedented
labor-capital compromise. The task of
management was to remodel the labor process
according to the canons of scientific
management
, while the concern of unions was
to ensure that workers benefitted from the
corresponding productivity increases, through
strikes or negotiations. 63
Thus, the regulation school uses Fordism to denote not a
specific labor process or production techniques, but a
regime of accumulation based on the articulation between
mass production and mass consumption . The concept of
Fordism, as Boyer points out, is intended to characterize
the macroeconomic conditions governing accumulation. As
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such, it only makes sense at the level of the whole
economy, not at the micro level of the firm. 64
The full-fledged development of Fordism was made
possible by a new monopolistic mode of regulation, which
encouraged the growth of mass consumption compatible with
productivity gains caused by intensive accumulation. 65 This
mode of regulation involved: (1) collective bargaining
agreements which linked wages to productivity; (2) an
oligopolistic pattern of price setting which contributed to
stabilize the accumulation regime; (3) Keynesian
macroeconomic policy and the welfare state (including
social security, unemployment insurance, and other forms of
social wages) which helped to articulate production and
consumption; and (4) the hegemony of credit and the
expansion of consumer credit facilities. 66
The monopolistic mode of regulation emerged out of a
prolonged period of social and political struggles which
began in the 1930s with the New Deal and culminated with
the experience of World War II. During the postwar period,
after this mode of regulation became consolidated,
monopoly regulation ensured 25 years of economic growth and
prosperity for U.S. capitalism. But in the 1970s, faced
with the exhaustion of Fordism and the crisis of
profitability that followed, and with the challenge of the
social movements excluded from the benefits of Fordism, the
monopolistic mode of regulation plunged into an open
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crisis. By the 1980s the crisis of monopolit ist ic
regulation (including its Keynesian macroeconomic
policies, and the welfare state) had led to the rise of neo-
liberalism, supply-side economics and monetarism as the
dominant forms of regulation. 67
In conclusion, the regulation school is concerned with
stages and phases of capitalist development rather than
with abstract laws of motion and tendencies operating at
the level of capitalism in general. As such, it offers a
theoretical framework for analyzing the historical
development of capitalism that goes beyond traditional
Marxist accounts of this subject. 68 The regulation
approach, however, has several significant problems. Most
important among these are: the ambiguity of some of its
key concepts and the divergent use of these concepts by the
members of the regulation school; the weakness of its
analysis in relation to the state; the tendency of some
studies, particularly the more recent ones, to focus on
questions of structural coherence and economic growth and
disregard class struggle and social agency; and the need to
produce more case studies that will shed light on the
usefulness of regulation theory as an approach to the
historical development of capitalism while enriching the
theory itself. All of these are areas in which the
regulation approach needs further development. 69
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Despite its shortcomings the regulation approach has
influenced a good number of scholars from a wide range of
fields including economics, political science, geography,
sociology, labor relations, history and others. Moreover,
it has stimulated a significant amount of research which
has enhanced our understanding of the political economy of
capitalism. Yet, as stated above, the regulation approach
has a number of limitations which it needs to overcome if
it is to remain a fruitful framework. Once this is
recognized, as Boyer indicates, further work within the
regulation school cannot simply repeat past research on a
larger scale. Rather, the conceptual framework must become
more precise and new questions must be asked, and new areas
of research undertaken in order to reduce some of the
uncertainties that still plague regulation theory. 70
One way to achieve this is to use the regulation
approach to produce case studies that will provide original
insights into the development of specific regimes of
accumulation and modes of regulation. These detailed and
specific historical studies could help give the regulation
approach the analytical precision that overly general
presentations have lacked. 71 Thus, this dissertation, which
examines the role played by key political, technocract ic,
and managerial elites in the emergence of the post-World
War II (Keynesian) mode of regulation, can be seen as a
57
historical study whose aim is to contribute to the
development of regulation theory.
r
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CHAPTER III
READING TAYLORISM POLITICALLY
Introduction
This chapter discusses the relationship between
Taylorism and the Taylor Society. The Taylor Society--
originally called "the Society for the Promotion of the
Science of Management " --was founded by the followers of
Frederick Winslow Taylor as an organized expression of the
scientific management movement. For such reason it seems
only appropriate that any discussion of the Taylor Society
begin with an examination of the nature and historical
significance of scientific management, or Taylorism, in the
strict sense of the term. As Peter F. Meiksins points out,
both Taylor and Taylorism have been the objects of
considerable scholarly attention in recent years: "As part
of a broad re-examination of the history of the American
working class, the character of the capitalist labor
process and the evolution of corporate structure, social
scientists from a variety of disciplines have, of
necessity, been led to re-examine the nature of Taylorism
as well." 1 Most of the contributors to this discussion,
however, tend to focus exclusively on the relationship
between Taylorism and the labor process. In doing so,
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these scholars, for the most part, have missed the broader
ideological and political implications of Taylorism. My
discussion in this chapter takes a different approach.
Although the chapter examines the emergence of scientific
management and re-examines the debate on Taylorism and the
labor process, my focus is on the ideological and political
implications of Taylorism, not on the success or failure of
scientific management as a form of capitalist control of
the labor process. In particular, my concern here is with
how the Taylor Society "read" Taylorism and how this
"reading" enabled it to go beyond the labor process and the
factory
.
Tavlor and Tavlorism
As David Montgomery points out, beginning in the 1880s
and gaining strength during the first two decades of the
twentieth century both capitalists and managers in the
United States were engaged in a monumental effort to
reorganize the labor process of their factories. The main
objective of this campaign was to obtain a more systematic
and direct control of factory production. At the forefront
of this campaign was the movement known as scientific
management. The basic elements of scientific management,
according to Montgomery, were: (1) centralized planning of
production, (2) systematic analysis of the labor process,
(3) detailed instruction and supervision of each worker,
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and (4) incentive wage payments. Each of these points,
Montgomery adds, "undermined the traditional autonomy of
the craftsmen," and clashed with the growing power of trade
unions. 2 In Montgomery's words, "[t]he historical role of
the scientific management movement was to explain, guide,
and justify the changes in the hierarchy of human relations
in the workplace that accompanied the turn-of-the-century
transformation of American industry." 3
Scientific Management or "Taylorism" emerged at the
end of the nineteenth century--a period marked by strikes,
violence and other element of widespread industrial unrest-
- as a response to labor unrest and to workers' control of
production. It was a managerial strategy that specifically
aimed to abolishing the power which a certain group of
workers--the autonomous craft smen--exercised in directing
the process of production. 4 The "father" and most
prominent figure of the scientific management movement was
Frederick W. Taylor, a mechanical engineer from a well-to-
do Philadelphia family. 5 According to Judith Merkle, what
gave Taylor the title of "Father of Scientific Management":
was not his invention of all the techniques of
Scientific Management. Taylor's work introduced a
complex of technical, organizational, and
ideological elements which can be traced to specific
currents of thought in his time, and which proved to
have differential decay rates during the years that
followed his death. The synthesis of ideas that he
put forward was the original development. It is
this synthesis rather than the ideas alone that has
been acknowledged as the identifiable body of
Taylorism. This new type of linkage between pre-
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existing ideas account for the unique social
reaction to Taylorism, not aroused by its neglectedand forgotten predecessors. Other innovators hadoffered partial answers, but only Taylor's synthesisanswered simultaneously problems of production and
organization, at the same time that it responded
with solutions to the industrial disruption in
American society
.
6
Hugh Aitken also emphasizes that Taylorism was a
creative synthesis of pre-existing ideas. Taylor, Aitken
states, first became known as a member of the post-Civil
War shop management movement which included plant managers
such as Slater Lewis, A. Hamilton Church, Frederick A.
Halsey, and Henry R. Towne. This movement was concerned
with problems of productivity at the shop level, and shared
a particular interest in incentive wage payments as a means
of increasing productivity. What made Taylor different
from his contemporaries and predecessors, according to
Aitken, was not that he adopted a radically new approach:
rather it was that, accepting many of their
assumptions, he carried them to their logical
conclusions and embodied the results in an allegedly
complete system of management that was more
inclusive, more self-contained, and more powerful in
its practical implications than their proposals and
devices. Taylor's system was also much more
suitable to serve as the nucleus of a dedicated
movement than were the tentative, pragmatic
suggestions of other students of the problem. . .
.
This is one reason why Taylorism or, as it was later
called, scientific management , still evokes
recognition and emotional response, while only
specialists know the work of men like Hasley and
Slater Lewis
.
7
Taylor himself, it should be noted, recognized that
scientific management was a creative synthesis of pre-
existing ideas: "Scientific Management does not necessarily
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involve any great invention, nor the discovery of new or
startling facts. It does, however, involve a certain
combination of elements which have not existed in the
past, namely, old knowledge so collected, analyzed,
grouped, and classified into laws and rules that it
constitutes a science." 8
The development of Taylor's ideas on scientific
management was directly linked to his practical experiences
at the shop floor. Taylor was, after all, a product of the
"shop culture" tradition which, according to Daniel Nelson,
"had supplied the bulk of American mechanics and engineers
during the preceding half century." As Nelson points out,
in the 1870s most manufacturers, machinery designers, and
engineers still obtained their training on the job. Even
though college-trained engineers were on the rise and the
apprenticeship system was in decline, "it was still not
unusual for a potential executive to spend his early career
in the shop, to learn the business " from the ground up'."
As a group the men who were a product of the shop culture
were "hard-headed, practical, and pragmatic, " they "often
disdained theory and questioned the value of formal
education." 9 Taylor was one of these "practical" men. And
as such he spent his early career in the shop learning the
"science" of management "from the ground up."
One of Taylor's most important practical experiences
came at the Midvale Steel Company. In 1878, after having
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completed an apprenticeship as a machinist and pattern-
maker in a small shop in Philadelphia, Taylor took a job as
a laborer at Midvale. Within six years he had become chief
engineer of that plant." During this period Taylor laid
the foundations of scientific management. In particular,
there was as a key episode which Taylor would later
associate with the beginning of scientific management. As
a worker at the machine shop of Midvale, Taylor had
participated along with his coworkers in "soldiering"
--the
deliberate restriction of output. Shortly after becoming
assistant foreman, however, Taylor began a systematic
effort to break-up soldiering by increasing the pace of
work
:
As soon as I became gang boss the men who were
working under me and who, of course, I knew were
onto the whole game of soldiering or deliberately
restricting output, came to me at once and said,
"Now Fred, you are not going to be a damn piecework
hog, are you?" I said, "If you fellows mean you are
afraid I am going to try to get a larger output from
these lathes," I said, "Yes; I do propose to get
more work out." I said, "You must remember I have
been square with you fellows up to now and worked
with you
.
I have not broken a single rate . I have
been on your side of the fence . But now I have
accepted a job under the management of this company
and I am on the other side of the fence, and I will
tell you frankly that I am going to try to get a
bigger output from these lathes . " They answered,
"then, you are going to be a damned hog." 11
Taylor's effort led to a bitter conflict with the workers
of that plant in which, as he puts it, "I was doing
everything in my power to increase the output of the shop,
while the men were absolutely determined that the output
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should not be increased." The conflict at Midvale,
according to Taylor's own testimony, "lasted for nearly
three years ....
"
12
The experience at Midvale convinced Taylor that
soldiering had become a major obstacle to the process of
capital accumulation. Taylor identified two types of
soldiering. The first was natural soldiering--which was
due to "the natural instinct and tendency of men to take it
easy." The second was systematic soldiering--which
involved a deliberate and conscious effort by the workers. 13
Of the two forms of soldiering, Taylor was fundamentally
concerned with the second:
The natural laziness of men is serious, but by far
the greatest evil from which both workmen and
employers are suffering is the systematic soldiering
which is almost universal under all of the ordinary
schemes of management and which results from a
careful study on the part of the workmen of what
will promote their best interests....
The greater part of the systematic soldiering ... is
done by the men with the deliberate object of
keeping their employers ignorant of how fast work
can be done. So universal is soldiering for this
purpose that hardly a competent workman can be found
in a large establishment, whether he works by the
day or on piece work, contract work, or under any of
the ordinary systems, who does not devote a
considerable part of his time to studying just how
slow he can work and still convince his employer
that he is going at a good pace. 14
According to Taylor, what enabled workers to engage so
effectively in systematic soldiering--and hence resist
management's attempts to intensify the pace of work--was
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that they possessed a superior mastery and knowledge of the
labor process than management:
This mass of rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge
may be said to be the principal asset or possession
of every tradesmen. Now, in the best of the
ordinary types of management, the managers recognizefrankly the fact that the 500 or 1000 workmen,included in the twenty or thirty trades, who are
under them, possess this mass of traditional
knowledge, a large part of which is not in the
possession of the management. The management, of
course, includes foremen and superintendents, who
themselves have been in most cases first-class
workers at their trades. And yet these foremen and
superintendents know, better than anyone else, that
their own knowledge and personal skill falls far
short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all
the workmen under them. 15
This "mass of traditional knowledge," Taylor concluded,
amounted to nothing less than workers' control of
production. Knowledge is power. And in this case, power
was in the hands of the skilled workers who controlled the
labor process through their craft secrets and traditions.
Management, on the other hand, was totally dependent on the
workers' "initiative" in the work process. As Taylor put
it, "the underlying philosophy of all of the old systems of
management in common use makes it imperative that each
workman shall be left with the final responsibility for
doing his job practically as he thinks best, with
comparatively little help and advice from the management." 16
As long as workers controlled the labor process, their
practices would hinder management's attempts to increase
both productivity and the intensity of the pace of work. 17
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The solution to this situation, Taylor argued, was to put
the control of the labor process in the hands of
management, "where it belongs." Since workers' power in
the workshop was based on their superior knowledge of the
labor process, Taylor sought to expropriate the skilled
workers' traditional knowledge of the work process. Thus,
the guiding principle of scientific management, in Taylor's
own words, was "the deliberate gathering in on the part of
those on management's side of all the great mass of
traditional knowledge, which in the past has been in the
heads of the workmen, and in the physical skill and knack
of the workman, which he has acquired through years of
experience." 18 By expropriating workers' "principal
possession" Taylor hoped to reverse the relationship
between knowledge and power in favor of capital. Having
gathered into their possession workers' traditional
knowledge, management could then proceed to the systematic
reorganization of the labor process in such a way as to
ensure that they would dictate what was done and how it was
done, while workers " [did] what they are told to do
promptly and without asking questions or making
suggestions .
"
19
Taylorism, then, as Mike Davis indicates, was not
about efficiency; it was about power. 20 Its primary goal
was not merely to make workers more "efficient;" it was to
achieve complete control of the labor process. As Aitken
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argues, all of Taylor's contributions to shop management-
including not only time and motion studies and the planned
scheduling and routing of work in progress, but also the
use of uniform belting and high-speed cutting tools-were
designed "to achieve control of the job and its performance
and, in particular, to enable management to prescribe and
enforce a standard work pace." 21 In short, Taylorism sought
to "liberate" the labor process from the forces that held
it hostage: workers' control of production. Put
differently, it attempted to open a new space for the
accumulation. of capital and for the development of
standardized mass production by creating a new type of
worker: the semi-skilled operative. As Antonio Gramsci
pointed out in the thirties referring to Taylorism, "the
American phenomenon ... is ... the biggest collective effort to
date to create with unprecedented speed and consciousness
of purpose unmatched in history a new type of worker and
man . " 22
Re-examining Tavlorism
The success or failure of Taylor's efforts has been
the subject of considerable scholary debate in recent
years. Most of the scholars who have contributed to this
discussion on the historical significance of Taylorism have
focused primarily on the relationship between scientific
management and the capitalist labor process. The most
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influential of these contributions is Harry Braverman
'
s
Monopoly and Labor Cap ital, which argues that Taylorism was
the capitalist strategy to ensure capitalist control over
the labor process in the late nineteenth-century factory
and that its widespread use during the twentieth-century
has been crucial to the degradation of work. 23 According to
Braverman, the capitalist labor process is characterized by
tendencies towards the de-skilling and degradation of work
and by a continuous capitalist effort to seize control over
production from relatively "skilled" and "autonomous"
workers. The essence of capitalist control of production
is the separation of mental and manual labor, that is the
separation of conception and execution. Through this
process capital reduces workers to "general purpose
machines" or "abstract labor" and removes the "subjective
factor of the labor process... to a place among its
inanimate objective factors." 24
What Braverman is describing here is the process Marx
called the transition from the formal to the real
subordination of labor to capital. The formal
subordination of labor arises with the private legal and
economic ownership of the means of production, the private
appropriation of social production, and the commodification
of labor power. Labor was formally subordinated to capital
in both the putting-out system and the early factory. The
key here is that although workers had been gathered under
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"the watchful eye of the capitalist" or his foreman, they
remained in control of the labor process. The real
subordination of labor, on the other hand, takes place
within the labor process itself and requires a fundamental
reorganization of the work process. Labor becomes really
subordinate to capital when the capitalist can control what
the worker does while engaged in the labor process. The
transition from formal to real subordination is measured by
the progress of de-skilling, routinization, and
standardization of tasks. The end result of this process
is the creation of "abstract labor." 25
For Braverman, the self-conscious expression of this
process is found in the principles of scientific
management
:
Modern management came into being on the basis of
these principles. It arose as theoretical construct
and as systematic practice
,
moreover, in the very
period during which the transformation of labor from
processes based on skill to processes based upon
science was attaining its most rapid tempo . Its
role was to render conscious and systematic, the
formerly unconscious tendency of capitalist
production
. It was to ensure that as craft
declined, the worker would sink to the level of
general undifferentiated labor power, adaptable to a
large range of simple tasks , while as science grew,
it would be concentrated in the hands of
management
.
26
Taylorism, thus, is not merely a set of organizational
principles: it represents "nothing less than the explicit
rationalization of the capitalist mode of production." It
expresses the logic of capitalist accumulation which
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inexorably drives management towards complete control of
the labor process. In other words, from Braverman's
perspective, capital has no other choice but to extend the
process of real subordination of labor as far as its power
will permit. Taylorism represents the essential expression
of this process; it is the strategy that will ensure
capital's objectives. 27
A central problem with Braverman, as Michael Burawoy
points out, is that he develops a unilateral analysis that
only takes into consideration the "objective" (economic)
aspects of the labor process, and ignores the "subjective"
dimensions of work. In doing so, Braverman fails to expand
our understanding of production beyond its purely economic
moment by explicitly including the political and
ideological moments of work. As Burawoy puts it:
Not only can one not ignore the 'subjective'
dimension, but the very distinction between
'objective' and ~ subjective' is arbitrary. Any work
context involves an economic dimension (production
of things) , a political dimension (production of
social relations) , and an ideological dimension
(production of an experience of those relations)
.
These three dimensions are inseparable... 28
The process of production, then, must be seen as an
inseparable combination of its economic, political and
ideological aspects. And this is precisely what Braverman
fails to recognize.
Braverman's analysis, Burawoy argues, leads him to
reduce workers' resistance to Taylorism to "an essentially
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derivative role, an impotent expression of their helpless
subordination to capital." in doing so, he fails to see
that class struggle "is not merely derivative but is also
determinative of capitalism's development . "29 In short/
Braverman's conceptualization entails a treatment of the
working class as an object of capital, an object rendered
ineffectual by the development of capitalism. In Burawoy 1 s
words
:
Braverman's analysis is exclusively from the side of
the object. This is no oversight; Braverman
repeatedly stresses the mechanisms through which
subjectivity is destroyed or rendered ineffectual
and through which individuals lose their
individuality. In this he follows a powerful
tradition within Marxism, most clearly represented
by George Lukacs in History and Cla.s.s ConsrinnsnP^
Like Lukacs, Braverman presents capitalism as a
process of becoming, of realizing its inner essence,
of moving according to its imminent tendencies, of
encompassing the totality, of subordinating all to
itself, and of destroying all resistance. Unlike
Lukacs, however, Braverman does not call upon the
miraculous appearance of a messianic subject--the
revolutionary proletariat--which, through the agency
of the party, would conquer history and turn
capitalism on its head.... 30
For Braverman, then, capitalism is an "expressive totality"
which moves as an irresistible force towards the
subordination of society to capital. In the process, it
destroys, absorbs, or makes ineffective any source of
resistance
.
31
According to Burawoy, there is no doubt that Taylorism
gathered together knowledge about tasks and decided "the
best way" to perform them. For him, however, it is by no
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means clear that this constituted a monopoly of knowledge
over the labor process (after all, he states, Taylor
obtained his knowledge of the labor process as a worker);
nor is it clear that these new rulings could be enforced.
Missing from Braverman's assessment of Taylorism are the
workers' responses to this process. "It is one thing for
management to appropriate knowledge; it is another thing to
monopolize it," Burawoy points out. Under Taylorism,
Burawoy argues, instead of a separation of conception and
execution, what we find is a separation of workers'
conception and management's conception, of workers'
knowledge and management's knowledge. The attempts to put
Taylorism in practice led workers to recreate the unity of
conception and execution, but in opposition to management's
designs. Workers used their creativity to outwit the
agents of scientific management before, during and after
the "appropriation of knowledge." Consequently, in any
shop there are "official" or "management approved" ways of
performing tasks and there is the workers ' way, which is
devised and revised in response to any management
offensive. Not only has management failed to appropriate
from the workers their "trade secrets", it is not
necessarily to their advantage to do so. "Shop
management," Burawoy indicates, "usually knows this." 32
In Burawoy ' s view, Taylorism was a failure as a
practical mechanism of capitalist control:
83
Unlike changes in the division of labour and the
scientific-technical revolution, Taylorism, definedby the specification of task performance, cannot beidentified with the separation of conception and
execution. what then is its relationship to
capitalist control? It has been resisted by trade
unions the world over and has promoted struggles by
organizing labour and capital into hostile campus.On a day-to-day basis workers attempt to sabotage'
Taylorism, while at a broader level unions join in
struggles to defend
' output ' clauses in rules.
Thus, scientific management may have undermined
capitalist control over the obscuring of surplus and
of the relations of exploitation between capital andlabour. With respect to the securing of surplus
there can be no definitive answer. Insofar as
Taylorism fostered antagonism between capital and
labour, the coordination of interests became less
feasible and the reliance on coercive measures more
necessary
.
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For Burawoy the significance of Taylorism lies precisely in
its failure to enhance capitalist control over the labor
process. This failure, in his view, created the conditions
for the emergence of a new type of labor process
characterized by "the scientific-technical revolution." 34
Richard Edwards and Daniel Nelson also question the
practical impact of scientific management. According to
Edwards, the significance of Taylorism was that it offered
a solution "to the crisis of control in the firm." But, he
contends, "if we look at Taylorism as a management practice
rather than as an idea, the promise was never fulfilled."
One reason for this was that "the system was complicated,
and employers often grew impatient long before the final
elements were ready to be installed." More importantly
Edwards argues, Taylorism failed because most large firms
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did not even give it a try: "The extent and incidence of
scientific management has always been something of a
mystery, but the available information suggests that
Taylorism was confined to smaller nonunionized enterprises.
In any event, the new industrial giants~U.S. Steel,
International Harvester, and the others--showed little
interest in it." 35 In the final analysis, however,
Taylorism "failed to solve the crisis of control in the
firm because workers fought it to a standstill." This was
especially true, Edwards points out, after the Watertown
Arsenal strike, which galvanized organized labor's
opposition to Taylorism and "ended the possibilities for a
scientific management solution to the firm's crisis of
control .
"
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Daniel Nelson, moreover, questions the impact of
Taylorism on the "labor problem":
Despite Taylor's apparent preoccupation with the
worker, scientific management had little direct
effect on the character of factory work or the lot
of the worker. Taylor's labor "reforms" were
introduced in toto in only a handful of firms. And
even in piecemeal form they had far less impact than
his technical and organizational innovations.
Taylor's claims and reputation notwithstanding, a
different and often antagonistic group of labor
reformers revolutionized the worker's role in the
twentieth-century factory. 37
Rather than a "partial solution of the labor problem,
"
Nelson contends, Taylorism was a response to the problems
of factory coordination. It was a refinement and extension
of the earlier ideas known as systematic management. 38 In
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Nelson's view, the long-standing association of Taylorism
with "a partial solution of the labor problem" stemmed from
Taylor's efforts to link "his reform of the factory system,
a subject of modest appeal, with the elimination of the
labor problem." Taylor's enduring fame, Nelson states, "is
in large measure a testament to his success in that
endeavor .
"
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Although Nelson offers compelling evidence that
scientific management was not as widespread as Taylor and
others would have us believe, his analysis underestimates
the impact of Taylorism on the worker and on the
reorganization of the labor process. The fact that
Taylorism was not applied in toto in most industrial
establishments should not lead us to understand that key
aspects of Taylorism, such as the stop watch and incentive
wage payment schemes, had no impact at all. Furthermore,
in arguing that Taylorism was a response to a problem of
"factory coordination," Nelson assumes that scientific
management' was merely a "technical problem" instead of an
inherently political problem rooted in the control of the
labor process. Thus, where there is a problem of "politics
of production" Nelson only sees "technical matters."
Finally, by claiming that "another group of labor
reformers [welfare capitalists] revolutionized the
workers' role", Nelson completely disregards the role
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played by the Taylorites and the Taylor Society in the area
of industrial relations during the interwar period.
In conclusion, the debate on Taylorism reopened by
Braverman has focused, almost exclusively, on the labor
process. Despite their differences, most scholars who have
participated in this debate have conceived Taylorism merely
as a form of labor control. The central concern in this
discussion has been the question of how successful and
widespread was Taylorism in practice. By focusing on this
question, these authors, for the most part, have failed to
examine the broader ideological and political implications
of Taylorism. Moreover, because of their narrow concern
with the practical applications of Taylorism, they have
also failed to appreciate the relationship between theory
and practice in the case of Taylorism. As Charles Maier
points out:
Theories of management are to the practice of
business as theories of architecture are to
buildings. Few buildings follow the canons of
design announced by leading architects, even if they
incorporate individual elements. Still,
architectural manifestoes are crucial for orienting
the profession to what might be their solution if
clients, money, and site constraints allowed. So,
too, few industrial plants incorporate the doctrines
of management experts as coherent ensembles. Few
factories were organized as Taylorite institutions,
even, in the United States. Nonetheless, Taylorism
or scientific management dominated the discourse of
industrial relations through the 1920s.... 40
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Tavlorism and the Taylor Society
The significance of Taylorism, then, (as far as this
study is concerned) lies not in its actual factory
applications, but rather in its political and ideological
appeal during the interwar period. It is the social and
political implications of Taylorism and not its not narrow
technical features which merit our attention. 41
This perspective allows us to explore the relationship
between Taylorism and the Taylor Society. How did the
Taylor Society "read" Taylorism? How did this "reading"
enable it to go beyond the labor process and the factory?
For the Taylor Society, first of all, Taylorism was an
ideology that promised an end to class conflict and social
division. According to this view, Taylorism would
eradicate class conflict by providing simultaneously higher
wages to workers and higher profits to owners. These
benefits, in turn, would be the product of a general
increase in productivity made possible by a more
"efficient" workplace and by the cooperation between labor
and capital. This view was best articulated by Taylor in
his testimony before the House of Representatives in 1912,
where he stated that scientific management was not merely
piece work, time studies, incentive wages, or any other
"group of efficiency devices." The essence of scientific
management, as Taylor put it, was "a complete mental
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revolution" which involved a reconciliation between labor
and capital:
The great revolution that takes place in the mental
attitude of the two parties under scientific
management is that both take their eyes off thedivision of the surplus as the all-important matter
and together turn their attention toward increasing'the size of the surplus until this surplus becomes
so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel over howit shall be divided. They come to see that when
they stop pulling against each other, and insteadboth turn and push shoulder to shoulder in the samedirection, the size of the surplus created by theirjoint efforts is truly astounding. They both
realize that when they substitute friendly
cooperation and mutual helpfulness for antagonism
and strife they are able to make this surplus so
enormously greater than what it was in the past that
there is ample room for a large increase in wages
for the workman and an equally great increase in
profits for the manufacturer. 42
During the 1920s the Taylor Society, or more properly the
progressive wing of the Taylor Society, took Taylor's
conception of scientific management as "a mental
revolution" a step further. According to Robert Bruere, a
leading member of the Taylor Society, the success of
Taylor's methods in the workshop led him to limit his
vision of "the great revolution in mental attitude" to
industrial production. Taylor's methods were so successful
in creating a large surplus in individual plants and his
doctrine of high wages and low labor costs was so effective
in improving industrial relations in these plants, "that he
tended to see in high wages, high profits, and a fair price
to the consumer the complete solution to all of the
problems of industrial relations." Taylor's vision of the
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problem of industrial relations, thus, did not go beyond
the factory. As Bruere states, it "came to be enclosed by
the walls of the workshop." Consequently, Taylor lost
sight of the larger social significance of his own
doctrine
.
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For Bruere, "the mental revolution" envisioned by
Taylor must go beyond the factory; it must embrace
distribution, consumption and all other areas of social
life:
The revolution in mental attitude which Taylor
advocated cannot be socially effective until the
entire community is secure not only in its ability
to create a surplus, but also in the equitable
distribution of the surplus when created. For the
conquest of surplus is not the end but the beginning
of civilization. It is the function of industry as
society's main instrument in the struggle for
existence to create surplus; it is the function of
government and our cultural institutions to provide
for such a distribution of the surplus as will raise
the general standard of living and improve the
quality of the race. The mental revolution must be
carried beyond the individual plant, beyond the
total industrial organization, until it embraces the
mind of the entire community.... 44
Although Taylor was concerned primarily with the creation
of a larger surplus (and not with its social distribution)
,
his very approach to creating surplus--based on common
understanding and cooperation--entailed a new approach to
the problem of distribution and a new view of labor's
status in relation to capital, Bruere concludes. 45 What
Bruere enunciates here, in my view, is the outline of a
social-democratic perspective.
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In this context, it is important to note that as early
1920 Morris Cooke was advocating a program along the same
lines as the one outlined by Bruere. In April of that year
Cooke wrote a letter to Sidney Hillman, of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, in which he proposed that the
labor movement adopt a program based on increasing
production through the development of the scientific
management of industry. By contributing to this program.
Cooke argued, the labor movement could share a larger
portion of the surplus produced. As Cooke put it:
Most of us have come to believe that in
itself any increase in the production of
essential commodities is a desirable social
end. All groups and classes of society
should actively participate in the
cultivation of the arts and sciences leading
thereto. If under the present organization
of industry we could assume that labor was
receiving at least a 'fair share' of the
proceeds of any increase in production of
course there would be no guestion as to
labor's participation in building up a more
efficient industry simply because labor has
more to gain than any other element in the
community through the betterment in status. 46
Cooke's proposal basically involved a trade-off in which
labor would receive a larger share of the surplus through
higher wages in exchange for adopting a program based on
expanding production and accepting the "technical"
expertise of scientific managers in the workshop. As such,
this program of labor-management collaboration for
increased production anticipated important elements of the
post-World War II capital-labor accord.
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By 1926 Cooke expressed satisfaction with the progress
achieved by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' program of
union-management cooperation to expand production:
I believe that Sidney Hillman and the AmalgamatedWorkers have been another large element in winning
over labor to product ion ... The Amalgamated has not
only almost completely organized its industry but ithas secured markedly higher wages, unemploymentinsurance and the right to sit in on the discussions
of practically every problem that affects the
business. Then I think they have made the
demonstration that labor has a very real
contribution to make to policy. 47
However, Cooke warned, if this progress was to be
maintained workers had to organize and their organizations
had to collaborate with scientific management. As Cooke
put it to Harlow S. Person, managing director of the Taylor
Society, in letter written in January 1929:
The big thing that is going on in the United States
is the increase in output due to various causes, but
principally to the imagination and better management
on part of the workers. If we are going to keep
this we need organization on the part of the workers
and those organizations need a better picture of
what is happening and new techniques by which to
protect themselves and at the same time let
themselves out. 48
The role of progressive managers like Cooke and others in
the Taylor Society was to provide the "better picture" and
the "new techniques, " while the role of workers was to
cooperate with management in the expansion of production.
The outcome from such collaboration would be the
distribution of the surplus in the form of higher wages for
workers
.
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For the Taylor Society, thus, Taylorism also involved
a strategy for economic growth. The cornerstone of this
program was the recognition of productivity as the source
of wealth and prosperity. As Taylor put it:
The general material gain which those of the presentgeneration have over past generations has come fromthe fact that the average man in this generation,
with a given expenditure of effort, is producing two
times, three times, even four times as much of thosethings that are of use to man as it was possible for
the average man in the past to produce. This
increase in
_
productivity is, of course, due to many
causes, besides the increase in personal dexterity
of the man.... But from whatever cause this
increase in productivity has come, it is to the
greater productivity of each individual that the
whole country owes its greater prosperity. 49
These changes in productivity, Taylor concluded, directly
affected the living conditions of the working people; it
provided them a higher standard of living and transformed
"the luxuries of one generation" into "the necessities of
the next .
"
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The general adoption of scientific management, Taylor
contended, would double the productivity of the average
worker. This raise in productivity, in turn, would lead to
an expansion of both "the necessities and luxuries of
life;" it would enhance "the possibility of shortening the
hours of labor;" and it would increase the "opportunities
for education, culture, and recreation." Moreover, the
"great increase in wages" linked to the doubling of
productivity would "largely eliminate the wage question as
a source of dispute." Finally, by lowering the cost of
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production this increase in productivity would enable the
companies who adopt scientific management to compete
better
:
this will so enlarge their markets that their men
will have almost constant work even in dull times
and they will earn large profits at all times. This
means increase in prosperity and diminution in
poverty, not only for their men but for the whole
community immediately around them. 51
Thus, as Judith Merkle points out, Taylor clearly related
the increase in productivity and wages to an expansion of
the market for manufactured goods. In doing so, Taylor
prefigured the notion of a mass consumption economy. What
he envisioned was to raise productivity to a point where
previously deprived sectors of the working class can be
incorporated into "the high consumption of mass-produced
goods." Put differently, the idea of a mass
production/mass consumption economy was already present in
Taylor's understanding of productivity as the basis of
economic growth. 52
The implications of Taylor's economic thought would
not go unnoticed by the Taylor Society. Writing in 1929 as
past president of the Taylor Society, Morris Cooke
characterized Taylor as an important innovator who made a
fundamental break with the past:
The America of the late [19th century], the period
when Taylor first came on the industrial scene, was
gripped in a vicious circle of low wages, low
production, low purchasing power and a consequent
lack of prosperity. Strikes and other evidences of
widespread industrial unrest marked the
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period. [Taylor] projected into this drab milieuhis program of high wages for the individual as thereward for high production by that individual; andpragmatist that he was, he taught the individual andsociety how exceptional production could be securedWith vivid applications.
. .he won acceptance for his'thesis that the warfare between employer and
employee, between the manager and those hedirects... is for the most part wanton waste. The
commonly accepted doctrines of high reward for highperformance, and so of actually lowering coststhrough paying higher wages, he was the first topropose. And thus there was initiated on a firm
technical foundation the typically American policy
of the maintenance of purchasing power. 53
Cooke, thus, credits Taylor with being the first proponent
of the "commonly accepted" doctrine of high wages and low
costs, and of providing "a firm technical foundation" for
the policy of maintaining the purchasing power of the
workers. In doing so, he clearly links Taylor's doctrines
to Henry Ford's "high wage policy" and to the
underconsumptionist currents (including Keynes) of the
interwar period. More importantly, Cooke's assessment
leaves no doubt as to the significance of Taylorism
(particularly during the Great Depression) as a strategy
for economic growth and prosperity.
For the Taylor Society, finally, Taylorism provided
both a "philosophy and technique" for social economic
planning. As is well known, a key component of scientific
management was the establishment of a centralized planning
department which was responsible for directing the overall
flow of production throughout the workplace. According to
Chris Nyland, in Taylor's early work's the Planning
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Department had been known as the Rate-Fixing Department.
The change in name, Nyland argues, was not just a matter of
semantics. It signified the "maturation in Taylor's
conception of what was required within the production
process that was to give his work so much significance." 54
Yet, despite its importance for Taylorism, the idea of
planning production was not introduced by Taylor. The
fact, as a leading Taylorite recognized, was that "managers
had always to some degree planned production and Taylor got
many elements of his planning and control mechanisms from
other shops." 55 What, then, was the contribution of Taylor
to the notion of planning production? According to Harlow
S. Person, managing director of the Taylor Society during
the 1920s, Taylor's contribution was that:
he integrated mechanisms into an interlocking whole,
and the degree to which planning and precise control
were developed by him was so great in quantity as to
create a new qualitative situation. Planning
generally had not been effective because it was
based on so many chance factors. Now with the aid
of standardization, calculations could be made with
a fair degree of certainty. This made possible the
planning-room procedures of routing, scheduling and
complete and economical utilization of facilities.
It was this precise control through planning and
preparation which secured the results of increased
productivity by eliminating idle times and
misapplied efforts, which are the result of many
different causes under uncontrolled conditions
.
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Taylor, thus, created a "new qualitative situation" with
respect to planning, one which secured increased
productivity by eliminating "waste" in the production
process
.
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Rexford G. Tugwell, who was close to the Taylor
Society during the 1920s, recognized the centrality of
planning in Taylorism. In a paper titled, "The Principle
of Planning and The Institution of Laissez Faire, " which
was presented to the American Economic Association in 1932,
Tugwell stated:
If we have been watching, describing, analyzingindustry as we should, we must have known that thegreatest economic event of the nineteenth century
occurred when Frederick W. Taylor first held a stop
watch on the movements of a group of shovelers in
the plant of Midvale Steel Company. And we must
have understood, when Shop Man^Pmp n t- was published
in 1903 that, perhaps a generation later, the world
could be overwhelmed with goods. 57
For Tugwell, the importance of Taylorism was that it
provided a set of planning techniques that would enable
capitalism to experience unprecedented expansion of mass
production. "If we had eyes to see the implications of
Taylor's work we should have known that the vast expansion
of production which must follow would clog all the channels
of trade, swamp the mechanisms of an artificially limited
commerce, and end in a period of violent reconstruction, "
Tugwell argued. American economists, however, had failed
to see the implications of Taylor's work and were thus
unprepared to effectively confront the Great Depression.
Because of their blindness to Taylorism, Tugwell contended,
economists had not yet discovered the sources of "the
astonishing capacity for production which seemed suddenly
to show itself everywhere in the twenties;" they had no
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idea of how production could be "regularized and made
available to consumers;" and worst of all, they had no
notion of what their policies "ought to be in days of
disaster.
"
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If the significance of Taylor's planning technigues
was that it enabled the expansion of mass production, its
problem, suggested Tugwell, was that it was confined to the
workplace. As such, it could overcome the limitations
imposed by "the institutions of laissez faire" to the
process of production:
...Industry after industry may follow the half-dozen
now fairly rationalized; each may use in its own
plants the new technology of work-elimination; each
may solve its own problems of control and
coordination. But it will end again in just such a
disaster as we are struggling through now unless we
take the final step of linking each to each. Unless
we learn the structure and rhythm of laissez faire
are inconsistent and anachronistic concomitants of
such technology as soon will infuse the industrial
process, confusion and disorder will prevail
whenever the willful pursuit of business privileges,
as we still know them, chokes the smooth
interchanging flow logically belonging to the system
of industry, but never yet achieved by human
management
.
59
The solution to this problem, in Tugwell' s view, was to
extend Taylor's notion of planning production beyond the
factory to the national economy. What was needed was to
develop the notion of "national planning" --understood in a
technical sense as a "normal extension and development of
the kind of planning which is a familiar feature of
contemporary business." For Tugwell, finally, the
98
implications of the development of a "national plan" for
the American economy were so profound that: "The setting
up of even an emasculated and ineffective central co-
ordinating body in Washington will form a focus about which
recognition may gradually gather. It will be an action as
significant as the first observation of Taylor; and it can
lead eventually to the crowning of that genius' work." 60
The leadership of the Taylor Society also understood
the need for national planning. In a discussion of the
Taylor Society, held in the winter of 1930, Harlow S.
Person stated, that "[the] operations of industrial society
are not yielding substantial good to the greatest number of
the industrial citizens ... because these operations are
not ... organized with that end in view." Specifically, this
occurred because of the "inconsistency between the basic
principle of business enterprise— individual self-interest
and intuition--and the basic principle of the production
technology which that enterprise, without full appreciation
of its influence, has come to use--cooperat ive
integration." The dominance of the former over the latter,
Person adds, has left the regulation and coordination of
industrial activity to "the chance composite influence of a
vast number of enterprises motivated by individual gain in
competitive activities, limited in their perception of
relationships and the organic consequences of their
activities, and on the whole dependent upon intuition for
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their decisions as to purpose and method." This situation
was the fundamental cause of industrial dislocations,
unemployment and halted economic stagnation. 61
Moreover, Person recognized that the attempts of
scientific management to stabilize individual enterprises
internally had been "frequently nullified by the impact of
forces of the industrial environment outside the control of
management." The way out of this situation was to extend
the Taylorist planning principles to "industrial society"
as a whole: "If these were applied to the organization and
control of industrial society, conceived as an organic
whole, many and perhaps most of the forces which now cause
periodic dislocations and distress in industrial life would
be eliminated." Thus, for Person, the notion of national
planning involved a "greater limitation to individual
freedom in business activities than is at present assumed
to desirable," and that Taylorist principles developed in
individual enterprises be extended "to industry conceived
as one vast enterprise in which all members of industrial
society are workers and share-holders in common." 62 By the
mid-1930s, Person, Cooke and the other leading figures of
the Taylor Society acknowledged that the only force capable
of ensuring the goals of national planning was the Federal
Government. Consequently, they endorsed the New Deal and
through it the establishment of an interventionist state
that would seek to stabilize and regulate of capitalism. 63
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In conclusion, for the Taylor Society, Taylorism was
much more than just a "system of labor control." it was
simultaneously "a mental revolution"--an ideology of class
conciliation and social peace; an economic strategy for
economic growth and prosperity; and a "philosophy and
technique" for social economic planning. 64 By focusing on
the political and ideological implications of Taylorism,
instead of on its more narrow technical features, the
Taylor Society was able to transcend the factory and the
labor process. It was able to articulate a political
discourse that addressed the problem of the macroeconomy
and the state. In short, the Taylor Society went from
Taylorism to social-Keynesianism (or social-democracy)
. It
went, that is, from factory to society.
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CHAPTER IV
FROM FACTORY TO SOCIETY
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the Taylor
Society. Although there is an extensive literature on
Taylor and Taylorism, there is no work which deals
exclusively with the history of the Taylor Society. Nor
for that matter is there any published study that explores
the influence of the Taylor Society on the emergence of the
political economy of mass consumption. 1 My purpose here is
not to provide a detailed historical account of the Taylor
Society, but rather to use that Society as a vehicle to
study the emergence of mass consumption capitalism. My
interest is to show how "a small band of Taylorites," who
at first were concerned exclusively with the problems of
factory production, eventually developed into an important
policy-making network concerned with the problems of the
macroeconomy and the state.
Origins of the Tavlor Society
The Taylor Society was formally organized in 1911. It
was a professional association composed primarily of
management consultants, engineers, and businessmen
interested in the "science of management." 2 According to
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founding member Frank B. Gilbreth, the purpose of the
Taylor Society was to:
gather, codify and preserve all data on the subject
of scientific management, to act as a clearinghouse
for ideas, to secure the cooperation of all men
capable of undertaking the work of scientific
management
... in order that there would be available
at all times for the members, a cohesive working
force, familiar with the principles, and in sympathy
with the ideas of scientific management. 3
Membership in the Taylor Society concentrated in
Philadelphia, New York, and Massachusetts. The principal
activities of the Society were membership meet ings ( local
and national)
, educational work and research concerning
scientific management, a consultation and information
service for members, discussions of the most important
issues facing the "business community", and the publication
(beginning in 1915) of a bimonthly bulletin. 4
The Taylor Society emerged out of the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
,
where "Taylor's followers
constituted a ready-made reform faction." 5 Beginning in
1886, with Henry R. Towne ' s paper, "The Engineer as
Economist," and following during the next two decades, with
contributions such as Taylor's "A Piece Rate System" (1895)
and "Shop Management" (1903), the ASME had provided a key
forum for the discussion of management as an engineering
problem. 6 By 1905, however, the ASME seems to have
reverted to a more narrow and traditional understanding of
the role of the engineer as a technician--that is, as
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someone merely concerned with problems of machine design
and operation. As Harlow S. Person puts it, "the concern
of that society with an increasing number of technical
subjects did not permit expansion of its program to give
that attention to management which importance of the
subject required." 7 Eventually, this would be an important
reason why the Taylorites decided to create their own
organization
.
A related problem was the emergence within the ASME of
a new generation of engineers linked as employees to large
corporate organizations. These engineers, as Edwin Layton
points out, identified their destiny with the large
corporations which employed them. By 1904, these
"commercialized engineers" came to dominate the ASME and
under their regime this society became subordinated to
corporate power. This situation created a growing division
within ASME. On one side, were the corporate employees who
were exponents of "commercialized engineering". On the
other side, were the representatives of the machine-tool
industries and light-manufacturing industries who defended
the notion "that mechanical engineers should be independent
and self-employed practitioners." Taylor and his followers
were part of the latter group. 8
As the most active group within the ASME, the
Taylorites took the leading role in the struggle to restore
independence and professionalism to engineers. In the
111
course of this struggle, they clearly identified
"commercialism" as the threat to their goals. 9 A leading
figure in this struggle was Morris Cooke who "grasped the
key fact that the hard core of resistance to scientific
management came from the public utilities and railroads
acting together as a sort of monopoly interest within the
engineering profession. By shifting emphasis from the
virtues of scientific management to the vices of the
utilities, [Cooke] was able to broaden the base of his
appeal and link the efficiency crusade to the national
Progressive movement." 10 Moreover, according to Layton,
Cooke "identified three groups that served as carriers of
utilities influence [within the engineering profession]
:
employees and officers of utilities; engineers affiliated
with their suppliers, such as the manufacturers of
electrical equipment and steam boilers; and consultants
whose practices depended upon the utilities." 11 In doing
so, as Peter Friedlander argues, Cooke demonstrated that he
understood very clearly the structural nature of the
opposition to scientific management within the ASME. 12
The election of Taylor to the presidency of the ASME
in 1906, deepened the rift in that organization. Taylor's
reforms, particularly his attempt to apply scientific
management to the society itself, provoked "a storm of
protest" from the conservative faction of the ASME. 13 It
was Cooke, however, who led the struggle to reform the
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ASME. Cooke hoped to transform the ASME into a forum for
scientific management and progressive social reform. For
this it was necessary to rid that society of corporate
influence and to instill in the engineering profession a
sense of dedication to public service. As part of this
effort Cooke wrote a paper in 1908, "The Engineer and the
People," in which he argued that public service was the key
to the engineer's status. The low professional status of
engineers was due to the fact that they did not serve the
people directly. Engineers might attempt to overcome this
situation by collectively serving the public. As a
practical step in that direction Cooke proposed the
creation of a committee in the ASME through which engineers
could provide public service and enhance their sense of
social responsibility
.
14
According to Layton, underlying Cooke's outlook was a
radical departure from more traditional views of
engineering and professionalism:
What made Cooke 1 s proposal revolutionary was his
assumption that loyalty to the public and loyalty to
employers were antagonistic, even incompatible
.
This theme was not stressed in Cooke's 1908 paper;
it became apparent only later. Cooke saw
engineering and business as radically different . He
resented "the assumption that business- -big or
little— is engineering. His animosity was directed
particularly toward the large, monopolistic
corporations, which he felt were exploiting the
people and polluting American politics. Engineers
who allied themselves with such organizations were
acting against the public interest. 15
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For Cooke, in conclusion, the domination of engineering by
"large, monopolistic corporations" was responsible for the
low professional status of engineers. This presented "a
terrible menace to society". The solution to this problem
was to be found in regaining autonomy for the profession
and in the dedication to public service. 16
As Daniel Nelson indicates, the efforts of Taylor,
Cooke and the other Taylorites to reform the ASME led, by
1911, to an informal alliance between traditional engineers
(whose background was similar to that of the Taylorites)
and corporate engineers. A clear indication of this
alliance was that, during this period, engineers like John
Calder and L.P. Alford, two of the society's most
articulate members, openly criticized Taylor and scientific
management. Both of these men were part of the system
management movement, but considered engineers to be
technicians and the ASME an organization for the discussion
of technical rather than management problems.
Consequently, they opposed the Taylorites' attempts to
broaden the scope of the society and of engineers' social
responsibility. 17 Another important indication of this
alliance was the resistance to publishing papers on
scientific management, including, significantly what would
become Taylor's most important work, The Principles of
Scientific Management . 18 This was followed in 1912, by the
report of a committee of the ASME which basically rejected
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the scientific claim of Taylorism. In short, "the ASME
came close to repudiating scientific management between
1910 and 1912.-19 The Taylor Society was created as a
response to this situation.
The Taylor Society was born during the "Eastern Rate
Case." In the spring of 1910, a group of railroads
announced a general wage increase for their employees. The
railroads followed this announcement with a petition to the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for an increase in
freight rates. The rationale for this, according to the
railroads, was that wage increases constituted financial
losses, thus, the need for an increase in price. In
response to this action, the Eastern Shippers Association
called upon Louis D. Brandeis to present their case against
the price increase before the ICC. The hearings held by
the ICC--which became known as the Eastern Rate Case-
lasted from August to December 1910. The case was decided
in February 1911 and it was won by the shippers'
association. The case marked a turning point for the
scientific management movement. It propelled the movement
into the national spotlight and popularized the concept of
"scientific management" throughout the United States. As
Milton Nadworny indicates, the Eastern Rate Case put the
scientific management movement "on the map" and gave it a
proper name. It also provided an opportunity for the
formation of the Taylor Society. 20
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The strategy used by Brandeis was to attack the
railroads as "inefficient". If the railroads were operated
in a more efficient way, he argued, they could pay higher
wages without increasing their rates. The problem with the
railroads was that they had failed to adopt scientific
management
:
We say that this situation, this practical
declaration of hopelessness which comes from the
railroads, this incompetence to deal with the great
problem of labor and the great problem of costs, is
due to failure to regard that which the most
progressive manufacturers in competitive lines of
business have been led to adopt, namely the science
of management
.
21
If the railroads adopted scientific management, Brandeis
contended, the results would be "higher wages to the
workman, less costs, and therefore, better profits to the
manufacturer, and reduced prices, in many instances to the
consumer--and this reduction in price to the consumer,
coincident with the general increase in prices about which
we have heard so much, and the increase in the cost of
living." 22 Brandeis' most sensational claim, however, was
that the adoption of scientific management would save the
railroads one million dollars a day. This claim sparked an
"efficiency craze" around the country and transformed
scientific management into a national phenomenon. 23
To elaborate his strategy and document his claims,
Brandeis turned to Taylor and his followers. At this point
an important development occurred. Henry L. Gantt, one of
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Taylor's closest associates and a member of the ASME
'
s
governing council, attempted to get the society to endorse
Brandeis' case against the railroads. The ASME, however,
rejected Gantt's petition. 24 The Taylorites went ahead
anyway and assisted Brandeis. In October 1910, Brandeis
met with Gantt, Frank Gilbreth, Henry V. Sheel, and Robert
T. Kent, editor of Industri al Enalnpprinn . in New York to
discuss the strategy for the ICC hearings. It was at this
meeting that the name "scientific management" was
officially adopted for the Taylorite movement. As Nadworny
states, "it was not the first time the term was used, but
it was the first time it was accepted as an official
title
.
" 25
As part of their efforts to assist Brandeis, Gilberth
and Kent went to Canada to gather information on the
management methods introduced into some shops of the
Canadian Pacific Railroads by Gantt. It was during this
trip that Gilbreth conceived the idea of creating a society
which would "perpetuate Fred Taylor's work" and "conserve
the ground that will be won" by scientific management after
the Eastern Rate Case. Gilbreth and Kent discussed the
idea with Cooke, and a few days later, on November 9, 1910,
a group of five men met at the New York Athletic Club and
laid the foundation for what would become the Taylor
Society. The five men present at that first meeting were
Morris Cooke; Frank Gilbreth/ Robert Kent; Wilfred Lewis,
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President of the Tabor Manufacturing Company (a model
Taylorite plant); and Conrad N. Lauer, also from Tabor. it
would take another year, however, before the Taylor Society
was formally organized. 26
In October 1911, a month before the Taylor Society was
formally organized, Harlow S. Person, with the aid of
Morris Cooke, organized a "Conference on Scientific
Management" sponsored by the Amos Tuck School of Business
and Finance at Dartmouth College. At the time, Person was
the Dean of that school. The purpose of the conference was
to bring together a group of New England businessmen with
management engineers and manufacturers who were experts on
scientific management. This encounter, the organizers
hoped, would enable the New England businessmen to gain a
better understanding of the principles of scientific
management and of the benefits of applying these principles
to their businesses. 27 The conference was attended by the
most important figures in the field of scientific
management including: Frederick Taylor, Carl Barth, Henry
Gantt, Harrington Emerson, Sanford L . Thompson, King
Hathaway, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, Robert B. Wolf, and
James M. Dodge. Among others, the businessmen associated
with scientific management included: Henry Kendall, A.
Lincoln Filene, Ralph E. Flanders, and John G. Aldrich.
The conference market the first major meeting devoted to
the subject of scientific management. 28 The fact that it
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was organized by Person and Cooke is not insignificant.
For this conference prefigured what the Taylor Society
would become--a forum for the discussion of management
problems. In a sense, although the Taylor Society was not
yet formally constituted, the Dartmouth Conference was the
society's first public activity.
The Taylor Society, or the Society for the Promotion
of the Science of Management, as it was called originally,
was formally organized in November 1911. 29 According to
Robert T. Kent, the organization's secretary: "The Society
was formed partly because ...the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers ... would not give to the Taylor
principles the publicity that we thought they deserved."
The creation of a formal organization was also the product
of the need to consolidate the gains made by scientific
management as a result of the Eastern Rate Case. As its
first president the society elected James Mapes Dodge, a
past president of the ASME. This was done, as Kent
indicates, "to avoid offending" the ASME. 30 That is to say,
it was done so that the Taylor Society would not appear as
a divisive element within the ASME. The society, after
all, had been originally conceived as one which would act
in harmony with the ASME. 31 The election of Dodge was also
an attempt to win over Taylor's support for the new
organization
.
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According to Nadworny, Taylor was initially opposed to
the creation of a society to promote his work. He was
concerned that a separate organization would not be as
effective as a group within the ASME . For him the problem
was that the new organization would be composed of people
already converted to scientific management, while within
the ASME there was still a large group that needed to be
convinced about the benefits of Taylorism. Thus, the
formation of the Taylor Society could do more harm than
good to the cause of scientific management. 32 Despite
Taylor's opposition, the new society continued to function
and develop. Moreover, the formation of the Taylor Society
gave new life to scientific management within the ASME, and
by 1919, as Edwin Layton states, "the Taylorites ... seemed
to control the society." This influence was evident in the
role played by the Taylorites in the formation of the
Federated American Engineering Society, a progressive
federation of four major engineering groups, and in the
creation of a special management division within the ASME
in 1920 . 33 The Taylorites' control over the ASME, however,
was short-lived. By the mid-1920s Cooke and the Taylorites
had been defeated by the conservative forces within the
ASME. 34 Having failed to transform the ASME into a forum
for scientific management and progressive social reform,
the Taylorites turned their energies to expanding the work
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of the Taylor Society as an independent policy-discussing
and industrial research network. 35
Development of Poliri^
In its early years, before World War I, the Taylor
Society focused its attention on the purely technical
aspects of the labor process. Its domain was the factory
not society, production not consumption. As Harlow S.
Person explains:
Before the War American industry was on a sellers'
market and the emphasis in the work of the society
was on production technique, and the principles as
expressed therein, for on a sellers' market
production to meet what appears to be insatiable
demand is the major problem of industry. It was
during this period and in the production field that
the basic technique of scientific management was
worked out and the fundamental principles
formulated
.
36
During this period discussions at the society meetings were
restricted to topics such as "the determination of work and
operating standards, the order of introducing Taylor's
methods into a plant," and "the handling of materials
between machine operations." 37 In this respect, the
society's outlook was basically in tune with Taylor's early
concerns
.
However, with the election of Harlow Person (who was
not an engineer, but an economist) as President in 1913,
the Taylor Society began to broaden its scope. In
particular, the Society began to address the so-called
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"problem of industrial relations," which Person defined as
"the problem of management." 38 As part of this effort, in
1915 the Taylor Society provided a forum for industrial
consultants Robert G. Valentine and Robert B. Wolf to
develop their "revisionist" ideas on the relationship
between scientific management and organized labor.
Valentine was a proponent of "workers' consent in
management," whereas Wolf advocated the idea of
"nonfinancial incentives" to motivate workers in production
and defended a positive role for unions. Both of them
departed in a radical way from Taylor's understanding on
the role of unions. 39 Although the majority of the members
of the Taylor Society did not necessarily share these views
at this time, the society still provided an open forum for
such ideas. 40 In the years ahead the Taylor Society would
give vent to the issues of "workers' consent," "workers'
participation," and "union-management co-operation." Such
was the development of the Taylor Society in this area,
that by 1923 Person proclaimed "the outstanding
contribution which scientific management is now making, is
to the solution of the problem of industrial relations." 41
World War I marked a turning point in the history of
the Taylor Society. It was during the war--when all of the
officers and over 50 per cent of the membership of the
Taylor Society went to work for the U.S. government on
behalf of the war effort— that the Taylorites discovered
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the macro-economy and specifically the state. 42 The war
effort made it necessary for U.S. industries to maximize
production while at the same time it generated a labor
shortage which strengthened the trade union movement. This
led the state to turn to the Taylorites (and other
management "experts") for the planning and development of
war production. During the war, as Daniel Nelson states,
many managers and businessmen served on the War Industries
Board, the Council of National Defense, and the
Conservation Division of the WIB, "all of which stressed
the elimination of waste, the simplification of styles and,
the standarization of parts." 43 The members of the Taylor
Society were part of this contingent and their experience
organizing war production enabled them to broaden their
social perspective and enter what Person called the "period
of the larger conception of scientific management." 44
On December 8, 1917, the Taylor Society met to discuss
the problems of organization and production for war. At
that meeting, Henry Kendall, a Massachusetts textile
manufacturer, argued that U.S. victory in the war was
contingent
:
upon the maximum production of the country,
production of what is wanted, in the quantities
wanted, and at the time wanted, and this maximum can
be obtained by a completely organized war machine,
and this can be brought about in time only by a
definite plan and centralized authority in bringing
it to pass. 45
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For Kendall, this utmost coordination and centralization of
Government activities was a necessity, if the U.S. was
going to defeat the "all embracing, high-efficient
organization represented by the German Government." 46
Ernest Martin Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College,
concurred with Kendall, stating "that there is nothing to
do except to make a complete democratic move, to commandeer
everything and everybody and every resource in this country
for the common purpose." "If this is centralization of
authority,
" he added, it seems to me that that is what we
ought to do." 47
Morris Cooke, however, warned against the excesses of
centralization of authority and argued in favor of a more
decentralized and democratic form of control:
In planning any organization, industrial, political
or any other, it seems that we should always try to
come back to the rule of democracy ... wherever we
decentralize we get the spring and the surge and the
inspiration that comes with people acting from
motives of their own without dictation from the top,
or least with the minimum of dictation from the
top. 48
For Cooke, in short, the war should be conducted along more
"democratic lines." Despite their differences, the
Taylorites shared a common understanding of the
significance of the war for American society. This
understanding was best expressed by the president of
Dartmouth College, who was a close associate of the Taylor
Society, as he summarized the discussion on the war effort:
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All of this goes back to a very large fact in
connection with our national welfare, namely, that
we have been a nation of individualists and havebeen extremely slow to understand that prosperity
and welfare were coming to us in the last analysisby disassociating ourselves from the theories ofindividualism that have prevailed, and accepting an
entirely new view in regard to cooperation, which
eventually must be the basis of effective
democracy
.
49
It was this understanding which enabled the Taylor Society
to draw on the cooperative and collective war effort (what
Murray N. Rothbard calls "war collectivism") as a model to
confront the Great Depression and build the New Deal. 50
During the war the majority of the leaders of the
Taylor Society worked with the Ordnance Department, the
Emergency Fleet Corporation, the United States Shipping
Board, and other planning and production agencies. 51 Within
these agencies, the Taylorites played an instrumental role
in terms of labor-management relations. Of particular
significance, as Morris Cooke pointed out, was that
" [during] the War a group of those associated with the
Taylor Society helped to draft [an industrial code] which
was issued as General Order #13 by the Ordnance Department
and under another designation by the Quartermaster
Department." 52 This Code, which according to Nadworny, "was
probably mainly Cooke's handiwork;" recommended that
government contractors accept collective bargaining, the 8-
hour day, minimum wages, equal pay for women, health and
safety provisions (aimed fundamentally at protecting women
and children), and union-management cooperation schemes. 53
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Before the war it seems improbable that most
Taylorites would have endorsed these measures. However,
the experience of organizing war production with the
collaboration of the unions under government sponsored
collective bargaining arrangements, led the members of the
Taylor Society to reassess their previously held position
in relation to union recognition and collective bargaining.
This new understanding on the role of unions would be key
to the rapprochement between the AFL and the Taylor Society
during the 1920s. 54 As Edward Eyre Hunt indicates, the war
had broadened the function of the management engineer
tremendously and had put "[not] mechanical but human
problems ... in the foreground." 55 This tendency would be
taken even farther during the post-World War I period.
The end of the war brought new possibilities and
challenges for the Taylor Society. At a national meeting
which took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on October 3-
4, 1919, the post-War World I situation was summarized in
the following way:
The aftermath of the war brings with it a severe
test of resourcefulness and efficiency in the
conduct of business activities. The wholesale
destruction of the products of labor, the vast
amount of deferred maintenance that has to be made
up on much of the undestroyed maintenance that has
to be made up on much of the undestroyed property,
the smaller numbers of ablebodied laborers
available, the demand for shorter hours and for an
increased measure of the comforts and luxuries for
the masses, --all require increased intelligence in
the processes of production and of distribution. 56
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Moreover, as John E. Otterson, from Winchester Repeating
Arms Co., and acting president of the Taylor Society
argued, the war had expanded the opportunities "for the
application of the philosophy and the science of management
as taught by Mr. Taylor, and were he here today, I am sure
he would be able to point out to us a wider field of
application of his teachings." 57 In light of these new
challenges and sensing an opportunity to expand the
application of scientific management "to a wider field,"
the Taylor Society established a central office in New York
and created the position of managing director, to run the
affairs of the society on a day-to-day basis. On April
1919, Harlow S. Person was chosen managing director of the
Taylor Society, a position he held until the dissolution of
the society in 1936. 58
The postwar period also brought a transformation in
the membership and composition of the Taylor Society. In
its early years the membership of the Taylor Society was
composed primarily of engineers and employers. The
society was a small and close-knit group composed of
"Taylor men" and representatives of "Taylor plants." From
"a small band of Taylorites" which attracted some twenty or
twenty-five persons to its meetings during the first two
years of its existence, the society grew to a membership of
over 800 during the 1920s. 59 The society's membership not
only grew in size, it also changed in composition. By
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1922, as Person states, membership to the Taylor Society
did not require "that one be a 'Taylor man' or represent a
'Taylor plant'." it meant only that a person was
interested in management as a science, desired to promote
investigation in that field, and was "open-minded and
appreciative of great contributions to the development of
better management." 60 As a consequence of this change, the
Taylor Society began to attract social scientists such as
Mary Van Kleeck and Irving Fisher, journalists such as
George Soule and Robert Bruere, and urban mass retailers
such as E. A. Filene and A. Lincoln Filene. The
transformation in the society's membership and composition
coincided with the broadening of its social and economic
perspective, and with the extension of scientific
management to new areas.
A key area to which the Taylor Society attempted
to extend the application of scientific management was
sales and marketing. This was done during the 1920s, in
the context of contracting markets. According to Person,
the war had plunged the economy into a "buyer's market":
...the war... was a tremendous shock to the
industrial system. On the one hand it caused a
still greater development of productive capacity,
financed out of future earnings through the
mechanism of bonds and taxation, and caused a
coincident decline in consumers' demand... a decline
which is likely to continue for some time because of
the continuing heavy taxes and the maladjustments
caused by the war. In short, the shock seems to
have hastened evolutionary tendencies, which would
have developed more gradually and with only minor
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depressions, and to have thrown us suddenly upon abuyers' market which will last for some time and maybe the beginning of a dominant buyers' market. 61
What this meant, in Person's view, was "intense competition
on the part of management to find the individual consumers
and to sell them." And in that competition selling price
and cost of production would be critical factors. 62 Thus,
the need to focus on marketing and selling.
As Henry Dennison, a prominent member of the Taylor
Society, pointed out, since 1920 the problem of marketing
and especially the creation of demand for the product and
the development of new products had become the pre-eminent
concern of business executives. At the forefront of those
concerned with the problems of marketing and selling,
according to Dennison, was the Taylor Society. As early as
October, 1920, "articles suggesting a more scientific
viewpoint on marketing" appeared in the Bulletin of that
society. 63 These articles and the discussions that took
place at the Taylor Society on selling and marketing
recognized that "the application of science" to the
solution of sales problems was "a relatively recent
development in American business." Yet, the attitude that
prevailed was that "[the] problems of marketing, like
factory problems, must be isolated, abstracted and analyzed
after the scientific method." The assumption was that, if
American business and management had used "science" to
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resolve its factory problems, they could also use it to
resolve the problems of marketing and selling. 64
Henry Kendall summarized the Taylor Society
perspective on selling in the following way:
There are three essentials to selling: knowing your
product, knowing the market and knowing the trade
channels. The problem of the sales executive backed
by the chief executive today is, on the basis of
these three essentials, to create new markets. To
guide and sustain the sales executive, the chief
executive should know as much about merchandising as
the latter, and should now focus his attention upon
the latter's problem. 65
Moreover, Kendall added, the key to the problem of
marketing is to: (1) find a new market for the product,
(2) modify the product to meet the requirements of an
existing market, or (3) develop a new product to meet the
requirements of an existing market. Here again, it is the
task of the sales managers, with the assistance of the
"chief executive, " to coordinate the process of market
research and "sales engineering." 66 This process entailed
not just the study of the product and of the market in
general, but more specifically, "the evolution of
merchandising, " "the use of statistics and the development
of the sales budget, " joint research in the field of
selling and marketing with other institutions, and
"scientific advertising." As a result of this new emphasis
on selling the sales managers had come to occupy the
position held by the production managers in the period
before the war. 67
130
The approach of the Taylor Society to the problem of
selling and marketing was part of their approach to a
broader problem: the problem of economic stabilization at
the macroeconomic level. During the 1920s the Taylor
Society was an important component of the campaign led by
Herbert Hoover to create a macroeconomic management system.
The idea behind this campaign was to achieve macroeconomic
stability through microeconomic strategies. As Guy Alchon
indicates, this campaign sought to influence the
microeconomic decisions of individual managers in such a
way as to enhance the stability of the economy as a whole.
The underlying assumption of this approach was "that if
enough managers stabilized their operations along the lines
recommended, then the sum of individual decisions, much
like the invisible hand of the classical market, would add
up to increased productivity, moderation of distributive
conflict, and, thus, the collective good." 68 According to
this approach, then, the stability of the economy as a
whole was achieved through the action of individual
managers at the level of the firm, the role of the state
and other private agencies was to provide guidance to these
managers so that they could stabilize or "regularize" their
firms
.
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As part of this effort, the Taylor Society played a
leading role in the study developed by the "Committee on
the Elimination of Waste" in 1921. The study of waste in
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industry was an initiative undertaken by Hoover as
president of the Federated American Engineering Societies
(FAES ) ; its purpose was to investigate the causes of
"inefficiency" and low production in industry. The Waste
Committee was dominated by the Taylor Society--a
substantial majority of its eigthteen members were
Taylorites— and its report was recognized as a statement
representative of scientific management. 70 According to
Person, "that committee was composed largely of Taylor
engineers, its point of view was entirely Taylor, and the
standards by which it judged waste were the standards,
simon-pure, of scientific management." 71 In fact, as
Nadworny points out, several key reports published in Waste
In Industry were summaries of studies conducted by members
of the Taylor Society: Sanford Thompson's reports on the
building and boot and shoe industries; Morris Cooke's on
men's readymade clothing; John Williams' on the printing
industry; and Fred J. Miller's on metal trades. 72
The report of the Waste Committee created heated
controversy within the engineering profession and was
soundly rejected within employer circles. Its most
controversial aspect was its assessment of who was
responsible for waste (i. e., inefficiency) in industry.
The report concluded that over 50% of industrial waste was
the responsibility of management, while it held labor
responsible for less than 25%. 73 Underlying this conclusion
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was the understanding that management could eliminate the\
sources of waste and inefficiency in industry, if it
followed the Committee's recommendations for stabilizing
plant operations. One of the most important
recommendations put forth by the Committee was the need for
management-labor cooperation to increase production. The
Committee also stressed the need to prevent unemployment,
which was not only an important source of waste, but also
of industrial unrest. 74 Here again, the responsibility for
dealing with this problem was placed on the shoulders of
management. Not surprisingly, the reaction of organized
labor to the report of the Waste Committee was positive.
In Person's words, the Committee's report "was hailed by
organized labor as one of the most important documents in
their interest ever published-- for it publicly placed the
chief responsibility for waste on management." In doing
so, it contributed to the process of reconciliation between
scientific management and the unions. 75
As Evan Metcalf points out, although much of the Waste
Report was concerned with problems of shop management and
production control, the Committee's recommendations went
beyond the traditional methods associated with scientific
management and encompassed measures concerning business
planning, such as the coordination between production and
sales. In particular, it stressed the need for mechanisms
of formal sales forecasting and systematic budgeting, both
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of which were necessary if firms were to respond
effectively to fluctuations of the market and to the
problem of "irregular employment." For Hoover, Metcalf
argues, the Committee's report represented a landmark in
the transition of scientific management from its pre-War
World I concern with "the minutiae of shop and office
routine" to "broad questions of policy-making." 76
This transition was also evident in the role played by
the Taylorites in the FAES 1 second major research project,
a study of the twelve-hour day in the steel industry. This
study, which was undertaken by the FAES at Hoover's
initiative, was also dominated by engineers associated to
the Taylor Society (5 of the 8 members of the Committee
appointed to supervise the project were Taylorites) . And
as was the case in the Waste Study, its conclusions (which
viewed favorably the change to a eight-hour day) were
highly controversial within the engineering profession.
Specifically, the study's recommendations were rejected by
the steel industry—which opposed shortening the work day--
and by its allies within the engineering societies. 77
A central aspect of Hoover's campaign to stabilize the
American economy was the movement to prevent unemployment,
or as it was called during the 1920s, the movement to
"regularize employment." 78 In terms of policy-making, the
principal vehicle of this movement was "President Harding's
Conference on Unemployment." This conference, which was
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convened by Harding in September 1921 at Hoover's
suggestion, was one of Hoover's first and most important
projects as Secretary of Commerce. The Unemployment
Conference had two fundamental purposes. The first,
immediate purpose, was to mobilize the business sector and
local communities behind an emergency relief and re-
employment program. The second aim, was to develop a long-
range program of unemployment prevention. 79 But for Hoover
and his allies (including the Taylorites) , the Unemployment
Conference was above all "the vehicle through which
microeconomic regularizat ion and a greater data competence
might become instruments of macroeconomic stabilization." 80
According to Alchon, the Unemployment Conference and
such research offshoots as the Business Cycle Committee
supplied evidence that regularizat ion, "understood as
managerial production and sales strategies that could
reduce fluctuations in employment and business activity,
"
had become a key aspect of Hoover's campaign for
macroeconomic stabilization. 81 Hoover's focus on
regularizat ion was
.
shared by the members of the Taylor
Society, who viewed unemployment as a form of industrial
waste that could be prevented by the application of
scientific management at the level of the firm. As Person
states, "the [Taylor Society] has maintained that the point
of attack on practically every phase of the industrial
problem is in the individual plant, and that better
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conditions in general are to be achieved by wiser
administration and more scientific managements of
individual enterprises." 82 Consistent with this
perspective, the Taylor Society encouraged individual
managers to take measures to regularize employment within
their own firms. In doing so, they sought to contribute to
the development of a macroeconomic stabilization strategy
based on the scientific management of individual plants.
In September 1921, Hoover, acting as Chairman of the
Unemployment Conference formed an Economic Advisory
Committee, to set the agenda and prepare the program for
that conference. This committee, as Alchon notes, was
dominated by representatives of the American Association
for Labor Legislation, the National Bureau of Economic
Research, and the Taylor Society. 83 Among the Taylorites
who composed the Economic Advisory Committee, the most
important figure was Henry Dennison. A paper products
manufacturer from Massachusetts, Dennison was a pioneer in
the efforts to regularize employment (his company establish
the first company unemployment fund in the United States)
and was considered one of the most progressive and
influential business leaders in the country. 84 Active in
the movement to prevent unemployment since the pre-World
War I period, Dennison became a close associate of Hoover's
Commerce Department throughout the 1920s. Elected
president of the Taylor Society in 1920, Dennison became
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the leader of a group of progressive employers—including
Richard A. Feiss, Henry Kendall, Howard Coonley, Edward A.
Filene, A. Lincoln, and Morris Leeds--who were at the
forefront of the campaign to regularize employment. 85
For Dennison, and other members of the Economic
Advisory Committee such as Wesley Mitchell, the question of
controlling the business cycle was a central one for the
Unemployment Conference. Indeed, the Committee's
preconference report stressed the need to focus attention
on the study of the business cycle and on ways to enhance
the control over it. To this end Hoover, who shared
Dennison ! s and Mitchell's view on the importance of
controlling the business cycle, formed a subcommittee of
the Unemployment Conference to study this question. 86
According to Metcalf, the report of the Business Cycles
Committee, which was published in May 1923, provided a
broader framework for the development of regularizat ion
policies. Specifically, the report recognized that many
aspects of the business cycle were not well understood by
businessmen or managers, and that some of these aspects
were beyond their control . Moreover, he states, the report
contained three major areas of policy recommendations: (1)
monetary policy, (2) long-range planning of public works,
and (3) regularization of employment and investment by
private business
.
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For Mary Van Kleeck, a key member of the Business
Cycles Committee, "the theme of that report was that
unemployment must be traced back to the businessman. Not
that he is to blame, but he must take the lead in analyzing
the whole network of conditions and applying such knowledge
as scientists can bring to bear." 88 Van Kleeck, a social
worker and Director of the Department of Industrial Studies
of the Russell Sage Foundation, was since the pre-World War
I period a leading advocate of regularize employment.
During the war she became closely associated with Morris
Cooke, with whom she collaborated on issues regarding
women's work. 89 Subsequently, in the early 1920s, she
became a member and an officer of the Taylor Society.
Being a social worker, however, meant that her perspective
on social problems was different from that of the majority
of engineers and employers that composed the Taylor
Society
:
Social workers are vitally concerned in the
attainment of a more adequate standard of living.
In their work among families and individuals whose
living conditions are below par, they encounter
unemployment, low wages, and evidence of unwholesome
conditions in industry. But they do not always see
that the remedy for these conditions may be in the
workshop. In the Taylor Society, social workers
have an opportunity to meet members of the
engineering group who are tackling problems in the
plant with just as much anxiety as have the social
workers to reduce long hours, increase wages, and to
regularize employment. Perhaps the engineers also
need this contact to enable them to see the full
significance of management engineering in its
effects upon the social life of the community. 90
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Moreover, Van Kleeck stated, the fact that the Taylor
Society recognized the importance of the social scientist
"and had admitted those of us who whose work has been
entirely in the human aspects of industry, " was a clear
signal that the society was moving in the right direction.
It was an acknowledgement, in her view, "that no one could
be a true Taylorite who does not have the human interest
either to begin with or as result" of their industrial
studies. 91 Van Kleeck' s interest in the Taylor Society,
thus, was "not directed toward challenging the technical
engineer to give attention to problems of human relations."
She was concerned rather with having "those people who see
the present disastrous results of industrial organization
in the community realize how the art of management in the
shop can fundamentally change those social conditions in
the community." For Van Kleeck, the Taylor Society was a
vehicle through which management could be interpreted to
those "who are seeking to construct a better society." And
membership in the society provided "an opportunity to share
in that interpretation." 92 Van Kleeck, in short, viewed the
Taylor Society as an important element in the campaign to
achieve social stability through microeconomic strategies.
As a social scientist, Van Kleeck was also very much
concerned with the need to develop scientific management as
a tool for social research in industry:
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Are there not signs that scientific management mustlearn to apply its own science to the more subtle
and difficult problems of human relationships which
we are coming to see as the science of management?
How much do we know, for instance, on the moot
question of financial or non-financial incentives
and the whole problem of developing and conserving
the creative power of the workers in highly
developed forms of industry. Or again, how shall welearn to measure the relation between production and
consumption?
.. .What methods shall be set up to
answer [these questions]? The field of discovery is
as yet vague, but its vital importance is
increasingly shown. We need to forge the tools, to
find the methods, for making the discoveries. 93
For Van Kleeck, all of the areas under the supervision of
the industrial manager required information that could only
be provided by the methods of the social sciences. Here
lies the importance of social research in industry; it is a
means of discovering the "facts'* that will enable the
manager to scientifically administer the industrial plant:
" [Can] the industrial manager know all he needs to know
about materials if he excludes form the range of his
knowledge the habits and attitudes of the men who make
them...? Must he not also know the habits, the attitudes
and the circumstances of purchasers? Can the market be
understood without using the methods of the social
sciences?" Above all, Van Kleeck concluded, the power of
social research lay in its capacity to harmonize social
conflict and make cooperation possible. 94
Van Kleeck 's concerns about the importance of
developing tools for social research in industry were
shared by the leading members of the Taylor Society. In
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particular, Harlow Person, who also was a social scientist,
argued likewise that the Taylor Society should insist upon
the "widest possible discussion of all phases of scientific
management." It should, he added, contemplate its
discussions from the point of view of the manager, the
worker, and the social scientist each of whom could
contribute to the analysis of an aspect of social reality
that the others had not experienced. The importance of
this type of approach to social research was that it
provided a broader understanding of the problems in
industry. It also provided a better basis for cooperation
between these different groups. By combining and
harmonizing these three different perspectives the Taylor
Society could contribute to the development of a truly
scientific approach to social research, and scientific
management could "finally [reveal] itself as raising
fundamental questions of industrial philosophy." 95 Thus,
both Van Kleeck and Person were convinced of the
"objective" and "impartial" nature of the "scientific"
approach to social research they proposed; and of its
importance as a tool to further a strategy of economic
stabilization. In this, they shared with Hoover what
Alchon calls "a basic faith in the social virtues of
technocratic analysis and prescription." 96 This faith
explains the centrality of economic and social surveys in
Hoover's effort to stabilize the American economy.
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In conclusion, through their participation in the
waste and the twelve-hour day studies, and in the different
committees of the Unemployment Conference, the members of
the Taylor Society played a leading role in Hoover's
campaign to create a macroeconomic management system.
Conversely, participation in this campaign played a key
role in the transition of the Taylor Society from factory
to society. As Hoover put it, it enabled the Taylorites to
move beyond their concerns with the details of factory
production to the broad issues of policy-making. It
enabled them, finally, to develop what they considered to
be "a truly scientific" approach to social research in
industry and to apply scientific management to "fundamental
questions of industrial philosophy."
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CHAPTER V
TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MASS CONSUMPTION
Introduction
During the New Deal the question of recasting the
political economy came to the forefront of American society.
As the Great Depression undermined the institutional
arrangements that had supported the development of capitalism
until then, contending political-economic strategies sought
to gain influence in the policy-making process. In this
chapter I focus on the political struggle between two of
these strategies: corporatism and Keynesianism
. I will
begin, however, by discussing the political rupture between
Hoover and the Taylorites, and the emergence within the
Taylor Society during the late 1920s of a proto-Keynesian
perspective. I will also trace the Taylor Society into the
1930s to understand its relationship to the New Deal.
Finally, I will examine the role played by the Society and
those closely associated with it in the development of a
Keynesian political-economic order
.
Proto-Keynesianism
During the 1920s the Taylor Society and its associates
played an important role in the development of Hoover's
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campaign to create a macroeconomic management system. This
campaign, as I have shown, was based on a mioroeconomio
approach to macroeconomic stability. It involved, according
to Guy Alchon, the creation of a planning apparatus conceived
as "a middle way" between "statist collectivism" and
"laissez-faire." In this "middle way", the role of the state
was limited to providing information and guidance to
individual businessmen concerning their microeconomic
decisions, in the hope that this guidance would influence
their decisions and contribute to the stabilization of their
firms. As such, this strategy relied heavily on the
expertise and authority of management engineers and social
scientists. 1 Thus, the prominent role played by the
Taylorites
.
For the Taylor Society, Hoover's campaign represented an
opportunity to expand the application of scientific
management to new areas and a recognition of the importance
of Taylorism as a tool for resolving social problems. 2 Their
alliance with Hoover was based on the recognition by both
parties of the need to apply "the engineering method" to
social problems. Despite the close collaboration between
the Taylorites and Hoover, their alliance began to unravel
toward the end of the 1920s. By 1932, with the election of
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the launching of the New Deal, the
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differences between these two groups had become
irreconcilable and their political collaboration came to an
end
.
The severing of the Taylorite-Hoover alliance was the
result of several factors. First among them was that during
the late twenties leading members of the Taylor Society
became increasingly critical of Hoover's program and
consequently begun to develop political relationships with
individuals who espoused a different political-economic
strategy. By 1927, for example, Mary Van Kleeck-who as
member of the Business Cycle Committee had defended a
stronger role for the federal state in the prevention of
unemployment—began to distance herself from Hoover and his
strategy. Van Kleeck was particularly concerned with the
problem of growing unemployment within the context of general
prosperity. For her, this situation was indicative of
structural problems in the economy, and also a signal of the
failure of Hoover's macroeconomic strategy. 3
As Van Kleeck grew increasingly skeptical, she became
—
along with Frances Perkins—one of the most prominent critics
of President Hoover's unemployment policies. Specifically,
both Perkins and Van Kleeck were sharply critical of the
optimistic figures on unemployment put forward by the Hoover
administration--figures that did not correspond to the ones
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[Mil
generated by «*, *ftooi„ and private firm§i4 Thig ^ &f
"statements from the White House," Van Kleeck wrote in 1930,
"give evidence of a disappointing opportunism in politiotl
leadership, rather than [the] sober grappling with realities
which is characteristic of engineering. »§
in 1928, as part of her efforts in favor of a more
comprehensive collection of unemployment statistics, Van
Kleeck advised Senator Robert F. Wagner on his bill to exei
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This bill increased the
appropriation authorized for the Bureau by $100, 000 "so that
it might extend its report to include statistics on part-time
as well as total unemployment, based on data obtained not
only from a large number of manufacturing industries and
railroads but also from the mining, construction,
agricultural, transportation, and retail and wholesale trade
industries .
"
g For Van Kleeck and other like-minded
individuals, this bill represented the culmination of a long
(and until then unsuccessful) attempt to develop a more
adequate process of collecting unemployment statistics, what
Van Kleeck and the others could not accomplish under Hoover's
nut < i i > t * i
'
i u 1 1 mi i i ' m.tti.uitMiifiit system, r hey smuihl in -h 1 eve
llni >iujh W.tqne i ' s I ei) i s I .it inn.
furthermore, by the late 1920s Van Kle
openly critical of Hoover f s conception of the relationship
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between the state and the economy. At a meeting of the
Taylor Society in December 1928, she strongly criticized
American businessmen for their attitude toward the state:
Why is the American business man so gun-shy of thestate?... How much do we do in a free kind of
stat^f " Vh thinkin^ *bout the relationship of the
^
t0
€
^dustry?... is it not about time we began to
w^h\h Problems of industry as not stoppingit the factory door, and least of all, not stoppLwith the door of the particular manufactured is ftnot about time we ... consider what is the particularfunction of the state which can best serve the entireplan of the community? 7
Van Kleeck's comments, however, were not directed exclusively
at the business class. They were intended also as an
explicit criticism of the political leadership of the
country— including the "engineering political leaders" (an
obvious reference to Hoover)— for promoting this attitude
among the businessmen. In an indictment of Hoover's
understanding of the relationship between the state and the
economy, Van Kleeck said:
If, of course, we are continually, in the mood of
saying, as do our great political leaders—even
engineering political leaders— 'Beware of state
socialism,
'
and 'Beware of politics in business, ' and
'Let us maintain the individual initiative of the
American businessman; ' if we are going to be
controlled by formulae like that, and are going to be
so gun-shy of any legislative proposal, we shall get
just the kind of limited, negative legislation that
industry is continually complaining of. 8
Van Kleeck's critique was shared by Taylor Society
members, such as industrial consultant Ordway Tead, who
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welcomed "every scientific management study which [helped]
define and characterize the severe limitation under which the
competitive process inherently works [and helped] to destroy
the hold on business men's minds of such now compelling
slogans as 'less government in business,' and 'competition is
the life of trade. "'9 Although this was still a minority
perspective, it foreshadowed the ideological direction that
the Taylor Society would take during the 1930s.
Also significant, in this context, was the distancing of
Morris Cooke from Hoover. By 1928 Cooke, who had earlier
called Hoover "the engineering method personified," was
openly critical of the presidential candidate. In October of
that year, Cooke wrote to Felix Frankfurter explaining why he
became disenchanted with Hoover and would not support him for
President
:
On at least four different and very important matters
he [Hoover] has gone back on views previously held and
taken up with the views held by those who control the
newspapers and other big interests. He isn't as smart
as I hoped he would prove. 10
Kenneth E. Trombley, Cooke's official biographer, confirms
the reasons behind Cooke's break with Hoover: "Cooke
[thought] that generally Hoover did an excellent job as
Secretary of Commerce. During this period [Cooke]
represented his state on a committee
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set up by Hoover to study electrical questions, which had
afforded him an opportunity to observe the Secretary at first
hand. They soon broke, however, for Hoover consistently
backed the private power interests ."
U
In 1931, following his break with Hoover, Cooke was
appointed by Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt to serve as a
trustee on the New York State Power Authority ,12 In this
capacity, he established a close political relationship not
only with Roosevelt, but also with Frances Perkins and other
key figures in Roosevelt's state administration. This
experience enabled Cooke to establish a new political
alliance and to become an integral part of a political milieu
that would play a crucial role during the 1930s. According
to Jean Christie, Cooke "looked forward early to
[Roosevelt's] nomination and election to the Presidency, and
in 1932, clinging to his useful standing as a Republican,
supported him as an 'independent.'" 13 Along with Cooke, a
group of prominent businessmen linked to the Taylor Society
—
including Henry Dennison, Henry Kendall, E. A. Filene, and
Morris Leeds—endorsed Roosevelt and subsequently became
strong supporters of the New Deal. This endorsement
confirmed the final political rupture between the Taylor
Society and Hoover. 14
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A closely related factor in the demise of the Taylorite-
Hoover alliance was the emergence within the Taylor Society
of a proto-Keynesian political-outlook. Between 1927 and
1929, discussions in the Taylor Society focused on the
problem of "the maintenance of economic balance."
Increasingly, however, the debate on this question began to
transcend the boundaries of the consensus built around the
Hooverian approach to macroeconomic stability. At a
conference dinner held in 1927 and attended by the directors
and guests of the Taylor Society, Henry Bruere, vice-
president of the Bowery Savings Bank, asked: "Is it true,
since we have so much prosperity, that the secret of
prosperity is mass production and rising purchasing power?
Have we at last discovered the magic circle? If that is
true, what are we doing about it?" Bruere
' s questions
reflected a growing concern within the Taylor Society about
the ability of Hoover's program to maintain economic balance
and sustain prosperity. It reflected also an emerging proto-
Keynesian perspective which was developing within the society
during the late 1920s. 15
Such a perspective went beyond Hoover's strategy for
macroeconomic stability. It involved a developmental or
growth-oriented strategy based on high wages and rising
consumption norms. As Wilfred Lewis, president of Tabor
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Manufacturing Company, expressed in a paper titled "Master
Planks in the American Industrial Program," presented to the
Taylor Society in December 1927:
^nH
35 b
f
C°me increasingly plain that high wages arefundamental to American prosperity. Some economistshave suggested that high wages are the strongestincentive to lower costs of production anddistribution. But at the same time that the highpayroll brings pressure to bear on the management toincrease production and decrease costs, it is alsoincreasing the purchasing power of the consumers and
sustaining or increasing the market for goods... 16
This strategy clearly linked high wages to increasing
productivity and the expansion of mass consumption. In his
paper, moreover, Lewis presented four major planks for
industrial development: (1) to raise living standards by
increasing real income through improvements in production and
the cheapening of products; (2) to increase the high level of
wages still more and to link these high wages to increases in
productivity; (3) to improve the production and distribution
of goods through co-operation between management and workers;
and (4) to stabilize employment--by keeping "men and machine
fully occupied." 17 These four planks summarized the aims of
the Taylor Society during the late twenties. They
constituted not only the outline of an industrial development
program, but also, more importantly, they pointed toward the
emergence of a full-fledged "Keynesian" macroeconomic
strategy
.
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The proponents of this strategy had a clear
understanding of the effects it would have on the
macroeconomy. Specifically, they argued, their policies
would promote economic growth and prosperity for the country.
As Henry H. Williams, of the R. T. French Company in
Philadelphia and a Taylor Society member put it:
«L
t
^ ?
urchasin9 Power of the workers of this countryshould increase twenty five per cent it would not beaitticult to predict what would happen in manyindustries. The demand for automobiles would
undoubtedly increase in an enormous way. The buildinq
of new living quarters for a vast section of our
immediately undertaken and theindustries affected by such construction would
prosper. All sorts of electrical appliances and
conveniences would have their sales augmented ... 1
8
William's analysis was significant in at least two ways.
First, he articulated his explanation in terms of the
"multiplier effect" this strategy would have on the
performance of the overall economy. In doing so, he was
expressing his analysis in terms later made famous by Keynes
himself. Put differently, what Williams expressed here was a
central aspect of what would subsequently be known as
Keynesianism. Second, his analysis focused precisely on the
effect of this strategy on the three commodities, house, and
electro-domestic appliances--that would become the mainspring
of "Fordist" economic growth during the post-World War II
period
.
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in William's view, two obstacles stood in the way of the
development of this strategy based on high wages and mass
consumption. The first, was the fact that the majority of
the managers and capitalists strongly opposed the policy of
high wages. They are, he stated, too concerned with making a
short-term profit: "It matters not that almost all industrial
enterprises will ultimately benefit by [this policy]
. The
question is what will be our earnings next month or next
quarter?" For these managers and capitalists, wages were no
more than costs for capital; lower wages meant lower costs.
For Williams, however, wages were not just a cost but also
an outlet for mass production. High wages, he argued, were a
way of increasing the workers' purchasing power and expanding
mass consumption. This, in turn, would ensure continuous
economic growth and prosperity. Low wages might benefit
capitalists in the short-run by increasing profit margins,
but in the long-run they had the negative effect of
restricting consumer demand and halting prosperity. 19
The second obstacle was the weakness of organized labor.
According to Williams, despite its efforts, organized labor
had failed to achieve its aim of increasing real wages in
step with increases in productivity:
While productivity and the income of the United States
have greatly increased in the last few years, real
wages have increased little, if any. In new and
advancing industries where rapid progress in
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nL^fbeV^ fa -P^e-nent infairlv „AiV « many years ' labor isx y well organized. Labor is strong where it canaccomplish the least. 20
Although Williams recognized the social and economic
implications of organized labor's weakness and suggested the
need for a better form of organization, he did not discuss
how it might be accomplished. However, other proto-
Keynesians within the Taylor Society, such as Morris Cooke,
did address this crucial issue.
In his 1928 presidential address to the Taylor Society,
Cooke called for management to visualize labor unions as "a
deep social need" and to assist in their development:
The interest of society, including those of the
workers, suggest some measure of collective
bargaining in industry to the end that the
weaker side may be represented in negotiations
as to hours, wages, status and working
conditions. Collective bargaining implies the
organization of workers on a basis extensive
enough— say nat ion-wide--as to make this
bargaining power ef fect ive
. . . If labor
organizations are in fact desirable social
agencies and essential to the orderly conduct
of industry, they logically come within the
field of management. It therefore becomes part
of our task to discover all necessary outlets
for the energy and spirit of the grouped
workers and to aid in the cultivation on the
part of management and labor of those newer
disciplines which will effect the maximum co-
operative effort. 21
Trade unions, Cooke contended, were necessary as a form of
"balance of power" between capital and labor. They should be
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seen as a way to ensure workers of "a fair bargaining
Position so that they can safeguard themselves, and society
on occasion, in the proper distribution of the rewards of
productive enterprise and, of increasing importance against
the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of those who control
through their property rights." The key problem of industry,
Cooke concluded, was to discover how to give unionized
workers "a functional place in the industrial process. "22
That is, how to incorporate unions effectively into the
process of production. "What we want," Cooke stated, "is to
set up an integrating process which will tend to unite us in
a common purpose. "23
In 1931 the Taylor Society, led by Cooke, drafted an
"industrial code" that sought to address the problem of
"human relations and working conditions in industry". The
code stated that "unprejudiced study of the most effective
forms of organization of labor for functioning in relation to
management as a science is an obligation resting upon
progressive managers, in the interest of good management as
well as in recognition of the importance of satisfactory
human relations in industry." 24 Furthermore, the Taylor
Society industrial code defended the right of workers to
collective bargaining:
Labor's right to recognition as a party to
collective agreements is now, in this country,
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so widely recognized as to be generally beyonddebate m theory and beyond contest in YS Jf. That right may be exercised throughvarious forms of organization which can,however perform the function of representing
oraan?L\°
YeeS
°
nly if C °ntro1 of th
^ workers'g ization rests fully and really with theworkers. With whatever form of workers'
organization an employer must deal... Any
condition of the work contract binding theworkman not to join an independent (standard)labor union is to be deprecated ... 2 5
Notwithstanding what this document stated, the position of
the Taylor Society on labor organizations was not shared by
most employers and managers in the United States. More
specifically, most capitalists and management strongly
opposed collective bargaining and labor unions, and it was
this opposition in combination with the weakness of organized
labor which posed a serious threat to the proto-Keynesian
"path to prosperity."
Unlike Hoover's program, the aim of the proto-Keynesian
strategy was not to stabilize production, but to expand it.
This view was clearly articulated by H
. B. Brougham, an
economist linked to the Pollack Foundation for Economic
Research, who presented a paper to the Taylor Society in
December 1927. 26 Brougham criticized Hoover's policies
concerning the stabilization of production. These policies,
as expressed by Hoover's Committee on the Elimination of
Waste in Industry, were the following: (1) "productive
capacity should be conservatively based upon a careful study
of normal demand;" and (2) "production schedules should be
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based on a carefully foliated sales policy, deterged from
an intensive study of markets, thus stabilizing
product ion.-.27 In Brougham's view, these policies should be
turned "inside out" and replaced by new ones focusing on the
expansion of production, not on its stabilization. As
proposed by him, the proto-Keynesian policies concerning
production would read as follows: (1) "normal demand should
be based on a careful study of productive capacity, and
should be steadily increased as capacity to produce
increases;" and (2) "the aim is not to stabilize production,
but to expand production, and to remove any purely monetary
hindrance to that expansion by providing that markets be
supported by an always adequate purchasing power." In short,
according to Brougham, "production would not be stabilized,
but mobilized with a view constantly to raising the standard
of living. "28
As Wallace Clark, a management engineer and Taylorite
pointed out, one of the most important problems facing
American industry during the interwar period was "to
determine whether to reduce productive capacity until it
matches effective demand for goods or to increase the
purchasing power of consumers to keep pace with a productive
capacity that is constantly growing."29 a key difference
between Hoover's program and the proto-Keynesian strategy
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espoused by Brougham and others closely associated with the
Taylor Society was their response to this problem. Whereas
Hoover-
s
favored the first option, that is, reducing
productive capacity until it matched effective demand; the
proto-Keynesian perspective aimed at increasing purchasing
power and expanding production. "To the engineering mind,
"
argued Clark summarizing the proto-Keynesian view, "the
solution of this problem inevitably lies in the increasing of
purchasing power, for it is inconceivable that the expansion
of American industry can be arrested. "30
However, Brougham warned, a serious problem related to
the expansion of American industry was the tendency to
increase productive capacity while simultaneously displacing
more and more wage earners. Given this situation, should the
expansion of production be left to "the play of competitive
forces" or should it be planned in the interest of the
nation? Moreover, how were workers to maintain, let alone
increase their purchasing power, if they were left unemployed
and cut off from the source of their purchasing power?
First, Brougham answered, prosperity must be planned. More
specifically, effective demand must "be adapted, controlled,
and graduated" in correspondence with the constant expansion
of production. Not to do so would be to "surrender to the
blind forces that have hitherto ended our brief intervals of
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prosperity.'Ol The answer tQ ^ secQnd probiem ^
development of a program of public works on an extended
soale, which could provide displaced workers with alternative
employment and thus with a renewed source of purchasing
power 32
Such a program of public works would not only provide
displaced workers with employment, it would also generate new
jobs and spur new economic activity. Moreover, Brougham
argued, its adoption in the summer of 1920, when there were
increasing signs of economic troubles, would have averted the
1920-1921 depression during which American industry suffered
20 billion dollars in loses. As he put it:
The [influx of public expenditures ]... would have
circulated like a transfusion of new blood through allthe veins and arteries of industry. New purchasing
power could then flush out the congested areas of
surplus goods, and with renewal of demand yet more
credits would have flowed spontaneously into
productive works. Instead of the dead loss of twenty
billions in idle and depreciated plant and products,
with unemployment and business stagnation, new public
works would be set up and in use to balance the added
bonded indebtedness, and prosperity would be prolonged
with fresh business expansion. 33
The implications of Brougham's analysis were self-evident.
If the country was to avoid a repetition of the 1920-1921
economic crisis, prosperity must be planned—meaning that
purchasing power must rise in accordance with increases in
productive capacity, and that public works must be expanded
to provide the growing numbers of displaced workers a new
171
source of purchasing power. Anything short of this program
would be an invitation for another crisis. The Great
Depression dramatically confirmed Brougham's.
By the end of 1927, then, a distinct proto-Keynesian
perspective had emerged within the Taylor Society. Such a
perspective involved a growth-oriented strategy based on high
wages and rising consumption norms. Its aim was not "to
stabilize production, but to expand production", and to
support that expansion by sustaining or expanding the markets
for goods via "an always adequate purchasing power." This
perspective not only went beyond Hoover's program for
macroeconomic stability, it also prefigured some of the
central aspects of the post-World War II Keynesian/Fordist
developmental model. Missing from this perspective, however,
was a more precise and elaborate understanding of the role of
the state and of the unions in the development of a mass
consumption political economy. Such an understanding would
only develop during the early 1930s.
The onset of the Great Depression finally brought the
Taylorite-Hoover alliance to an end. Two circumstances
prompted the dissolution of that alliance. The first was the
obvious failure of Hoover's macroeconomic management system
to prevent the depression itself. The second was what Evan
Metcalf calls "President Hoover's persistent reliance during
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the Great Depression on business initiative as an alternative
to government action to support investment and employment,
despite evidence of its failure. "34 ln June l932> , TaylQr
Society document calling for a conference to discuss "the
challenge of the economic situation" publicly criticized the
policies adopted by Hoover's administration to face the
depression
:
The situation after two and one-half years ofdepression is one of "stabilized" depression "Certain measures which have been adopted have retardeddeflation--possibly for the time being stopped it.But there have not been adopted measures designed tostimulate business activity, either directly asthrough public works disbursement of purchasing poweror indirectly as through manipulated general priceincreases. It is doubtful whether the only proposed
measure within Congress which has a chance of adoptionLtneWagner relief and public works bill] is
sufficient to serve as a stimulus. Apparently publicpolicy has been governed by the belief that the
outcome should be left to automatic adjustments withtheir waste of productive capacity and acute
suffering . 35
This conference was one in a series--the others took
place on July 7 and August 18—organized by the Taylor
Society to discuss the depression. The purpose of these
conferences was to elaborate a programmatic response to the
depression and to influence public policy. In November, as
part of these discussions, the Taylor Society created a
special committee composed of 15 members of the conference
group to prepare a "plan of action" to confront the economic
situation. In a memo to Sanford E. Thompson, Harlow S.
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Person explained that: "The purpose of this committee is to
consider and revise a program of positive aotion for
presentation to the New Administration and to Congress
... All
of us are aware that the struggle has begun between the
forces of liberal action and the forces of conservative
action to secure dominance in the next Congress. Any
influence we may hope to exert should be made promptly. "36
According to Thompson and Person, president and managing
director of the Taylor Society respectively, the Hoover
administration was not only taking inadequate steps to
confront the depression, it was also undermining the measures
which could provide some relief, such as the bill introduced
by Robert Wagner to extend relief through a public works
program. The response of Hoover to Wagner's bill, the Taylor
Society leaders argued, amounted "to an emasculation of the
bill (1) by reducing the funds available and (2) by
substituting Treasury financing for bonds issues, thereby
eliminating the most hopeful features of the bill— a moderate
reflation." 37 As a consequence of this action, Thompson and
Person concluded:
It now seems apparent that a public works program will
not serve as an immediate, direct and bold stimulus to
resumption of business activity. The purchasing power
which it is hoped public works would distribute among
wage earners cannot register its effect for many
months, and is then likely to be to slight for the
situation which will have developed by that time. 3 ^
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In short, Hoover's policies had failed. As William G.
Schluter, professor at the Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce and a close associate of the Taylor Society, pointed
out in a document circulated among the participants of the
"Economic Conference" sponsored by the society, the basic
problem of the depression was the lack of consumer demand and
this problem was not being directly attacked by Hoover's
policies
:
The current depression is primarily a consumer's
crisis. It can only be remedied by easing the
mdebtness of consumers and increasing their current
incomes. This consumer's
crisis has been so destructive and has gone so farthat it will not be immediately solved, nor correctedfor sometime if reliance is placed only on possibleincrease in production activity under private
initiative.
.. [A] decisive stimulation for [the
recovery and increase in consumer's income] must comefrom other sources ... The United States Government is
the only super-agent with the sufficient credit to
provide this stimulation and break the continuous
vicious cycle of declining prices, production and
incomes . 3
9
It was the persistent emphasis on private init iat ive--along
with the failure of Hoover's program to prevent the
depression in the first place—which led Cooke and other
prominent members of the Taylor Society to endorse Roosevelt
in 1932 and to support the New Deal.
In July 1932, the leadership of the Taylor Society
discussed a draft of an open letter to Hoover, which proposed
a 3 point relief program. The program, as drafted by Person,
called for: (1) a deliberate inflation of the currency—to
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raise general prices and provoke a resumption of business
activity, (2) the extension of a broad and comprehensive
program of public works to distribute social purchasing
power, and (3) the establishment of a national economic
council-to make studies and recommendations for the economic
development of the nation. 40 In the conclusion Qf the
to Hoover, Person stated:
This is a specific program which we recommend you Itrequires leadership, an obligation which the
organization of our government imposes on you. If VOuassume bold leadership along these lines the Congressand the citizens of the United States will followBoth the Congress and the citizens have followed
willingly and helpfully when definite constructivepromising lines of action have been indicated. They
stand ready to follow along bolder lines... We can be
masters of our economic destiny. All that is needed
is imagination, boldness and a definite plan... 41
Hoover, however, failed to provide the leadership, or the
program necessary to get the country out of the depression.
As a result, the Taylor Society backed Roosevelt in the hope
that he would provide the "imagination," the "boldness" and
the "definite plan" that the economic situation required.
Roosevelt's plan, as it turned out, was the New Deal. The
Taylor Society not only supported this plan, but, as I will
show below, helped to develop it. Underlying the Taylor
Society's support was the understanding that the New Deal
provided the mechanisms through which society could become
"master of its own economic destiny."
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During the early 1930s two political-economic
strategies-corporatism and Keynesianism-contended to
become the dominant approach guiding the New Deal policies.
Morris Cooke, Harlow S. Person, and other leading members
of the Taylor Society were part of the political network-
which included figures such as Felix Frankfurter, Robert F.
Wagner, Frances Perkins, Robert LaFollete, Jr., Sidney
Hillman, and George Soule—that put forward a Keynesian
strategy based on the expansion of mass consumption via the
intervention of the state. This Keynesian elite was
critical of the corporatist program, promoted by
businessmen such as Gerard Swope and Henry I. Harriman, and
embodied in the National Recovery Administration, which
sought to limit production, fix prices and minimize the
role of state. The Keynesians advocated, instead, an
expanded role for the state in regulating the economy;
policies that would increase social purchasing power and
mass consumption; and the enactment of the more radical
social reforms of the so-called Second New Deal, such as
the Wagner and Social Security Acts. 42
It should be noted that both of these strategies were
advanced not just by different political networks, but also
by different blocs of capitalists. As Steve Fraser points
out, the corporatist strategy was promoted by a more
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traditional business elite linked to the railroads, public
utilities and producer goods. Harriman and Swope, for
example were both linked to public utilities. The
Keynesian strategy, on the other hand, was advocated by a
network of manufacturing, retailing and financial interests
closely linked to mass consumption of durables and light
durables. Mass urban merchandisers such as Filene's and
Macy's and mass consumption-oriented banks like the Bowery
Savings Bank were prominent supporters of Keynesian
strategies. The corporatist bloc was plagued by
overproduction, older technologies, foreign competition and
indebtness, while the Keynesian bloc was concentrated in
newer and expanding mass consumption-oriented industries.
Finally, the corporatist bloc favored cartel-like
arrangements to restrict production, while the Keynesian
bloc was concerned above all with expanding mass
consumption through the intervention of the state. 43
Led by Cooke and Person, the Taylor Society played an
important role not only in the development of the Keynesian
strategy, but also in the political struggle against
corporatism. The struggle between Keynesianism and
corporatism, which took shape early in the 1930s, centered
on several issues that had strategic significance for the
development of American capitalism. Key among these was
the question of the nature of the Great Depression. For
corporatists, the depression was caused largely by an
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overextension of productive capacity, which resulted from
"blind competition." This perspective was expressed by
Henry I. Harriman, vice-chairman of the New England Power
Company and prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, in a paper presented to the American
Economic Association in 1932:
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bri^ ^ut aplus of goods, a corresponding lowering of
n^6 f' finall y the disruption of business andunemployment, with resultant underconsumption. Theaccumulated surplus of the previous period of
expansion is exhausted; as a result, production isresumed and there is a return to prosperity and
employment; and thus the upward and downward swings
are continued. While we cannot expect with ourpresent knowledge and experience to prevent
recurring depressions, let us hope that the depths
of the valley of future depressions may be reducedby avoiding preceding periods of overexpansion and
undue speculative activity. 44
Harriman 's assessment provided not only an explanation of
the causes of the depression, it suggested also the
elements that defined corporatist economic recovery
policies: the restriction of production and the self-
regulation of industry.
For Keynesians, on the other hand, the depression was
a crisis of underconsumption, not of overproduction. As
Leonard Kuvin, an economist from the Index Number
Institute, pointed out at a meeting of the Taylor Society
in December 1929:
The real obstacle to the employment of all available
man power in this country is the lack of proper
179
mechanisms to engage the productive capacity nowidle and the absence of adequate means to stimulatedemand from our own consuming population. Far from
^nH
rK 0^Cing in thS S0Cial sense ' ^rican industrya d the American people suffer from a chronic
condition of industrial underproduction. Theirpowers of consumption are limited in a large measureoy their lack of incomes. The bulk of the nation'sincome is lodged in the hands of a minority of
potential consumers. 45
The problem, in Kuvin's words, was that the bulk of the
U.S. population received "a disproportionately small share
of the nation's income;" and consequently, "the greatest
possible market for American manufactured goods [was]
stifled by a lack of purchasing power." Further
aggravating this situation, Kuvin stated, was that " [f]unds
that should be paid to labor to nourish consumer demand
[were] put back into unused equipment." 46 In short, the
problem was the lack of social purchasing power, not the
overexpansion of productive capacity. The solution,
therefore, lay not in restricting production, but in
increasing purchasing power. This, in turn, entailed a
dramatic redistribution of the nation's income.
Ralph E. Flanders, chairman of the American
Engineering Council's committee on the balance of economic
forces and a friend of the Taylor Society, concurred with
Kuvin's analysis. In Flanders' view, the depression was
not due to a situation of general overproduction:
I . . . feel that general overproduction has not yet
existed in this country. It is conceivably
possible; but if one rides on a railroad train, say
through scattered sections of this country, or if
one walks about the streets of a great city, he sees
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so that, looking at the thinqe broadest way, I think it is safe to say thatgeneral overproduction has never been reached^tnis country
.
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Flanders conceded that there were cases of "special
overproduction, ' such as the cases of wheat and cotton in
agriculture and the soft-coal industry, but these were
particular instances and not indicators of a condition of
general overproduction. 48
Drawing on Keynes and Hobson, Flanders argued that the
depression was a crisis caused by:
the fact that purchasing power does not equal theproductive capacity, due mainly to the fact that the
results of industry, manufacture, transportation, and
so forth, on the whole have gone too largely intothe hands of those who invest rather than spend, andtoo little into the hands of those who ordinarily
would spend rather than invest." 49
Put differently, the problem was that "too large a
proportion of income from business" was in the hands of
"those getting the higher salaries and dividends," and "too
little" went "into the hands of the workers on lower
salaries." This produced a crisis of underconsumption.
The way out of this situation was to increase the
purchasing power (and thus income) of workers so that they
could increase their capacity to consume. One way to
achieve this was through "capital investment in the form of
new manufacturing buildings, new machinery, bridges,
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highways, dwellings houses, office buildings," and
"anything that goes under the general category of capital
goods .
"
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A crucial factor that led to the onset of the
depression-according to George Soule, editor of the N^w
Es^lic and close associate of the Taylor Society-was the
failure of industry to carry out the policy of high wages.
As Soule explained, this theory was based on the
understanding that:
Industry fosters very rapid technical improvements
oy the use of which more production can be turned
out with less effort. This means the lowering oflabor costs per unit of product. Now that result
can be an increase in wages or a lowering of prices
or an increase in profits.
.
.
[I] f, when productivity
advances you give the workers the benefit, largely
through the increase of money, wages, or reduction
of prices, then the workers will be in a position tobuy back a large part of the increased product that
is produced as a result of the technical advance,
and that is good for industry. But if you do not
give the wage worker the benefit you may find
difficulty in disposing of your product because
those who share in profits are not so likely to buy
the products of our great mass production
industries, which are set up on the basis of
manufacturing goods used by the general
population
.
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The failure of American employers to adopt this doctrine,
Soule argued, contributed to the depression in two ways,
one direct and the other indirect. It kept wages low, thus
limiting the consumption capacity of the workers and
preventing them from absorbing a much larger percentage of
the consumer goods being produced by the mass production
industries. Moreover, it contributed indirect ly--via the
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increased earnings of industry that were not shared with
l abor __to rapidly rising profits
^
wh . ch overstimulated
speculation in the securities market . 52
Finally, Soule warned, American industry would be
incapable of adopting a high wage policy as long as it
remained organized on a individualistic and competitive
basis
:
The automobile manufacturer, for instance, may knowtnat it is to his advantage that the wholepopulation should be able to buy automobiles. Henas the power to increase only, however, the wagesof the workers in his own factory, and he can notfind a market for his whole product among his own
workers.
. .The policy has to be applied by all of the
employers at once or by a very large section of themto be effective. On the other hand, the competitive
nature of our market creates a continued pressure infavor of lower production costs and sends the wage
rate down... Those are things that everybody can see
at work if he uses his common sense; consequently,
mere good will on the part of the big employers can
not keep wages advancing. 53
In short, Soule did not believe that the action of
individual employers would succeed in bringing about a
policy of high wages. To ensure the adoption of this
policy, thus, industry would have to be reorganized under
new principles and the state would have to play a more
active role regulating the economy.
In April 1932 the Taylor Society presented for
discussion among business and management circles a
programmatic document entitled: "Action Toward Business
Recovery." The document, which was drafted by the
president and the managing director of the society with the
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advice of a number of businessmen and economists, adopted
an underconsumptionist perspective in line with the
analyses developed by Kuvin, Flanders and Soule. it
recognized that a primary cause of the depression was the
failure of purchasing power to keep pace with the increase
in production. Specifically, it stated that:
During the period from 1925 to 1929 there was anincreasing supply of capital for investment. This
o?
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r
^f fr °m profits in business; from promotionf e enterprises; and from investment of surplusby the public in general. This capital for awhile
was absorbed by manufacturing developments, such asthe automobile; by construction activities; and byforeign investments. All of these, except the lasttransferred^ money to the people who were buyinggoods .. .Buying power was also temporarily
accelerated by installment buying and credit
arrangements. But as the needs for capital becameless it was used more and more for uneconomic
purposes or became actually stagnant. This money
which should have been directed to purchasing power
of goods was made unavailable. Demand for
manufactured goods as well as construction became
less and^ less
.
Failures of banks and business
institutions took place, unemployment and distress
among workers, reduction of wages among those
remaining employed, and a general impairment of the
standard of living. 54
The document, moreover, criticized reductions in
expenditures for public improvements as counter-productive,
and called for drastic governmental action "designed
deliberately to direct money and credit into channels
whereby they will become both a stimulant and a means to
consumer purchasing." 55
By 1932, then, two schools of thought concerned with
the nature of the depression had emerged. One focused on
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the problem of overproduction, and the other on
underconsumption and the lack of purchasing power. Each of
these interpretations, moreover, entailed a very different
understanding of the policies necessary to get the economy
back on its feet. Nowhere was this more evident than in
the issue of national economic planning. Although both
corporatists and Keynesians favored national planning, they
attributed very different meaning to that concept.
Corporatists, such as Gerard Swope of General Electric and
Henry Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce, advocated a
planning scheme based on separate, autonomous industries
under minimal government control, and coordinated by trade
associations. 5 6 The principle underlying this plan,
according to Swope, was that:
Trade
^ associations in America are the natural
organizations to study the economic elements of each
particular industry. Each trade association should
hold itself responsible for the coordination of
production and consumption to stabilize its
industry, with the consequent benefits to the
employees and to society. The trade associations,
working out their problems in the stabilization of
industry, would then be the foundation stones upon
which to erect the superstructure of [a] national
economic council ... 57
The primary purpose of such a planning scheme,
according to its proponents, was "to balance production and
consumption." As Harriman stated, "[o]nly through a proper
co-ordination of production and consumption can a sane,
orderly, and progressive economic life be developed."
However, what corporatists meant by "balancing production
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and consumption" was not adjusting consumption to
production, but just the opposite. In Harriman's words:
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consuming capacity of the country andv e the volume of such production among the
rather
etLntS ° f indust^ on a equitabll basis,han to continue the present harsh and
unremunerative competitive system, but this thevcannot attempt today becauseof the ever-presentrisk of incurring penalties under antitrust laws
cond^Mon^^ 16 35 th6y may haVe been for economicnditions of an earlier day, are not in consonance
with the present-day needs of industry. 58
Put differently, the objective of the corporatist planning
scheme was to restrict production. To accomplish this
objective, furthermore, corporatists called for the
modification of antitrust laws to allow businessmen "to
enter contracts for the purpose of equalizing production to
consumption." That is to say, to allow the limitation of
production
.
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The differences between the corporatist strategy
proposed by Swope and Harriman and the one advocated by
Keynesians came into sharp focus during the Hearings on the
Establishment of a Nati onal Economic Counci l. These
hearings—which were convened by the Senate Subcommittee on
Manufactures and were chaired by Senator Robert LaFollette-
-took place between October and December 1931.
According to Steve Fraser, the hearings were planned
by a small group that included, among others LaFollette,
George Soule of the New Republic
,
Sidney Hillman of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and Harlow S. Person of the
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Taylor Society. The objective of this group was to
neutralize the influence of the corporatist planning scheme
and to provide a forum for the Keynesian approach. To this
effect: »[t]he group discussed who was to testify and what
questions were to be asked. They designed the sequence of
testimony so as to first display the ideological and
programmatic exhaustion of the business community, and then
to follow with 'expert' analysis by friendly economists and
industrial engineers so as to provide the 'scientific'
basis for the [Subcommittee's] ultimate political
recommendations." These recommendations focused upon the
establishment of a government sponsored national economic
council composed of representatives of industry, finance,
agriculture, transportation, and labor. 60
Harlow S
.
Person, managing director of the Taylor
Society, presented a key testimony at these hearings.
Person criticized trade associations on the grounds "that
they had little or no influence on the stabilization of
industry generally"; defended the establishment of a
national economic council or government planning agency
"with the power to require all industrial enterprises" to
provide the information pertinent to the task of economic
planning and to make recommendations for legislative action
to the Congress; and called for the regulation of the rate
and amount of investment of new capital in industry. 61
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Furthermore, in an exchange with LaFollette-which
exemplified the way the hearings were set up to undermine
the corporatist planning scheme-Person rejected the notion
of restricting production as a central objective of
economic planning:
The Chai rman
.
As you conceive the problem [of
be
a
SS^?n;/° Y^ bSlieVe that the P^cipal goal too obtai ed is the control or reduction ofproduction?
Doctor Pprsop
, no. while I do not accept the broad
statement that human wants are limitless andinsatiable for the simple reason that a day has only
^4 hours, I do accept as a basis for present policythe statement that human wants are not adequately
satisfied, and that the trouble is not
overproduction in terms of human wants, but lack ofbalance of production in terms of specific wants.
The Chai rman
. I gathered from a reading of the
report of the chamber of commerce committee on
continuity of business that it reflects an attack on
this problem on the part of business men which islargely directed to the problem of curtailing or
quotaing of production. It is manifest in their
emphasis on the importance of changes in the Sherman
antitrust law which are directed largely to the
legalization, so to speak, of contracts for the
curtailment of production. While that suggestion
may or may not have merit— I am not passing on that
now--I was anxious to get your reaction to the
problem because it seems to that we would make a
great mistake if we placed our emphasis, if we
concentrated on the objective of attempting to
reduce production in a systematic way rather than
attempting to consider at the same time ways and
means of increasing consumptive power and of
supplying the demands of the consumptive power as it
is increased.
Doctor Person . I agree with the Senator. I think
it would be quite wrong to make curtailment an
objective. I will concede that in accomplishing,
let us say, the objective of satisfaction of human
wants as they develop in a balanced manner there
might be for a period relative curtailment in
certain commodities and extension in others. But as
to the total of production, I think if we can
achieve some manner of increasing consumptive power-
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To Keynesians, then, the objective of economic
Planning was not to restrict production, but rather to
increase purchasing power, expand mass consumption and
utilize the maximum possibilities of the productive
capacity of the nation. As economist Lewis Lorwin put it:
...economic planning
... means the coordination
of economic activities in such a manner as to
use our resources in a collective way in
relation to a continuously rising standard ofliving. Unless demand is prompted and
systematically developed, so as not to remain
stagnant, but to become more extensive in
scope as well as higher in quality, we have
got somehow to restrict output; but if we are
able to maintain an increasingly productive
equipment we must develop our demand, too.
Economic planning consists in balancing, not
a stationary production with a stationary
demand, but in balancing a progressively
developing technique with a progressively
rising standard of living... 63
Put differently, Keynesians did not share the vision
of a static balance between production and consumption
which underlay the corporatist economic program. They did
not believe that the task of the day was to maintain a
"mature" economic machine. They advocated, instead, a
growth-oriented program centered on the expansion of mass
consumption and "a progressively rising standard of
living .
"
The implications of such a program were developed by
Mary Van Kleeck in her testimony at the LaFollette
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hearings, which focused on a critique of "the Swope Plan"
for industrial self-regulation . 64 Van Kleeck acknowledged
that Swope had made a positive contribution by proposing a
Planning scheme that called for employees' participation
and Federal supervision of industry. However, she argued,
the Swope Plan failed to go far enough in either direction.
First, under this plan employees' participation was limited
to the administration of pension, disability and
unemployment funds. Workers' participation, therefore, was
not extended to the more important and decisive area of
planning production. Moreover, workers were to be
represented by "employees' committees" or "company unions,"
which in the past "had rendered some service in producing
better relationships between employees and management," but
had "never had any real control over the fundamentals of
wages and over management policies." 65
In Van Kleeck
' s view, such a conception of labor
representation constituted a major flaw in any planning
scheme because it failed to recognize that in the area of
industrial relations "where the interests of the management
and of labor are not identical, where there is a question
as to what is going into surplus for profits and what is
going into the wage envelope ... the trade unions [remained]
as the only group which, as a group, can represent labor." 66
Thus, the importance of the trade unions. Swope 1 s plan,
however, excluded the trade union in favor of an employees'
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representation scheme that did not give workers any degree
of real participation in the process of production.
universafLn?^^6 ° f the Sw°pe plan bein9 ^ivenniversal application in the United States ifemployees' representatives elected by their fellowemployees and paid by the trade associations
composed of the companies which employ these' men,
QuestLn !
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eral thesis is adopted, that purchasingpo er is the important question in the plans forProduction today, then it is surely obvious thatthere is a tremendously important function for thelabor unions to fulfill in national economicplanning. Their point of view must be representedThey must have a chance to function in relation to
management
.
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In short, Swope
' s planning scheme failed to recognize
(as did all corporatist schemes) the importance of
collective bargaining and labor unions in the development
of a political economy of mass consumption. Such was not
the case of Van Kleeck and other exponents of the Keynesian
strategy who testified at the LaFollete hearings-
including Sidney Hillman--who advocated a strong role for
the labor movement in the policy-making process and who
understood the role of collective bargaining and unions in
maintaining wages high and increasing the workers'
purchasing power. 68
The second major weakness of Swope ' s plan, according
to Van Kleeck, lay in the vagueness of the powers it
assigned to the Federal government in relation to the
supervision of industry. According to Van Kleeck:
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On the side of investigation and statistics whichis the subject of primary interest in thisSnJ' 6 fSderal ^emment seems to be
It It ^°
aPProving the form of reports tostockholders. That is a gain, of course, but theexperience of the Federal Trade Commission? en joinedin its investigation of the causes of high pricesfor commodities at the instance of a trade
?ho^h^ 10n ^ C ° al industry, is sufficient toshow the necessity of freeing the Federal agency forthorough investigations in the public interim
Eo^lT!
a
^
m° re th
t
n annual reP° rts to stockholders.qually vague is the plan's provision for definite
regulation by the Federal government.
Here again, Van Kleeck raised a fundamental point of
difference between the corporatist strategy and the
Keynesian strategy: the role of the state in the economy.
The difference between both strategies was that, while
corporatists advocated a planning scheme based on the self-
regulation of industry and with minimal government
intervention therefore clinging to a conception of an
"associative state"; Keynesians favored an interventionist
state with strong regulatory functions with respect to
capitalist enterprises and the macroeconomy in general.
Thus, the call by Keynesians during the LaFollette hearings
for the establishment of a National Economic Council
conceived as a state planning agency, and not as a private
business council as proposed by Harriman and other
corporatists. As Frances Perkins put it: "when someone
speaks of economic planning nowadays one is supposed to be
referring to economic planning by the government." 69
Underlying the Keynesian conception of the role of the
state was the assumption that left to its own devices
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business was incapable of stabilizing the economy. This
was so, they argued, for two reasons. First, the
capitalists self-interest and fixation with short-term
gains undermined any serious effort of cooperation in
search of long-term solutions for the problems of the
economy. As Henry P. Kendall, a leading textile
manufacturer and past president of the Taylor Society
stated, when asked during the LaFollete hearings if he
thought that industries acting independently or as members
of trade associations could succeed in stabilizing industry
as a whole:
I do not think so, for the reason that they
can not get 100 per cent support. There are
always some selfish, greedy manufacturer who
says, 'Yes; that is fine for industry, and I
hope they will do it, but I am going to
continue to run long hours and increase
production for all its worth and make money
out of it; but I hope the others will
curtail.' The trade associations have never
been able to control that situation... 70
The inference from Kendall's testimony is quite clear:
given the unwilliness of industry to cooperate and plan
constructively on a voluntary basis it must be compelled to
do, as Person indicated, "by the power of the state." 71
Second, the economic crisis was a situation beyond the
control of any single industry or any group of industries
acting autonomously. As Sidney Hillman noted, the
depression was "not a problem of any one industry. The
real problem confronting us affects all industries, and it
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is not within the power of any industry to right itself. "72
Thus, even if industry found the will to act collectively,
it could not stabilize the economy because the problem was
out of their control. This was due in part to the
complexities of modern American capitalism which, in
Frances Perkin's view, were "so intricate that no one
industry can conceivably make its economic plan alone and
have it sound. "73 It was also due tQ the fact that fche
solution to the problems of the depression was linked to
areas-such as fiscal, monetary and other policies--which
were under the control of government not industry. For
this reason, argued Ralph Flanders, it was dangerous to
assume that business alone could restore prosperity:
I believe it is really dangerous for industry
to take the position, even tacitly, that if
you give it the power it can control the
severities of the business situation. I do
not think that is possible ... because the
primary elements of the thing seem to me to
be in the control of the Government and in
the field of Government rather than in the
field of industry... I think [Swope] is wrong
to put himself in the position of saying that
'If we are granted certain powers we will be
able to produce certain results, ' because
industry alone can not produce results. 74
Moreover, as Hillman stated, the onset of the
depression was in itself evidence that business had failed
to provide the leadership necessary to stabilize the
economy. Thus, the need for the government to step in and
assume the responsibility for leadership. The state, in
Hillman 1 s view, was the only institution with the power to
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enforce a recovery program (based on increasing purchasing
power to match productive capacity) that could lead the
country out of the depression. m Hillman's words:
It is impossible for industries to do it aloneThey won't do it; they have not done it, and theywill not do it. The only power that can put it intoeffect is government action. There have beenpromises as to what industry will do. We know thatnothing constructive from the larger point of view
was done when they were in a position to do it. 7 ^
Put simply, Keynesians placed their faith in state
intervention and not in the self-regulation of industry.
The Rise and Fall of Socia l Keynpsi^i^
The LaFollette hearings on national planning
established clearly that by 1931 two distinct approaches to
the American political economy had crystallized: a
corporatist strategy based on the sel f
-regulation of
industry and the restriction of production, and a Keynesian
strategy based on the expansion of mass consumption via the
intervention of the state. As Mary Van Kleeck put it in
her testimony before the hearings:
In the light of the reports presented in this
Congress, the big problem faced by the United
States is whether American industry alone or
through the Government can adopt social
economic planning, or whether it is limited
to business planning which would control
production ... 76
The crystallization of these two approaches had profound
significance because they pointed toward radically
different political-economic programs. Assessing the
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strategic implications of the adoption of either one of
these approaches in 1932, Harlow S. Person argued, "the
choice of one or the other of these divergent policies is
perhaps more momentous than any choice which the United
States has yet been compelled to make." 77 The imp i ications
of adopting one policy or the other were perhaps not as
momentous as Person contended, but they were certainly
important--as the history of the New Deal would
demonstrate
.
The adoption of the corporatist strategy in early 1933
led to the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA)
,
which established the National Recovery Act
(NRA)
.
Although it lasted only two years and "vanished
with hardly an institutional trace," the NRA was the
centerpiece of New Deal policy from 1933 to 1934. 78 The
process by which the NRA came into existence is a
complicated topic beyond the scope of this study. Suffice
is to say, that in the struggle with Keynesians to
influence New Deal policy, corporatism won the initial
battle. And this victory— although not complete because
the Act was the product of a series of contradictory
compromises—was reflected in the establishment of the
NRA. 79
The NRA was basically a revamped version of Swope '
s
associational plan-in which the state would sanction the
cartelization of capitalist enterprises in order to reduce
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destructive competition, limit production and fix prices. 80
From the beginning, however the NRA was in trouble. First,
it was torn by the political infighting of different
policy-oriented groups. This was best exemplified by the
battle against rigid price controls led by Leon Henderson,
a Keynesian economist who was in charge of the Research and
Planning Division of the NRA, and Leverett Lyon, of the
Brookings Institutional second, it managed to antagonize
many but please few. As Otis Graham puts it:
Large business in general appreciated the
chance to end 'cut-throat competition' byfixing prices or production targets, buthated dealing with a federal bureaucracy
which was not only sometimes slow and obtuse
but occasionally suggested unwelcomed gains
for labor and consumer. Small businessmen
found themselves outmanuvered for shares of
the market in the NRA code making-process.
Labor expected higher wages, but found prices
rising faster ... 82
As for the Keynesians and other liberal-minded New
Dealers, they considered the NRA "an ill-conceived
experiment" from the beginning. 83 The dissatisfaction of
Keynesians with the NRA and the economic policies
underlying it was expressed by Mary Van Kleeck in a letter
to Morris Cooke in which she explained her unwilliness to
accept a position on the Consumer's Advisory Committee of
the NRA:
I find myself forced to stand outside and criticize.
I have to work out in my mind the right direction
for my present activities—whether to attempt to co-
operate when I am out of accord with the main
economic thought apparently underlying much of the
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program in Washington and still more out of linewith what the big business interests are doinq to
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Thirdly, the NRA was paralyzed not only by an
inefficient bureaucratic machinery, but also by its
contradictory objectives. As Ellis Hawley argues, the
recovery act was "a contradiction in terms." On the one
hand, its proponents wanted to enter into agreements that
would violate the Sherman Act, but on the other they
admitted that these agreements would constitute
monopolistic practices. The solution to this dilemma,
Hawley indicates, was to incorporate into the recovery act
two contradictory clauses, "a clause exempting the proposed
codes from the antitrust laws and another providing that no
code should be so applied as 'to permit monopolies or
monopolistic practices, or eliminate, oppress, or
discriminate against small enterprises.'" 85 Caught between
these contradictory goals the NRA could not steer a clear
course. In short, as Otis Graham points out, "the design
of the NRA was both muddled and faulty." 86
Thus, it should come as no surprise that by May 1935--
when it was declared unconstitutional and terminated by the
Supreme Court--the NRA failed to accomplish anything
significant as a program of economic recovery. Except,
that is, for Section 7 (a) which provided "the
right to collective bargaining to workers under the NRA
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codes," and "reinvigorated the torpid labor movement. "87
Conceived as a concession to labor leaders, Section 7 (a)
was openly defied by capitalists large and small who
counterattacked the measure by fostering company unions.
This challenge led Sidney Hillman to call in 1934 for the
establishment of a mechanism to enforce the right to
collective bargaining . 88 By opposing collective bargaining
under Section 7 (a) of the NIRA, capitalists sabotaged the
only aspect of the recovery act that had any real
possibility of stimulating economic recovery by increasing
the purchasing power of the workers. As for the labor
movement, it would have to wait until the passage of the
Wagner Act for the establishment of the government
protection called for by Hillman.
The demise of the NRA opened the way for the rise of
Keynesianism as the guiding approach to the New Deal
policies
.
This took place in mid-1935 with the launching of the so-
called "Second New Deal." The notion of two New Deals was
first formulated by Basil Rauch in The History of the New
Deal: 1933-1938
. Underlying this notion was the assumption
that a fundamental shift in the policies of the Roosevelt
administration occurred in 1935. According to Rauch, this
change in policy divided the New Deal into two distinct
periods, and its importance justified the concepts First
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New Deal and Second New Deal. Rauch summarized the
differences between these two periods in the following way:
The primary aim of the First New Deal was recoverywhile that of the Second was reform. Higher pricedfor industry and agriculture were the immediate
objective during the first period; increasedpurchasing power and social security for thepopulation as whole were the immediate objectivesduring the second period. The policies of the firstperiod were expressions of the philosophy of
economic nationalism and scarcity, while those ofthe second illustrate the philosophy of
international economic cooperation and economic
abundance. The First New Deal was chiefly
beneficial to big business and large farmers. TheSecond New Deal was chiefly beneficial to labor and
small farmers. 89
In sum, the First New Deal was conservative because its
policies were favorable to business, while the Second New
Deal was liberal, because it was favorable to labor. 90
Although I draw upon Rauch' s periodizat ion of the New
Deal, my conceptualization of that process differs from
his. The distinction between the two New Deal periods, as
argued here, is that the first was corporatist, while the
second was Keynesian. As used here, thus, the Second New
Deal denotes the radical shift to Keynesian policies that
occurred between 1935 and 1938. Specifically, this shift
was defined by two interrelated elements. First, the
passage of "a cluster of epochal reform measures"--
including the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the
Banking Act of 1935, the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act and the wealth tax act--which were designed above all
to enhance the regulatory functions of the state and to
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stimulate mass consumption . 91 That the architects Qf ^
Second New Deal visualized these reforms as key components
of a recovery program based on the expansion of mass
consumption is evidenced by Frances Perkin's comment in
1933: "As a Nation, we are recognizing that programs long
thought of as merely labor welfare, such as shorter hours,
higher wages, and a voice in the terms and conditions of
work, are really essentially economic factors for recovery,
and for the technique of industrial management in a mass
production age." 92
The other element was the rise of the members of the
Keynesian elite to key positions as administrators of the
New Deal welfare state. As Steve Fraser points out, "[by]
mid-1937 the state agencies responsible for human capital
and infrastructural development, for planning and for
regulating the flow of public and private credit, were run
by this newly empowered Keynesian elite." The agencies
controlled by the Keynesians, according to Fraser, were the
Department of Labor under Frances Perkins; the Interior
Department under Harold Ickes; the National Labor Relations
Board and the Works Projects Administration under Harry
Hopkins; the National Resources Planning Board controlled
by Beardsly Ruml and Frederick Delano; the Rural
Electrification Agency under Morris Cooke and John
Carmody; and the Federal Reserve under Marriner Eccles
.
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From these positions the Keynesian elite would attempt to
shape the future of the American political economy.
In synthesis, the Second New Deal represented the
triumph of the "social Keynesian" program advocated by
Cooke, Person, Van Kleeck, and others since the early
1930s. 94 This program, unlike the more conservative variant
of Keynesianism which emerged in the late 1930s, stressed
not just the use of the state to promote mass consumption
through fiscal and monetary policies, but also the use of
the state to regulate capitalist enterprises through
"social economic planning. "95 The triumph of .. social
Keynesianism", however, would be short-lived. By 1945, as
Alan Brinkley points out, "the idea of an administrative
state, which seemed so strong in the late 1930s was in
decline; and the faith in fiscal policy so tentatively
embraced in 1938, had moved to the center of liberal
hopes. "96 ironically, then, the moment of triumph of social
Keynesianism also marked the beginning of its defeat.
Put differently, during the 1940s and the post-World
War II period the regulatory-oriented social Keynesian
approach was displaced by the more conservative "commercial
Keynesianism"
.
97 In the pr0 cess, the more radical aspects
of the program espoused by the Taylor Society and others-
aspects such as the notion of social economic planning, for
example, were eclipsed, while fiscal and monetary policy
became the fundamental tools of an approach based on the
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idea of indirect management of the economy. a key factor
that contributed to this transformation was the rise during
the late thirties and throughout the forties of a
conservative reaction to the New Deal. Propelled by the
1937 recession and by Roosevelt's attempt to reform the
Supreme Court and to reorganize the executive branch, these
conservative forces (which included not only Republicans,
but also Southern Democrats) would challenge the legitimacy
of the New Deal. 98
In November 1937, Harlow Person expressed his concern
about this effort in a letter to Morris Cooke. "Big
business," stated Person, "has been bringing propaganda of
the first magnitude to bear on Congress to repeal
progressive laws and force reversal of progressive
administrative policies and acts, by falsely leading people
to believe that they are the causes of the recession."
These forces, Person argued, wanted to restore "the grand
old days of the middle twenties." Person's response to
these claims was that "[a] secure prosperity is not to be
gained by returning to the highly dangerous set-up which
preceded New Deal legislation, but by adjusting our
attitudes to acceptance of the fact that the ownership
group has still to pay its price for relief from
depression, and that additional progressive, regulatory
legislation is essential." The task of the moment, Person
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said, was "to conserve the progressive results of the New
Deal legislation. "99
As it turned out, the conservative forces could not
turn the clock back to the pre-New Deal era. But they did
weaken the Roosevelt administration and to undermined its
capacity to further develop the New Deal. This was best
exemplified by the fact that in 1943 the conservative
forces in Congress were able to kill the National Resources
Planning Board, which was a strong institutional base of
social Keynesianism. 100 Moreover, as Basil Rauch notes,
"[i]n 1937, the administration undertook to complete the
structure of the Second New Deal with measures to benefit
particularly the less well-organized groups of farmers and
workers. By the end of 1938, this process had stopped, and
the creative period of the New Deal ended." 101 With the end
of the Second New Deal the hegemony of "social
Keynesianism" also came to an end.
World War II sealed the fate of social Keynesianism.
The war, according to Robert Collins, provided "striking
evidence of the effectiveness cf government expenditures on
a huge scale." "Spending for war," as Collins points out,
"finally ended the worst depression in American history." 102
And in doing so, it strengthened the case for indirect
management of the economy. Moreover, as Alan Brinkley
argues, the success of this approach during the war
provided a mechanism for economic growth in the postwar
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period that was not based on state sponsored planning of
capitalism. Such an approach, as Brinkley put it:
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World War II, in short, set the stage for the
dominance of "commercial Keynesianism" during the postwar
era. Purged of its more radical aspects and transformed
into a depoliticized "technique" or "tool box",
Keynesianism was embraced during the post-World War II
period by every Democratic and Republican administration
administration until the 1980s.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Analysis
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to
an understanding of the emergence of a Keynesian
political-economic strategy in America during the interwar
period. It is concerned primarily with one crucial aspect
of this process: the ideological role played by key
political, and managerial elites in the emergence of such a
strategy. It thus traces the political discourse
articulated by the Taylor Society, the institutional home
of scientific management, from its inception as an
industrial research organization in the pre-World War I
period to its development as an important policy-making
network during the New Deal. It focuses on key figures in
the Taylor Society including Morris Cooke, Harlow S.
Person, Henry Dennison, and Mary Van Kleeck, as well as
those who were closely associated with the society
,
such
as Rexford G. Tugwell, Louis D. Brandeis, George Soule,
Frances Perkins, and Sidney Hillman.
My analysis is based on a non-teleological conception
of capitalist development in which social agency plays a
central role and in which the history of capitalism is
understood as an open-ended process. Thus, although I
stress the role played by political and economic elites, I
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reject the "conspiracy model" of history in which all
outcomes consciously serve the interest of capital. I
assume, that the history of capitalism in the United States
is the outcome of political, economic, and ideological
struggles, involving conflicts not just between workers and
capital, but also between different sectors of capitalists
and between contending groups of professional and
managerial elites.
Accordingly, a basic premise underlying this
dissertation is that the Keynesian political-economic order
was not the "design" of an "enlightened elite," that sought
to deliberately "incorporate" the working class into a new
industrial state to save the American economy. Instead, it
was the product of working class struggles "from below" and
"reforms from above." The major reforms associated with
the Keynesian political-economic order (i. e., union
recognition, collective bargaining, social security, etc.)
were passed and implemented over the opposition of the
majority of capitalists. Such programs were achieved by
working class struggles which pressured state managers to
institute economic and social reforms that not only
provided benefits to many workers, but also strengthened
the state in relation to the working class, and increased
the state's capacity to intervene in the economy. The
configuration of a Keynesian political economy was thus
determined not by some capitalist "conspiracy" to "co-opt"
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workers or by some "deep logic of capitalist accumulation,"
but by the resolution of specific political struggles
between contending social forces in a given historical
moment
.
This is not to deny the significance of efforts to
reform the political economy "from above." Quite the
contrary. My analysis is also informed by the recognition
that there were contending political-economic strategies
within the capitalist class and between different political
and managerial elites. I focus specifically, on the
differences between two key strategies: corporatism and
Keynesianism. The corporatist strategy was advanced by a
traditional business and political elite linked to the
railroads, public utilities, and producer goods. It
favored a system of industrial self-regulation, which would
create cartel-like arrangements to restrict production, fix
prices and divide the market. The Keynesian strategy was
promoted by a bloc of newer, mass consumption-oriented
industries and by a professional and managerial elite that
was concerned above all with expanding the mass market
through the intervention of the state. The Keynesian
strategy advocated an interventionist state and economic
policies that would enhance social purchasing power and
mass consumption. Accordingly, it supported the enactment
of the major social and economic reforms of the New Deal
such as the the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act.
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The Taylor Society was born during the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) hearings of 1910, better known as
the "Eastern Rate Case." This case-which was presented by
Louis D. Brandies with the assistance of Frederick W.
Taylor and his followers--propelled the scientific
management movement into the national spotlight and
popularized the concept of "scientific management". As
Milton Nadworny points out, the Eastern Rate Case put the
scientific management movement "on the map" and gave it a
name. It also provided a site for the formation of the
Taylor Society, for it was during the ICC hearings that a
"small band of Taylorites" conceived of the idea of
creating a society that would perpetuate the work of
Frederick Taylor and take advantage of the efficiency craze
that had transformed scientific management into a national
phenomenon
.
The Taylor Society was formally organized in 1911 as a
professional-managerial network primarily composed of
management consultants, engineers, and businessmen. Its
membership was concentrated in Philadelphia, New York, and
Massachusetts; and its activities included among other
things, educational work and research concerning scientific
management, a consultation and information service for
managers and engineers, discussions of policy issues facing
the business sector, and the publication of a bimonthly
journal. By the beginning of World War I the Taylor
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Society had become the institutional home of the scientific
management movement and was without any doubt the most
progressive management forum in the United States.
Before World War I, the Taylor Society focused its
attention exclusively on the technical problems of factory
production and the reorganization of the labor process.
World War I, however, would transform the society's
outlook. During the war the majority of the members of the
Taylor Society went to work for the U.S. government as
management "experts." Their task was to contribute to the
effort of planning and developing war production. This
experience enabled the members of the Taylor Society to
discover the macroeconomy and the state. It also enabled
them to broaden their social perspective. In particular,
the experience of organizing war production with the
collaboration of unions under government-sponsored
collective bargaining arrangements, transformed the
Taylor Society's previous position in relation to union
recognition and collective bargaining. As part of this new
perspective, members of the Taylor Society played an
instrumental role in terms of labor-management relations
within the planning and production agencies they worked in
during the war. Of special significance in this respect
was the role played by members of the Taylor Society in the
drafting of an industrial code (General Order #13) which
advocated, among other things, collective bargaining, the
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8-hour day, minimum wages, equal pay for women, health and
safety provisions for women and children, and union-
management cooperation arrangements.
After the war, the Taylor Society shifted its
attention to the "problem of industrial relations" by
advocating a conception of industrial democracy based on
"workers' consent" and union-management cooperation
schemes. Among the most prominent of these schemes was the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) Plan, known also as the
Beyer Plan. This plan, which was designed and supervised
by Otto Beyer, a member of the Taylor Society and an Army
Captain during World War I, called for the unions to
cooperate with management to increase productivity in
exchange for management's recognition of collective
bargaining. it also linked wages to productivity gains.
The Taylor Society's new understanding of the "labor
question"--which was embodied in the Beyer Plan-- led to a
rapprochement with the American Federation of Labor during
the 1920s.
Moreover, in the twenties the Taylor Society and its
associates played an important role in the development of
Herbert Hoover's campaign to create a macroeconomic
management system. This campaign was based on a
microeconomic approach to macroeconomic stability. The
idea behind this approach was that economic stability was
achieved through the action of individual managers at the
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level of the firm. Under this conception, the state was
limited to providing guidance (along with other private
agencies) to these managers so that they could stabilize
their firms. This strategy relied strongly on the
expertise and authority of management consultants and
social scientists. Thus, the key role played by the Taylor
Society
.
The Taylor Society figured prominently in the study
undertaken by the Federated American Engineering Societies
(FAES) to investigate the causes of "waste" and low
production in industry. The group that developed this
study, the "Committee on the Elimination of Waste," was
dominated by members of the Taylor Society and its report
was representative of scientific management. The Taylor
Society also played a significant role in the FAES' second
major research project, a study of the twelve-hour day in
the steel industry. This study, which was developed at
Hoover's initiative and which recommended reducing the work
day to eight hours in the steel industry, was dominated by
engineers associated with the Taylor Society. Finally, the
Taylor Society also made important contributions to the
"Unemployment Conference, " convened by president Harding in
September 1921 at Hoover's suggestion.
In conclusion, through their participation in the
study on waste, in the steel industry research project, and
in the Unemployment Conference, the Taylor Society played a
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leading role in Hoover's campaign to create a macroeconomic
management system. For the Taylor Society, this campaign
represented an opportunity to expand the application of
scientific management to new areas and a recognition of the
importance of scientific management as a tool for resolving
social problems. Moreover, participation in Hoover's
campaign represented a shift in the Taylor Society from
its pre-World War I concern with the details of factory
production to the broad questions of policy-making. That
is to say, it completed the transition of Taylor Society
from factory to society.
Despite the close collaboration between the Taylor
Society and Hoover, their alliance began to unravel in the
late 1920s. An important reason for this was that leading
members of the Taylor Society became increasingly critical
of Hoover's program and consequently began to develop
political relationships with individuals who espoused a
different political-economic strategy such as Robert
Wagner, Frances Perkins, Robert LaFollete, Jr., and Felix
Frankfurter. This realignment reflected the emergence
within the Taylor Society of a proto-Keynesian perspective.
Such a perspective involved a growth-oriented strategy
based on high wages and rising consumption norms. Its aim
was not to stabilize production, but to expand it by
increasing mass consumption and thus social purchasing
power. This perspective not only went beyond Hoover's
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strategy for macroeconomic stability, it prefigured some of
the key aspects of the post-World War II economic order.
Missing from this perspective, however, was a better
understanding of the role of the state and the unions in
the development of a mass consumption political economy.
This understanding emerged during the early years of the
Great Depression.
During the 1930s Morris Cooke, Harlow S. Person, and
other leading members of the Taylor Society became an
important component of the political and business network
that put forward a Keynesian strategy based on the
expansion of mass consumption via the intervention of the
state. This network was critical of the corporatist
program, advanced by businessmen like Gerard Swope of
General Electric and Henry I. Harriman of the Chamber of
Commerce. The corporatist program--which would be embodied
in the National Recovery Administ rat ion--was based on a
strategy in which the state would sanction cartel-like
arrangements among capitalist enterprises to reduce
destructive competition, restrict production, and fix
prices. This system of industrial sel f-regulation entailed
minimal government intervention and a reduced role for
unions and collective bargaining. The Keynesian program,
on the other hand, advocated an expanded and strong role
for the state and unions in the political economy, along
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with macroeconomic policies that promoted social
purchasing power and expanded mass consumption.
During the Second New Deal (1935-1938) the Keynesian
elites entered the corridors of power and many of its
members took key administrative positions in the welfare
state. The state agencies controlled by this elite
included those in charge of human capital and
infrastructural development, as well as those responsible
for planning and for regulating the flow of public and
private credit. From these positions the Keynesian elite
would attempt to shape U.S. political economy. Their
triumph, however, was short-lived. During the 1940s and
after World War II, the program espoused by this elite was
displaced by a more conservative form of Keynesianism,
"commercial Keynesianism." In the process, the more
radical aspects of the program advocated by the Taylor
Society and other social Keynesians--such as an
interventionist state with strong regulatory power—were
eclipsed, and fiscal and monetary policy became the
fundamental tools of a program based on the idea of
indirect management of the economy.
Implications
What are the implications of the analysis developed in
this dissertation? It demonstrates that the Taylor Society
was a Keynesian formation and not an exponent of corporate
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liberalism as corporatist historians have argued.
According to these historians, corporate liberalism-
understood here as a liberal ideology and program that
envisioned a "middle way" between laissez-faire and
"welfare statism"
-was the strategy of business and
political elites who sought to reform capitalism. For
this perspective, the corporate liberal tendency of the
interwar period is best exemplified by such figures as
Gerard Swope of the General Electric Company, Henry I.
Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce and others including
businessmen like Henry S. Dennison and Edward A. Filene,
engineers such as Morris Cooke, and social scientists like
Mary Van Kleeck and Harlow S. Person. In the corporatist
view, there are no significant ideological and programmatic
differences between these advocates of capitalist reform.
Thus, the corporatist school fails to acknowledge the
existence of alternative political-economic strategies
(such as the one espoused by the Taylor Society) within the
business and political elites who sought to reform
capitalism. Rather, it encompasses all reformist currents
under the ideology and program of corporate liberalism.
The analysis developed in this dissertation takes issue
with this interpretation. It shows how during the interwar
period the Taylor Society became a forum in which an
important group of mass consumption-oriented businessmen,
engineers, management consultants, and social scientists,
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sought to map the outlines of a new Keynesian political
economy. The dissertation argues that the Taylor Society
was part of a professional-managerial elite, who by the
early thirties came to advocate a Keynesian strategy
focused on increasing social purchasing power and expanding
mass consumption via the intervention of the state. It
illustrates, finally, how this Keynesian elite came to
occupy key positions as state managers during the Second
New Deal, and how they attempted to shape the American
political economy.
This dissertation demonstrates that the political-
economic strategy espoused by the Taylor Society (and other
social Keynesians) went beyond corporate liberalism in
three major areas. First, the role of the state. The
Taylor Society and its allies favored an interventionist
state with strong regulatory power functions with respect
to capitalist enterprises and the macroeconomy in general.
In contrast corporate liberals such as Harriman and Swope
advocated a strategy based on self -regulated industries
under minimal government control and coordinated by trade
associations
.
Unlike the corporate liberals, the Keynesian elite
understood that left to its own devices the capitalist
class was incapable (as the Great Depression had
demonstrated) of regulating the economy. It also
recognized that the problem of regulating the macroeconomy
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was beyond the control of any single industry or any group
of industries acting autonomously. For the Keynesians,
this problem was linked to areas--including fiscal,
monetary an regulatory policies--which were under the
control of the state not of industry. The state,
Keynesians argued, was the only institution with the power
and the capacity to regulate the macroeconomy
. in sum, the
Taylor Society and its Keynesian associates advocated a
more radical, regulatory-oriented strategy, while the
corporatists clung to Hoover's vision of an "associative
state,
" in which government functions as
"coordinator, assistant, and midwife," but not as regulator
of the economy.
Second, the role of unions and collective bargaining.
The Taylor Society and other Keynesians advocated a strong
role for the labor movement in the policy-making process
and recognized the importance of unions and collective
bargaining in maintaining high wages and increasing
workers' purchasing power. That is to say, they visualized
unions as a "deep social need, " and in accordance with this
view they called on management to assist in the development
of trade unions. For the Keynesian, elite unions were
necessary as a form of balance of power between capital and
labor, which ensured workers a "fair bargaining position"
with respect to wages and working conditions.
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The corporatists, on the other hand, failed to
acknowledge the importance of collective bargaining and
unions in the development of a mass consumption political
economy. Under Swope 1 s Plan, for example, workers were to
be represented by employees' committees or company unions,
not by independent trade unions. These company unions
lacked any real power over wages and management policies.
By excluding trade unions in favor of employees'
representation schemes that did not give workers any degree
of real participation in the process of production, Swope *
s
Plan remained clearly within the boundaries of corporate
liberalism. The Keynesian elite— including the Taylor
Society--went beyond corporatism and enunciated a social-
democratic perspective on unions and collective bargaining.
Third, macroeconomic policies. The macroeconomic
policies espoused by the Keynesian network— including the
Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Banking Act of
1935, the Public Utilities Holding Act, and the wealth tax
act--were designed to enhance the regulatory functions of
the state and to stimulate mass consumption. For
Keynesians, then, the objective of macroeconomic policies
was not merely to stabilize production, but rather to
increase purchasing power, expand the mass market, and
increase the productive capacity of the nation.
Put differently, Keynesians did not share the vision
of a static balance between production and consumption
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which underlay the corporatist economic program. Nor did
they believe, as did the corporatist s , that the economic
task of the day was to maintain a "mature" economic system.
They advocated, instead, a developmental program centered
on expanding mass consumption (and thus social purchasing
power) via the intervention of the state. Such a
macroeconomic program, the Keynesian elite argued, would
lead to full employment, economic growth, and prosperity.
In synthesis, my dissertation establishes that there
were strategic political and ideological differences
between corporate liberals such as Swope and Harriman, and
social Keynesians like Cooke, Van Kleeck, Person, and
others associated with the Taylor Society. It argues,
moreover, that these programmatic perspectives were
advanced not just by different political and managerial
elites, but also by different capitalist blocs, or
fractions. The corporatist program was promoted by a more
traditional capitalist bloc rooted in railroads, public
utilities, and producer goods. This bloc was burdened by
overproduction, older technologies, foreign competition and
indebtness. The Keynesian bloc, on the other hand, was
comprised of a network of manufacturing, retailing and
financial sectors closely linked to mass consumption of
durable and light durable goods and to the expansion of the
mass urban market. It included, among others, mass
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merchandisers like Filene's and Macy's, and mass
consumption-oriented banks such as the Bowery Savings Bank.
The analysis developed in this dissertation, thus,
contributes to our understanding of the importance not just
of class, but of class fractions in the political conflicts
that led to the emergence of a the post-World War II mass
consumption political economy. it also shows the
importance of the role played by key political and
managerial elites in the creation of the post war political
economy. The creation of this political economy, however,
was not inscribed in the fate of capitalism. Nor was it
the unmediated product of the "design" of some "enlightened
elite." Rather, it was the outcome of a complex and
prolonged process of political struggle between contending
social forces.
By focusing on the conflicts between different groups
of capitalists and between contending political and
managerial elites, I have sought to shed light on one
important aspect of the process that led to the creation of
the postwar political economy. In doing so, I have taken
issue with the interpretation put forward by the corporate
liberal school, in the hope of providing an alternative
understanding to the historical problems studied here.
My attempt to provide an alternative understanding of
modern American political economy is informed by the
regulation approach. This approach--which is associated
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with the work of a group of French political economists
including Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer, and
others— centers on the concepts of "regime of accumulation"
and "mode of regulation." it is characterized by a non-
teleological conception of the history of capitalism and
rejects the view that capitalism is pre-determined by some
"deep logic" of capitalist accumulation. Instead, it
attempts to provide an approach in which human agency and
contingency play a central role. Accordingly, it focuses
on political, ideological, and economic struggles as the
concrete and contingent determinants of the history of
capitalism
.
Put differently, for the regulation approach the
history of capitalism is not pre-determined. Rather, it is
always mediated through historically contingent
institutional forms and regulatory networks (such as the
wage relation, the state, and others) which are themselves
always the outcome of past and present social conflicts.
The regulation approach was useful in the development
of my analysis in several ways. First, unlike the
corporate liberalism school, the regulation approach is
characterized by its emphasis on contingency, conflict, and
change. This emphasis contributed to my critique of the
corporatist approach and to the development of my argument,
which was based on a non-teleological conception of the
history of capitalism. Second, it provided a set of
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tneoretical concepts (i.e., regime of accumulation and mode
of regulation) which guided my understanding of the
development of twentieth-century American political
economy. Third, its attention to stages and phases of
capitalist development provided a useful tool for
periodizing the history of modern U.S. capitalism.
Yet, the regulation approach has a number of important
limitations which became evident in the course of my
dissertation and which need to be overcome if is to become
a truly fruitful tool for historical research. Key among
these are: (1) the ambiguity of some of its central
concepts and the divergent use of these concepts by members
of the regulation school; (2) the weakness of its analysis
of the state as a key institutional form of capitalist
regulation; (3) the emergence within the regulation school
of a structural-functionalist tendency which tends to focus
on questions of structural coherence (stability) and growth
and disregards social conflicts, human agency, and
contingency; and (4) the overly general and somewhat
abstract nature of most of the studies done by the
regulation school.
For the regulation approach to overcome these
limitations it needs to become more precise and
historically specific. It needs to become historicized
.
That is to say, the regulation approach can become a useful
framework for historians only if it can produce
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historically specific case studies that shed light on the
concrete history of capitalism in a given country or
region. These detailed and specific historical studies
(such as the one developed in this dissertation) could
provide the regulat ionists with the analytical precision
which their overly general and abstract presentations have
lacked
.
Limiha^inng
What are the limitations of the analysis developed in
this dissertation? First, although I recognize that the
Keynesian political economy was the product of a
conjunction of working class struggles "from below" and
"reforms from above," I do not incorporate a detailed
discussion of these struggles from below into my account of
the interwar political economy. Specifically, I do not
discuss in a detailed way the key role played by the new
industrial unions of the CIO in pushing forward the major
reforms of the New Deal, including the Wagner Act and the
Social Security Act. The fact of the matter, as I have
stated before, is that these reforms were passed and
implemented over the opposition of the majority of
capitalists. They were won by workers struggles from
below. If these struggles are not discussed in detail in
this dissertation, it is not because I fail to acknowledge
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their importance, but because they are beyond the scope of
this study.
My purpose was to examine the role played by key
political and managerial elites in the emergence of a
Keynesian order. In this sense, I was limited to examining
one aspect of the creation of the Keynesian political
economy, the efforts to reform from above. Its focus was
on the conflicts between different groups of capitalists
and between contending policymakers, not on the conflicts
between workers and capitalists. Left out of the picture
are the struggles from below. Yet, if we are to develop a
more comprehensive understanding of the creation of the
political economy of mass consumption we need to start
moving in the direction of studies that deal with the
conjunction between struggles from below and reforms from
above
.
Second, I need to do a better job of contextualizing
the ideological development of the Taylor Society. That
is, I need to place this development in relation to other
intellectual and social developments of the period. For
example, how did the rise of international communism and
World War I affect the way the Taylorites conceptualized
the relationship between capital and state? What are the
sources of influences in the ideological development of
the Taylor Society? What are the institutional bases
fostering the development of these ideas? What is the
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relationship of the Taylor Society to the Russell Sage
Foundation and other foundations? What is the relation of
the Taylor Society to theorists of abundance as Simon
Patten? What did Taylorists owe to Progressivism? What was
the influence of socialists ideas over the the Taylorites?
What was the influence of engineers such as Thorstein
Veblen? These are some of the questions that need to be
addressed to better understand the intellectual development
of the Taylor Society.
Third, I need to further develop the discussion of the
Taylor Society's shift to the problem of industrial
relations. Specifically, I need to elaborate on the
Taylorites' conception of industrial democracy. What did
the Taylor Society mean by industrial democracy? What did
it mean by workers' consent? Was the Taylor Society
syndicalist? Also important, is to discuss in detail the
involvement of the Taylor Society in the union-management
cooperation schemes developed during the 1920s. What were
the objectives of these cooperation plans? What were their
results? What was the contribution of the Taylor Society
to these plans? The rapprochement between the Taylor
Society and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) should
also be addressed in detail. What factors led to this
rapprochement? What specifically was the relationship
between the Taylor Society and the AFL? What role did the
Taylor Society play within the labor movement?
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Furthermore, it is important to discuss the relationship
between the Taylor Society and the CIO during the 1930s.
What role did the Taylor Society play in the emergence of
the CIO? What role did it play afterwards?
Fourth, the dissertation needs to explore in more
detail the ideological positions within the Taylor Society.
Did the Taylor Society represent a unified ideological
"position," or were there important ideological differences
within the Taylor Society? If so, what were these
differences? Did they reflect differences between sectors
within the society? Put differently, were there
ideological differences between businessmen and management-
engineers, or between businessmen and social scientists
within the Taylor Society? Were businessmen like Henry
Dennison and Henry Kendall more conservative in their
political outlook than engineers such as Morris Cooke and
social scientists such as Mary Van Kleeck and Harlow S.
Person? Moreover, did the social-democratic perspective of
Cooke, Van Kleeck, and Person represent a general
perspective shared by the organization, or did it represent
an exceptional case. Finally, it would be interesting to
trace figures such as Cooke and Van Kleeck into the 1940s
and 1950s to see were they stood in relation to their
previously held positions, and what role they played in the
political struggles of those decades.
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